The Houthi militias pushed new military reinforcements from Sanaa, Dhamar and Ibb towards Taiz Governorate, in an effort to compensate for their human losses and strengthen their combat positions, amid faltering efforts to attract new fighters from the population and tribes in the areas under their control.
Informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the reinforcements that moved during the past hours included dozens of military vehicles carrying hundreds of militants, heading to the fighting fronts in Taiz, especially the western front of the city, which is witnessing continuous confrontations.
The sources explained that the majority of the recruits included in the reinforcements belong to the marginalized group of dark-skinned people, in addition to security personnel and officers who were withdrawn from police stations and prisons and attached to the formations heading to the fronts, in an indication of the pressures the group is facing to provide new fighters and fill the shortage in its ranks.
Sending these reinforcements comes in light of the group’s declining ability to attract more fighters from citizens and tribesmen, with the escalation of popular and tribal rejection of the mobilization campaigns. This prompts it to transfer elements from several governorates under its control to reinforce the front lines.
Residents in the areas of Haziz in Sana'a, Ma'bar in Dhamar Governorate, Habeish Junction and the Al-Qaeda area in Ibb Governorate monitored Houthi military convoys crossing the main road linking the three governorates to Taiz, last Saturday and Sunday evening.
Residents said that the vehicles were passing in successive batches, a few minutes apart, carrying Houthi militants, in movements that appeared to be part of an organized transportation process to strengthen the group’s military presence in the governorate.
The sources stated that the recruits were transferred after receiving intensive combat training supervised by field commanders, noting that the movements were preceded by transfers of weapons and various military equipment to a number of fighting fronts in Taiz.
The Houthi reinforcements coincide with the continuation of confrontations in the vicinity of the city of Taiz, amid human and military losses incurred by the Houthi group, according to sources, at a time when it seeks to strengthen its positions with more personnel and equipment.
Resorting to recruiting recruits from different governorates, in conjunction with the faltering recruitment of tribesmen and residents, reflects the difficulty of supplying the fronts with fighters, and increases the group’s dependence on mobilization campaigns and transferring members to the front lines.
This move also highlights the cost that the Houthis impose on the population in areas under their control, with more recruits being pushed to the battle fronts instead of responding to the collapse of livelihood and services.
Operation “Yemen Dawn” has entered its fifteenth day, with continued military pressure on the Iranian-backed Houthi militias on the Taiz and Ma’rib fronts, and government attacks continuing to regain the sites it controls, in conjunction with air strikes targeting their gatherings, reinforcements, and fortifications, amid Yemeni military estimates that the Houthis have lost more than 15,000 dead and wounded personnel over the past weeks.
The Yemeni Armed Forces announced the implementation of 1,326 targeting operations during the past twenty-four hours, targeting Houthi gatherings, vehicles, fortifications, and fire sources. They said that the operations resulted, according to a preliminary outcome, in the neutralization of about 370 elements, and the destruction and damage of dozens of military vehicles and means.
In Taiz, confrontations continued on several axes, coinciding with the advance of government forces, supported by popular resistance, in various areas, and the recovery of sites, heavy weapons, and military equipment, at a time when the Houthi group seeks to rearrange its ranks and strengthen its combat positions after the defeat of attacks described as among the most violent during the last two days.
The confrontations were concentrated in the vicinity of Jabal Han and Al-Dhabab, west of the city, and the Al-Shaqab, Al-Aqrodh, and Al-Misrakh fronts in Jabal Sabar in the south, in addition to the Air Defense and Ghurab fronts, northwest of Taiz, while the northern and eastern fronts witnessed intermittent clashes that intensified at intervals.
Government forces made progress in the Al-Sanamat and Al-Sarari areas in the Sabr District, south of Taiz, following an attack that began at dawn on Sunday, according to what military sources reported, which reported heavy losses among the Houthis, and the continuation of operations. The warplanes also launched three raids targeting the group’s gatherings in Tabet al-Danain and the Madarat area, northwest of the city.
