(Deutsche Welle Chinese website) From November 12 to 13, 2026, the 5th Berlin Taiwan Conference was held in Berlin, Germany. Our reporter interviewed Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the Indo-Pacific Program of the German Marshall Fund (GMF), and asked questions about the U.S.’s Taiwan policy after the midterm elections and Europe’s role in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.
Deutsche Welle: After the midterm elections in the United States, the Democratic Party gained a majority in both houses of Congress. Does this mean that Congress will play a greater role in restricting the Trump administration's Taiwan policy?
Glaser: The U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not change significantly in the next two years. The top priority for Democratic lawmakers in the next two years will be to fulfill the promises made to domestic voters during the campaign, including lowering the cost of living and improving social welfare. If progress cannot be made on domestic issues, it will be difficult for the Democratic Party to win the presidential election in two years.
Secondly, the president and the executive branch still have considerable power in policy areas such as tariffs, and the restrictive role that Congress can play is relatively limited. Congress can hold hearings and require executive branch officials to testify, but its policy influence is not without boundaries.
In addition, the U.S. Congress’s support for Taiwan has a cross-party basis, and I will pay special attention to whether the Six Assurances Act (Six Assurances Act) has a chance to make progress in the future. The bill made little progress during the first two years of the Trump administration. After the midterm elections, it is worth watching whether Congress is willing to promote this bill, and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will play a key role in determining whether the bill can enter the legislative process. Overall, I don't expect much change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
Note: In 1982, the United States and the People's Republic of China issued the "August 17 Communique", committing to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. In response to Taiwan's concerns about security, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration proposed "six guarantees" to Taiwan, including that the United States would not agree to set a date for terminating arms sales to Taiwan, nor would it change its position on Taiwan's sovereignty.
Deutsche Welle: The US arms sales plan of approximately US$14 billion to Taiwan has yet to be officially advanced. What impact do you think this will have?
Glaser: This $14 billion arms sales plan has obviously been put on hold, but it has not been cancelled. It has not yet entered the process of formally notifying Congress, the next step in the process of moving forward with arms sales. I believe that delay in advancing this arms sale will bring several costs.
First, Taiwan cannot enter the production schedule of relevant weapons and equipment until the United States officially notifies Congress. Arms production itself takes time, so procedural delays also mean that Taiwan's acquisition of equipment will be further delayed. Second, it will damage U.S. credibility among its allies, especially Japan’s confidence in U.S. security commitments. Third, and my biggest concern: the longer this drags out, the more likely China will think it has influence, or even veto power, over what weapons the United States sells to Taiwan and when. This is very worrying.
During the Biden administration, the United States has made a lot of progress in normalizing arms sales to Taiwan, and has gradually begun to process Taiwan's applications in the same way as it handles arms sales needs from other countries: after receiving the needs, it will proceed with review and approval, and then relevant notifications will be submitted to Congress.
The Trump administration has also promoted arms sales to Taiwan, which deserves recognition. In December 2025, Trump approved an arms sales package to Taiwan worth US$11.1 billion, which was the largest single arms sale to Taiwan in US history. But this does not mean that the United States has done enough, nor does it mean that it does not need to continue arms sales to Taiwan in the future.
This US$14 billion arms sales plan was informally approved by the relevant congressional committees in January last year, but has actually been on hold for 11 months. I don’t think the United States will formally notify Congress of arms sales until the next two summits between Trump and Xi Jinping are over.
Deutsche Welle: Could this arms sale to Taiwan become a bargaining chip in Sino-US trade negotiations?
Gretchen: No. I don't think this is a deal or a quid pro quo in negotiations between the two parties. My view is that President Trump unilaterally decided to hold off on this arms sale because it was something Xi Jinping did not want to see. The real question is how long Trump is prepared to delay the decision.
Deutsche Welle: Taiwan will hold nine-in-one local elections on November 28. Will the election results affect Taiwan's diplomatic relations with the United States and other countries?
Glaser: I don’t think local elections will affect Taiwan’s current foreign policy. Taiwan's foreign policy is determined by the president, not local mayors or local councils.
Deutsche Welle: So, are these local elections likely to affect the 2028 presidential election?
Glaser: It's possible, but before we actually see the election results, I think it's too early to make a judgment. The competition in many local constituencies is fierce. It is unclear whether the DPP can win Taipei and New Taipei. The Kuomintang even thinks it has a chance to win Kaohsiung. Before the election results are truly announced, it is not appropriate to prematurely judge Taiwan’s future political direction.
Deutsche Welle: Trump's remarks have caused some European countries to question whether the United States is still reliable. Do you think Europe should take greater responsibility in supporting Taiwan?
Glaser: It’s not surprising that President Trump’s public comments have led people to believe that the United States may no longer be reliable. But I think if you look at what's actually happening, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is very strong. Cooperation between the two sides in the fields of economy, science and technology and security continues to deepen. Therefore, the actual situation is very different from the impression formed by focusing solely on Trump's remarks.
As for Europe, Taiwan is geographically far away from Europe, but if any accident occurs in the Taiwan Strait, even if it is not a full-scale war, even if China interferes with foreign ships passing through the Taiwan Strait, it will have an immediate impact on European countries.
Therefore, I think European countries and the EU should make it clear that they have important interests in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Europe can also strengthen its relationship with Taiwan and find ways to support Taiwan as each sees fit. Where possible, especially in leadership-level communications, send a clear message directly to Xi Jinping: Any behavior that changes the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force or coercion is unacceptable.
