Al-Nour: There is no ruling for Al-Burhan and Hemedti as military personnel

The Moroccan Monarch, King Mohammed VI, called for the new legislative and governmental mandate to constitute a real turning point in continuing Morocco’s ambition as a rising and reliable economic power, while achieving balance and harmony between economic growth and promoting social and spatial justice. He stressed putting youth issues at the forefront of public policy concerns.

The King said, in his opening speech of the first session of the first legislative year of the twelfth legislative term, today, Friday, in Rabat, that this term comes in an exceptional circumstance full of opportunities that may not be repeated, to continue achievements in various fields, offering his congratulations to the members of the House of Representatives for the confidence of the voters.

In the context of his talk about youth, King Mohammed VI stressed the need to put their issues at the forefront of the concerns of governance bodies, through an integrated vision that guarantees equal opportunities, and includes education, rehabilitation, and economic inclusion.

The royal speech linked this trend to enhancing young people’s confidence in their abilities for social advancement, in their homeland’s institutions, and in the opportunities it provides them to build a better future in light of freedom, dignity, and stability.

Regarding territorial management, the King stressed that the real challenge for the next stage is field work at the territorial level, by identifying the real problems of each region and working to find realistic solutions to them.

He explained that promoting integrated development, improving public services, and stimulating productive investment are closely linked to the path of advanced regionalization and activating administrative decentralization, warning that the delays and imbalances that impede decentralization and decentralization reflect negatively on economic and social development programs, and hinder responding to the real concerns of citizens.

In this regard, King Mohammed VI stressed that “it is no longer acceptable for any delay or procrastination in the full implementation of the decentralization charter,” as this requires transferring powers and the necessary human and financial resources from the center to the regions and regions.

He also called for putting an end to the obstacles that hinder the work of the region’s institutions, through a clearer definition of competencies, increasing its human and material resources, organizing relations between the state and the regions, and establishing coordination and contracting mechanisms that allow the regions to make decisions and implement projects.

On the economic level, the King called for accelerating planned infrastructure projects and launching a new generation of major strategies, especially in the areas of water, energy and food security, industrial take-off, digital economy and artificial intelligence. He also urged rationalization and development of the Kingdom's capabilities in the field of strategic reserves and securing the supply of basic materials, calling on the national private sector to rise to a strategic actor in the development transformation, and to be more proactive and innovative, and capable of creating job, investment and export opportunities.

Regarding the issue of immigration and the crisis that broke out with Spain, King Mohammed VI said that the balanced approach adopted by Morocco in managing the phenomenon of immigration has produced tangible results, but the current model of cooperation in this field has become outdated, as confirmed by repeated crises.

In this context, the King stressed that the partnership with Spain has witnessed important developments in various fields, including the fight against illegal immigration, but it is now facing major challenges linked to some overriding legal requirements and judicial decisions that are far from reality. He explained that these requirements and decisions, unfortunately, prevent the deportation of minor children and people who are impersonating refugees, and fuel the ambitions of criminal networks.

Speaking about the irresponsible statements issued by some political and media circles, King Mohammed VI stressed that the partnership is a political choice and voluntary commitment, and will never be the subject of any pressure, threat or blackmail, stressing that Morocco will present to its partners a clear and practical strategic document that establishes a new aspect of the partnership, in a way that enhances joint development and economic competitiveness.

In a message to members of the legislative institution, King Mohammed VI affirmed that the parliamentary mandate is “a trust, a political commitment, and a moral contract” that links parliamentarians to citizens, calling on members of parliament to assume their national responsibility, saying: “Be - may God protect you - live up to this national responsibility that you bear before God, before citizens, and before history.”

King Mohammed VI was accompanied by Crown Prince Moulay El Hassan, Prince Moulay Rachid, and Prince Moulay Ahmed.

Abdel Wahed Nour, head of the Sudan Liberation Movement and Army, rejected the participation of Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” in any future ruling in their military capacities, stipulating that those who want to engage in political action must give up their status and military uniform and resort to elections.

Nour stressed, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, that his movement would not side with either side of the war, and would not participate in a settlement that would return the Islamists to power, calling for the building of a new national army to which all forces, including his movement’s forces, would be subject, according to unified standards.

Abdul Wahid Nour is one of the most prominent leaders of the movements that took up arms in Darfur in 2003 to protest the marginalization of the region. He rejected the Abuja Agreement in 2006, which was signed by the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir with a wing of his movement led by Minni Arko Minawi.

Politics after the suit

Al-Nour linked his position on Al-Burhan and Hemedti to the demands of the December 2018 revolution, stressing that the future of government must be civilian, and that possessing forces does not give their leaders the right to political participation. He said: “Whoever wants to establish a party or present a project to the Sudanese can do so after leaving the military institution, provided that the vote is up to the voters.”