In parallel with the Taiz battles, government forces continued to put pressure on the remaining Houthi enclaves in the Bab al-Mandab region, while working to secure the highlands separating the governorates of Taiz and Lahj, in an effort to stabilize the positions that the forces had recovered, and prevent the group from using them to launch counter-attacks, or threaten the lines of movement.
On the eastern front, west of Ma'rib Governorate, the Yemeni Armed Forces reported that they developed their attack towards specific targets after the preliminary fire, and with the support of military aircraft and drones, which targeted the Houthi movements, their reinforcements, and their fire positions. She said that the simultaneous pressure on the southern and western fronts limited the group's ability to maneuver, transfer reserves, and reorganize its forces between the axes.
In a development that reflects the expanding scope of the Houthi attacks, the number of ballistic missiles launched by the group on the city of Marib rose to eight missiles within one day, according to the governorate’s information office.
The office explained that the total number of ballistic missiles and projectiles launched by the group within 72 hours reached 24, warning of the dangers threatening civilians, residential neighborhoods, and civilian facilities, especially in a governorate that hosts large numbers of displaced people.
These attacks coincide with the continuation of government and air strikes on Houthi positions, at a time when Yemeni military estimates indicate that the group has suffered extensive human losses over the past weeks, with operations continuing on more than one front.
In a parallel context, the Houthis' destruction of the ferry located on the Haijat al-Abd road linking Taiz and Lahj raised fears of additional humanitarian and economic repercussions, given the importance of the road in the movement of citizens, and the transport of goods and supplies to Taiz and its associated areas.
In a statement, the Yemeni Ministry of Transport considered the destruction of the facility an attack on the civilian infrastructure, which would disrupt the movement of commercial and service transport, and obstruct the arrival of goods and basic materials, thus doubling the living burdens on the population in light of the difficult economic conditions.
The Ministry called on the international community, the United Nations, and human rights and humanitarian organizations to take action against targeting roads and vital installations, work to assess the damage, and provide the necessary treatments to rehabilitate the road and restore transportation, warning that the continued destruction of infrastructure exacerbates the suffering of citizens and undermines their access to their basic needs.
The road gains additional importance in light of the continuing confrontations in Taiz and the military pressure on its axes, as it represents one of the vital paths for the movement of people and goods between the governorate and the southern regions, while its obstruction increases the difficulty of movement and supply.
In Aden, an expanded security meeting chaired by the Yemeni Minister of Interior, Major General Ibrahim Haidan, discussed developments in the security situation, general mobilization, the level of readiness in the security services in the governorates, and the efforts made to combat crime, pursue wanted elements, and control sabotage cells.
Haidan stressed the importance of coordinating efforts between military and security formations, and supporting the armed forces in Operation “Yemen Dawn,” noting that pursuing Houthi cells and thwarting sabotage plans represent an essential part of protecting the home front and supporting military operations.
The Minister stressed raising the level of vigilance and exchanging information between the security services, in a way that enhances the response to threats and protects citizens and public and private property, at a time when confrontations continue on multiple fronts, and government forces seek to consolidate their field gains and prevent the Houthis from regaining the initiative.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's decision to end his presidential term in 2030, coinciding with his launching an initiative to qualify candidates behind him within the Military Academy, opened a wide political debate about the conditions for running for the presidency in Egypt, and the specifications of the next president.
Positions varied between supporters who see the initiative as “early preparation to ensure an orderly transfer of power,” and others who warn against “turning qualification programs into additional conditions that restrict the process of candidacy and electoral competition,” amid questions about its compatibility with the provisions of the Constitution.
The initiative, which Sisi announced on Saturday, includes preparing groups of doctoral and master’s degree holders from Egyptian and foreign universities, through a 30-month program at the “Egyptian Military Academy, to introduce them to the nature of the state and how to preserve it,” and to provide voters with the opportunity to choose from among those qualified to assume responsibility.
