The latest land-based intercontinental ballistic missile "Dongfeng-61" is estimated to have a maximum range of about 18,000 kilometers and can carry 12 nuclear warheads. (Reuters file photo)
China Central Television reported that China's latest land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "Dongfeng-61" is being put into regular military training of the People's Liberation Army at a speed much faster than past intercontinental missiles. This has attracted attention from the outside world as to whether the efficiency of the Communist Army in integrating new strategic missiles into its nuclear forces is improving.
Hong Kong's "South China Morning Post" reported on the 8th that Shao Yongling, a former researcher of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, told CCTV that the DF-61 has made its first public appearance at the Beijing military parade in September 2025 and is now being put into regular training. Its progress is "much faster than the cycle of traditional intercontinental missiles forming combat effectiveness."
She pointed out that this type of missile has completed research and development, finalization, trial installation and reliability verification before its debut, which shows that the technology is quite mature; and it is highly compatible with the existing command, communication and support network of the Rocket Force, allowing the troops to quickly become familiar with this new weapon.
Chinese officials have not announced the technical specifications of the Dongfeng-61 so far. According to estimates from different agencies, its range may be between 12,000 kilometers and 15,000 kilometers, while the defense intelligence company Janes speculates that its maximum range is about 18,000 kilometers and can carry up to 12 nuclear warheads. The current nuclear arsenal of the Rocket Force also includes intercontinental missiles such as Dongfeng-5, Dongfeng-31 and Dongfeng-41.
Western analysts have different interpretations of the rapid progress of Dongfeng-61. Ankit Panda, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), said that judging from public sources and U.S. intelligence assessments, early Chinese intercontinental missiles did take longer to enter service, and the progress of the DF-61 "seems to be significantly faster."
However, Tong Zhao, also a Carnegie scholar, pointed out that if the DF-61 is a completely new design, this speed is indeed extremely unusual; but if it is just an upgraded version of the DF-41 with improvements in launch procedures, survivability, or the ability to penetrate missile defense systems, this speed seems reasonable.
Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, a researcher at the Nuclear Information Program of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), further explained that the DF-61 and DF-41 have almost the same launch vehicles and missile launchers. "We cannot assume based on this that the Rockets will become faster or more efficient in developing new intercontinental missiles."
In addition to the research and development progress, the actual combat readiness status of Dongfeng-61 is also difficult to verify. A former U.S. intelligence analyst who requested anonymity said that he has not yet seen any satellite images that can confirm that the DF-61 unit has achieved combat capability. The deployment of missiles also depends on the improvement of infrastructure and whether there is sufficient production capacity for missiles and launch vehicles.
In terms of broad strategic implications, David Logan, an assistant professor of security studies at Tufts University in the United States, believes that the continuous improvement of the survivability of China's nuclear forces and reducing the vulnerability to a first strike of U.S. nuclear weapons may make Beijing bolder in the use of military force; but confidence in the survivability of its own weapons may also alleviate the fear of eager use of weapons due to destruction, thereby reducing the risk of accidental escalation.
Panda pointed out that systems such as the Dongfeng-61 will lead to increased U.S. uncertainty about China’s flexible expansion and ability to shape strategic force, which may exacerbate U.S. insecurity and intensify competitive pressure.