The protests that broke out in December 2018 led to the overthrow of the National Salvation regime headed by Al-Bashir in April 2019, followed by the formation of a transitional authority with the participation of civilians and the military. However, the October 2021 coup led by Al-Burhan and Hemedti cut off the path of civil transition, before the outbreak of war between the army and the “Rapid Support” in April 2023, against the backdrop of the power struggle and disagreement over arrangements for integrating forces.

Al-Nour stressed that his movement is not fighting alongside either party. Regarding talk about understandings with the “Rapid Support” in Darfur, he expressed his welcome for any understanding that prevents confrontation, without confirming the existence of an agreement or specifying its content, stressing that his movement will defend itself if it is attacked by any party.

He explained that the presence of his forces in Jebel Marra, the stronghold of his movement in Darfur, preceded the current war, and that they maintained their positions despite confrontations with the army, Janjaweed, militias, and splinter movements.

He warned against the spread of the repercussions of the war to neighboring countries, and rejected the division of Sudan, considering that preserving its unity requires addressing the reasons that push some of its components to demand self-determination or secession. He cited the secession of South Sudan in 2011, warning against repeating the experience if the roots of the conflict remain unaddressed.

Nour called for a meeting to address issues of identity, the relationship between religion and the state, and the monopoly of power, in addition to managing diversity, resources, and the form of governance. He said: “Equal citizenship and the rule of law are the guarantee of unity,” stressing that political differences should be resolved through elections and parliament.

Nour said that his movement concluded, after the outbreak of the 2023 war, that neutrality alone is not enough, so in October 2023 it launched an initiative called for by parties, armed struggle movements, civil society organizations, civil leaders, and national figures, with the aim of stopping and ending the war, confronting hate speech, and restoring democratic civil transformation. It later moved to trying to form a front for civil forces that rejected the war and were not aligned with its two sides, to restore the December Revolution and its goals. The movement proposed standards for the representation of youth, women, resistance committees, civil society, civil administrations, and national figures.

Contrary to secularism

Al-Nour narrated the existence of a disagreement over secularism, indicating that the Umma Party agrees with the content of secularism, but has reservations about the term. He pointed to the formation of a committee headed by Dr. Abdullah Hamdok, the former transitional prime minister, who contacted Abdul Aziz Al-Hilu, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/North Sector, regarding a formulation that stipulates the separation of religion from the state. He added that the Umma Party requested a text with the same meaning without using terminology associated with secularism, and was given two weeks for consultation within its institutions.

He said that the division of “Taqaddum” and the emergence of “Resilience” and then “Establishment” came after those deliberations. “Taqadum”, a coordination of civil forces led by Hamdok, had split in February 2025 due to a dispute over the formation of a parallel government, and those opposing this option announced the “Samoud” coalition led by Hamdok. Al-Nour stressed that his movement will not continue the initiative if it deviates from the goal of restoring the December Revolution and establishing civil rule, stressing his refusal to join the Islamists by saying: “We will not go to the Kazan.” “Al-Kizan” is a common Sudanese expression used to refer to the Islamist movement, especially those associated with the Bashir regime, which ruled the country from the 1989 coup until its overthrow in 2019.

Al-Nur called for dissolving the existing army and building a new national army after stopping the war, with all forces, including his movement’s forces, being subject to unified standards.

He said: “The army does not rule. The army is an institution of the state,” considering that its rebuilding must end the monopoly of its leadership and its interference in power, and limit its mission to protecting the land, the people, and the constitution.

He based his call on what he described as the continuation of the structure inherited from colonialism, accusing specific elites of controlling the leadership and using the military institution to suppress the demands of other regions.

Al-Nour accused the army of committing crimes in the South, the Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains and Darfur, using chemical weapons, citing a report issued by Amnesty International in 2016 on Jebel Marra. The organization had said that it had collected evidence suggesting the use of chemical weapons against civilians, while the Sudanese government at the time denied those findings and rejected the evidence on which the report was based.

Al-Nour described the existing army as “the largest militia,” and considered it affiliated with the Islamists, calling for the building of a military institution that represents the nationalities of Sudan and its regions, according to clear conditions for service, the qualification of officers, and the formation of leadership. He stressed that his movement's forces will not be excluded from this operation.

Accounting within the movement

In response to accusations of violations against members of the movement, Nour said that anyone who wants to leave is available, while those who remain are subject to organizational regulations and military law. He stressed that accountability includes the leadership, including himself, and that the movement has judicial institutions. He accused some of those leaving the movement of using these accusations to justify their move to the regime against which they rebelled, declaring his readiness to appear before an international court or the courts of a state that respects the rule of law. He said he was in Kenya and was ready to appear before its courts if a case was brought against him.

He refused to reduce the movement to his person, saying: “This Sudan Liberation Movement does not have the right of Abdul Wahid,” stressing that it could choose another president. However, in his answer, he did not provide details about the fate of the members who were accused.