Al-Sisi assumed the presidency of Egypt in 2014, after winning the elections that followed the June 30, 2013 revolution, which overthrew the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, before being re-elected in 2018 and 2023. The Egyptian constitution witnessed amendments in 2019, increasing the duration of the presidential term from four to six years, and allowing Sisi to remain in power until 2030.
The Egyptian president’s speech caused a “shock” in the Egyptian arena, according to the description of the Egyptian journalist Amr Adeeb, who saw that it “caused confusion in the positions of the political forces,” noting that “the opposition had not decided how to deal with him, while the loyalists seemed unable to determine a clear position on him,” according to a blog post on the “X” platform.
Egyptian thinker, politician, and diplomat Dr. Mustafa Al-Feki believes that the political movement and debate that followed President Sisi’s talk about the end of his presidential term in 2030, and the plan for a democratic transfer of power, gain special importance, as they open the way for a broader discussion regarding the future of political life in Egypt.
Al-Fiqi added to Asharq Al-Awsat that this step “is credited to President Sisi, who is the first Egyptian president with a military background since 1952 to take the initiative to announce the end of his presidential term,” considering that this “represents a new sign of hope regarding the possibility of revitalizing political life and creating the atmosphere for a peaceful transfer of power.”
Through the Egyptian media and social media pages, the discrepancy appeared... Ashraf Abu Al-Nasr, assistant head of the “Hama Al-Watan” party, said that Al-Sisi’s statements “reflect an approach to protecting the stability of the state and enhancing the efficiency of its institutions, while selecting officials according to standards of competence, experience, and integrity.”
Representative Tamer Abdel Hamid, a member of the Senate, praised “the trend towards training and qualification, especially preparing doctoral holders through specialized programs at the Military Academy, which contributes to preparing leaders capable of running the state away from courtesies.”
On the other hand, others criticized assigning the preparation of potential candidates to the military academy, warning of its impact on political development and pluralism.
A fundamental aspect of the dispute revolves around Article 141 of the Constitution, which specifies the conditions for running for the presidency, including Egyptian citizenship from Egyptian parents, enjoyment of civil and political rights, performing military service or being legally exempt from it, and that the candidate must not be less than forty years old.
The constitutional text does not require obtaining a doctorate, or passing training at a military academy, but it stipulates that the law determines other candidacy conditions. Article 142 also specifies the mechanisms for accepting candidates, through parliamentary recommendation or popular support in accordance with specific controls.
Therefore, the extent to which the training program may be transformed into a binding condition for candidacy depends on the proposed legal formula and the extent of its compatibility with the constitution, and not on the principle of preparing leaders in itself, according to what is raised by the controversy between politicians and jurists.
In addition, the debate over the mechanisms for preparing presidential candidates has opened a parallel discussion about the possibility of appointing a vice president of the republic, in light of the Constitution’s power to appoint one or more vice presidents, define their powers, and delegate them to carry out some of his duties.
Journalist Amr Adeeb suggested appointing one or more vice presidents for President Sisi to gain the necessary experience.
Politicians went further towards “the necessity of preparing the Egyptian environment for comprehensive reform,” as Al-Fiqi stressed, “The importance of the presidential step should not be limited to setting the expiration date of the term or preparing potential cadres, but rather it should extend to reforming the political and institutional environment, limiting the powers of the executive authority, and strengthening the balance between it and the legislative and judicial authorities.”
Al-Fiqi called for “opening the public sphere to political action, strengthening the role of parties and consolidating political education,” considering that “the availability of these conditions is necessary to create an institutional climate capable of accommodating any step toward a democratic transfer of power, and ensuring broader political participation.”
“Despite the positives that the step carries in opening the discussion about the future of power and its transfer, its practical implications will become clear over time, with the extent to which the statements are translated into a clear political path and concrete institutional reforms,” according to what Saeed Sadiq, professor of political sociology at the American University in Cairo, told Asharq Al-Awsat.
