When talking about competition between the United States and China, Taiwan is accustomed to thinking of it as a military risk in the Taiwan Strait. Military aircraft, warships, and missiles are of course real pressure, but if you only focus on this area, you will only see the corner of the chessboard. RAND, a well-known American think tank, released in September a study on "The Scope and Nature of U.S.-China Competition" supported by the U.S. Congress's "Global Competition Analysis" research program and conducted for the U.S. Department of War. The report classified the competition between the United States and China mainly in seven areas: "domestic economy, science and technology, international economy, diplomacy, military, information and ideology and culture, resources and raw materials"; among them, technology and domestic economy are the two bottom pillars. Gaining advantages in AI R&D and deployment may become a key pivot in overall competition and have far-reaching impacts.
The competition between the United States and China is not just in a single field, but in the long-term competition over who can connect technology, industry, finance, talent, allies and governance effectiveness into a network. China has not completely surpassed the United States, and RAND does not regard this competition as a typical hegemonic transition; the image closer to reality is that the two powers have been at the top of power for a long time, competing for advantages in several high-leverage areas. If Taiwan still thinks of itself as a small country sandwiched between the two powers, policy discussions will lose focus. The question we ask is which dependencies become weaknesses in times of crisis? What capabilities can make Taiwan a key node that others cannot ignore?
Taiwan's first strategic issue is semiconductors. The value does not lie in the fabs themselves, but in the ecosystem formed by R&D, equipment, materials, talents, energy, information security and international customers. When the competition between the United States and China enters AI, advanced manufacturing and technology standards, if Taiwan's value is limited to OEM production for others, risks will be concentrated; if it can extend its manufacturing advantages to joint research and development, advanced packaging, system integration, standards and talent networks, Taiwan can participate in the formation of rules instead of passively accepting them.
The second topic is resilience. RAND specifically pointed out that national resilience in peace and war will affect the outcome of competition. For Taiwan, resilience cannot only be equated with armaments; long-term consumption of electricity, communications, submarine cables, ports, finance, medical care, network security and information environment may be more effective than a one-time military shock. What we need to measure is not only whether we can withstand the first blow, but also whether society can continue to operate under pressure, whether companies can continue to produce, and whether governments can maintain trustworthy governance.
The third topic is international networks. RAND believes that the choice of third-party countries may profoundly change the competition between the United States and China. This means that Taiwan’s diplomacy and security should not only count the number of diplomatic allies or items of arms sales, but also depend on whether it can be embedded in a cooperation network in technology, supply chain, information security, energy and democratic governance. The more countries' daily interests are connected with Taiwan, the more peace across the Taiwan Strait will be more than Taiwan's own problem.
Therefore, when Taiwan interprets the scope and nature of competition between the United States and China, it is important to take stock of whether its national power structure can be "deep, thin, thick, and broad." That is to make irreplaceability deeper, single point dependence thinner, social resilience thicker, and international connections wider. RAND’s last reminder to the United States is also worth learning from Taiwan. The most important means of competition is to strengthen the foundation of one's own vitality rather than destroying opponents; competition, maintaining stability and avoiding conflicts are not mutually exclusive. Taiwan's truly reliable security has never been about whether others are willing to help, but whether one is worthy of being connected, can be trusted, and has the ability to hold on.
