Special prosecutor's search and seizure by the National Election Commission for 'post facto modification of voting records'... 10 people involved booked (comprehensive report 3)

(Seoul = Yonhap News) Reporter Hwang Jae-ha, Choi Won-jeong, and Choi Yun-seon = The National Election Commission's special prosecutor team, Lee Tae-han, who is investigating the ballot paper shortage in the June 3 local elections, detected allegations of forgery and alteration of the National Election Commission's voting records and began a mandatory investigation.

The special prosecutor's team is expanding the investigation by registering about 10 National Election Commission employees as suspects, believing they conspired to 'edit voting records after the fact.'

The special investigation team identified circumstances in which voting records from polling places where ballot paper shortages occurred were forged and altered after the fact at the direction of the National Election Commission, and conducted a search and seizure of the National Election Commission and the Seoul Metropolitan Election Commission on the 4th.

The charges listed in the search and seizure warrant include forgery of official documents, use of forged official documents, and dereliction of duty.

The voting record is an official document that records how voting was conducted at the polling place on the day of the election, the management and issuance of ballot papers, and voting conditions.

On the day of voting, if a local government official acting on behalf of the National Election Commission at a polling place prepares a voting record in his or her capacity as a voting manager, he or she must seal it after the counting of votes and preserve it until the end of the term of office of the elected person.

The special investigation team determined that due to a paper shortage in this local election, 'unnumbered ballot papers' without serial numbers printed on them were distributed to about 140 polling places and actually used.

Ballot papers must have a serial number printed on them according to the Public Official Election Act.

If the ballot paper is corrupted or damaged, it can be replaced by writing a serial number on the unnumbered paper, but the explanation is that there is no legal basis for using it even when there is a shortage of ballot paper.

The special investigation team suspects that the National Election Commission, as it was expected that liability charges or lawsuits would continue due to the use of unnumbered ballots, ordered the election commissions at each level to record the voting records after the election and then collected the results.

It is reported that on June 5, two days after the election, the National Election Commission issued instructions to each provincial and provincial election commission to 'complement and organize poorly prepared voting records after the fact, as related data will be disclosed to the outside world.'

Accordingly, it was revealed that the National Election Commission at each level randomly took out the voting records even 4 to 5 days after the end of voting and wrote serial numbers on unnumbered ballot papers, or added information such as 'anticipating a shortage of ballot papers and requesting measures to the National Election Commission' in the special information column.

The special investigation team believes that even though there was a separate procedure for correcting the completed voting records, it was not followed and that the National Election Commission was also informed of the results of this correction.

The special investigation team explained that among the 140 polling places nationwide that received unnumbered ballots due to a paper shortage, forged or altered voting records were found in at least 40 places.

It is presumed that the forged and altered voting records were later collected by the National Election Commission and submitted to the National Assembly as is, even after the paper shortage situation arose.

In relation to this, the special prosecutor's team was found to have booked about 10 people, including the head of the National Election Commission's election management department and employees of the Seoul, Gyeonggi-do, and Incheon city election departments, on charges of dereliction of duty and forgery and falsification of official documents.

Forgery and alteration of voting records is a charge that was not revealed in the previous investigation by the joint investigation headquarters of the prosecution and police, and was newly discovered by the National Election Commission's special prosecutor team while analyzing data obtained from nine election commissions across the country where ballot shortages occurred.

On this day, the special investigation team simultaneously searched and seized the offices of the Chairman of the National Election Commission, the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, the Director of Election Policy Office, the Office of the First Director of Elections, the Election Management Department, the Office of Planning and Finance, and the Office of the Secretary-General and the Office of the Election and General Affairs Department of the Seoul Metropolitan Election Commission.

This can be interpreted as concentrating investigative power to trace the approval line of vote record manipulation from the bottom up and identify the systematic intervention of the ‘higher ranks’ of the National Election Commission.

Separately, the special investigation team discovered circumstances where there was bidding corruption in the early voting paper production project and secured related data through a search and seizure of the offices of the Election Infrastructure Division of the National Election Commission and the office of company A, a manufacturer of ballot issuing machines, on charges of breach of trust.

The special investigation team discovered circumstances in which the National Election Commission provided preferential treatment to Company A, such as leaking the business plan before the bidding announcement in the project to manufacture the 2024 model early voting paper issuance machine and purchase consumables.

After evaluating the performance of the equipment, Company A violated the contract by arbitrarily modifying the ballot paper machine to recognize only ink produced by the company, but the National Election Commission turned a blind eye to this.

Furthermore, local election commissions at all levels across the country changed their internal guidelines to purchase consumables such as ink from small businesses or small business owners only through private contracts with Company A.

The special investigation team believes that the National Election Commission created an exclusive supply structure that allowed Company A to sell not only ballot issuing machines but also consumables such as ink during the 10-year period of use.

The total business size amounts to 45.9 billion won.

Previously, on the 2nd and 3rd, the special investigation team searched and seized 18 departments, including the office of the Chairman of the National Election Commission, in connection with suspicions of unfair payment of fair election campaign expenses to the Chairman and non-standing members of the National Election Commission.