1. Is there a trend in Washington policy circles that the United States will withdraw from the second island chain?
Although the official U.S. strategy still emphasizes establishing denial capabilities in the first and second island chains, including deploying NMESIS anti-ship missiles in the Philippines, strengthening decentralized operations, and improving survivability and strike capabilities within the first island chain, different voices have emerged in Washington policy circles. The Defense Priorities Foundation published the "Asia's Second Island Chain Strategy" in September 2026, advocating that the US military should reduce its military commitments in the frontier areas of the first island chain such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and move its main military forces to the second island chain nodes such as Guam, Northern Mariana, Palau, and Micronesia to reduce the risk of battle damage caused by Chinese missiles and long-range strikes. Although this is not an official U.S. policy, it reflects the emergence of voices in Washington rethinking military deployment in the Western Pacific.
2. Security cooperation between Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines is imperative
Faced with China’s military activities and gray zone pressure in the first island chain, security in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea has become highly interconnected. Security cooperation between Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines is therefore more necessary. The Bashi Strait and the Miyako Strait are important throats of the first island chain. Once a conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait, Japan and the Philippines will also be directly affected. The three parties can prioritize intelligence sharing, maritime situation awareness (MDA) and gray zone coordination, establish reporting mechanisms for maritime militia and cyber attacks, and gradually promote cooperation in coast guard search and rescue to enhance the overall security resilience of the first island chain.
3. Drone supply chain points to Taiwan-India cooperation
The world is actively establishing a "non-red supply chain" to create new space for drone cooperation between Taiwan and India. Taiwan has semiconductors, information communications, PCBs, optoelectronics, motors, sensors and precision manufacturing technologies, and is well-positioned to establish a reliable supply chain that excludes Chinese capital and key components. India has a huge labor force, engineering talent, domestic demand market and manufacturing cost advantages. Coupled with the "Make in India" and national defense autonomy policies, the two sides can form a "Taiwan Technology + Made in India" model: Taiwan provides chips, flight controls, communications and key electronic components, and India is responsible for airframe manufacturing, assembly and large-scale production, further jointly entering markets such as the United States, Japan, and Europe that value supply chain security.
4. Taiwan should still pay attention to the attitudes of ASEAN countries towards the "one-China principle"
As Taiwan deepens its relations with Southeast Asia, it must also note that some countries are getting closer to Beijing on Taiwan-related discussions and military security. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar publicly stated in August 2026 that "Taiwan is part of China." The 2025 China-Malaysia Joint Statement even stated that "Taiwan is an inalienable territory of the People's Republic of China." On the other hand, the Chinese and Indonesian navies will conduct joint navigation exercises in the waters east of Taiwan for the first time in August 2026, which also has certain political and strategic symbols. Therefore, in addition to continuing to promote economic and trade and new southbound cooperation, Taiwan should also strengthen its observation of ASEAN countries' Taiwan-related discussions, maritime security and military interactions to prevent Beijing from gradually transforming its "one-China principle" into a regional diplomatic narrative.
5. Conclusion: From the “New Southbound” to the “Indo-Pacific Partnership”
Cooperation between Taiwan and ASEAN and South Asian countries is entering a new stage. In the future, we should not only focus on trade and Taiwanese investment, but should establish a multi-level network of supply chain, technology, talent, education and security, so that the New Southbound Policy can be upgraded from "market fragmentation" to "strategic connection". Economically, we will integrate into the Indian and ASEAN markets, industrially, we will establish a resilient supply chain, socially, we will deepen talent and education exchanges, and in terms of security, we will gradually expand cooperation from non-traditional security.
The core is not to ask ASEAN or South Asian countries to choose sides between Taiwan and China, but to make these countries realize that maintaining stable and in-depth cooperation with Taiwan is in line with their economic development and national interests. Only in this way can the New Southbound Policy transcend a mere economic and trade policy and gradually develop into an important long-term strategy for Taiwan's participation in the Indo-Pacific region.