Regarding the conditions of civilians, he said that the movement’s areas of control in Jebel Marra (West Darfur) receive, according to his estimates, more than seven million Sudanese. He added that his forces provide them with security, but they lack the necessary capabilities to provide food, water, and housing. He called on organizations to help them and journalists to visit the region. He also refused to classify his movement as “Darfur movements,” considering that its project relates to all of Sudan, and that limiting the forces coming from the regions to local demands deprives them of participating in determining national policies.

Negotiate terms

Al-Nour denied refusing to negotiate in principle, explaining that his movement negotiated with the Bashir regime in two rounds in the Chadian city of Abéché in 2003, and then participated in seven rounds in Abuja, Nigeria, between 2004 and 2006. The Abuja negotiations ended with an agreement in May 2006 signed by Minni Minawi’s faction, while the Nour faction and the Justice and Equality Movement rejected it because it did not meet their political and security demands. Nour said that this experience led him to refuse to return to negotiations with the regime, after he concluded that it was seeking to absorb its opponents with positions and money, not to achieve peace. He added: “The revolution will never remain part of the regime.” He then cited his rejection of alliances, the movement’s cooperation with the Justice and Equality Movement, and its participation in the National Democratic Rally, the Revolutionary Front, the “New Dawn,” and the Paris Declaration in 2014.

He attributed the departure of the Revolutionary Front, which brought together armed movements opposed to Bashir, to its transformation, in his estimation, from a front to overthrow the regime into a negotiating front seeking a “soft landing” through the “Sudan Call,” in reference to reaching a settlement with the regime instead of overthrowing it.

On Friday, an explosion in an ammunition warehouse rocked the city of Misrata in western Libya, where armed formations are widely spread, sparking a state of panic among citizens and prompting members of those formations to take out a number of crawlers and move them away from the site of the fire.

The explosion that took place in the city's Yader area, and the accompanying huge fire, rising columns of smoke, and scattering of ammunition in the air, brought to the forefront similar incidents that had occurred over the past months, amid demands from citizens to evacuate these sites in order to preserve lives and property.

Weapon stores within residential communities and neighborhoods constitute a renewed and accumulated challenge to the interim “national unity” government, headed by Abdul Hamid Al-Dabaiba, in western Libya, and raise citizens’ concerns, despite the issuance of a previous decision to evacuate these stores from populated areas.

Security units and field patrols went to the site of the accident to support the National Safety Authority teams, secure the area and help control the fire, amid warnings of the dangers of ammunition and explosives present at the site.

There were circulating reports about a missile falling on citizens’ homes as a result of the explosion, without confirmed information regarding the extent of damage or injuries.

While the circumstances of the explosion have not yet become clear, Al-Nabaa channel quoted a military source as saying that “the hypothesis of criminal action exists,” noting that the repeated explosions of ammunition stores in Misrata alone reinforce, in his estimation, “the hypothesis of the existence of criminal action or a plan behind these incidents.” The available information did not include the results of an official investigation that would resolve the causes of the explosion or confirm this hypothesis.

In a precautionary measure, the Criminal Investigation Department branch in the central region called on citizens to immediately move away from the fire site in Yader, warning that the presence of ammunition and explosives may pose a serious danger to lives and property.

The agency stressed the prohibition of approaching the site or gathering in its vicinity, and also warned against touching any suspicious objects or approaching ammunition and waste that may be present in the place, calling on residents to adhere to the instructions of the competent authorities, and to make room for the technical and security teams to perform their tasks.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya had previously announced, at the end of last September, the removal of 14,66 pieces of explosive ordnance from the Al-Suwaihli farm in Misrata within 9 months, with support from the United Nations Mine Action Service.

The mission said that the process of clearing the farm extended from January to September 2026, according to a field report presented by the Libyan Peace Organization during a UN team’s visit to the city last week.

These numbers highlight the extent of the efforts required to deal with explosive ordnance and its remnants in the city, even though the announced data does not specify a link between the munitions that were removed from the Al-Suwaihli farm and the ammunition depot, which exploded in the Yader area.

With the repeated incidents of explosions in ammunition stores, there are renewed fears of residents being exposed to risks, not limited to direct explosions, but extending to flying shells and shrapnel and the possibility of other ammunition exploding, which brings to the fore demands to move storage sites away from residential communities, and to strengthen safety procedures and control over them.

On August 22, a violent explosion rocked an ammunition warehouse in the Al-Saket area, south of the city of Misrata, without any casualties recorded. In early September last year, 16 people were injured as a result of an ammunition depot explosion in the city, which includes large armed formations.

The dangers of munitions are not limited to explosions, as official figures indicate that 487 victims have been killed as a result of mines and explosive ordnance since May 2020, including 175 dead, 312 injured, and 87 children.