On November 9, 2005, the Jordanian capital, Amman, witnessed three suicide bombings targeting the Radisson SAS, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn hotels, killing dozens and wounding more than a hundred others, in one of the bloodiest attacks in the history of the Kingdom.
Twenty-one years later, the memory of the bombings returns at a time when Jordan is facing the repercussions of two new attacks. The first of them targeted a church in the Karak Governorate in the south of the country on October 23, 2026, killing nine people and wounding dozens. The second occurred on November 5, when Corporal Jawad Ali Khalaf al-Salaita was killed in a knife attack targeting a member of Public Security in the capital, Amman.
The two incidents, which occurred within less than two weeks, raised questions that went beyond the identity of the perpetrators, to the reasons for continued targeting of Jordan, the nature of the threats it faces, and the extent of the ability of security and legislative measures to prevent their recurrence.
The anniversary coincided with a government move to increase penalties in anti-terrorism laws, after judicial papers regarding the defendants in the two recent attacks showed that each of them had previously been convicted in terrorist cases, before their release from prison.
Why does terrorism target Jordan?
Jordan was not far from the activity of extremist organizations before the 2005 hotel bombings. In October 2002, American diplomat Lawrence Foley was assassinated in Amman, in an operation that the Jordanian authorities linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who later became the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
In August 2005, missiles launched from Aqaba targeted the area where American naval vessels were anchored, before Amman witnessed, less than three months later, hotel bombings for which “Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia” claimed responsibility.
These operations reveal part of Jordan's position in the accounts of extremist organizations, especially those that targeted Western interests or countries participating in military operations against them.
The US State Department's report on terrorism in Jordan for the year 2023 indicates that the Kingdom's geographical location increases the possibility of it being exposed to attacks planned by organizations active in Syria or Iraq, targeting tourist or government sites inside Jordan.
The report also warns of the continuing threat of domestic extremism, especially online, at a time when the Kingdom is participating in regional and international efforts to combat terrorism and extremism.
The explanation for targeting Jordan is not limited to its geographical location. In a study published by researcher Henrik Gratrud, from the Norwegian Defense Research Foundation, in the journal “Study in Conflict and Treatment” in October 2025, the researcher indicates that Jordan’s participation in the international coalition against ISIS made it a target for the organization.
Gratrud explains that the organization sought to target Jordan in response to its participation in air strikes against it, and its security and military relations with the United States, in addition to targeting the Jordanian security institutions that pursue its supporters and prevent the implementation of its plans.
However, these factors explain the motivations of organizations to target the state, and they do not alone explain the circumstances that push individuals within Jordanian society to adopt extremist ideas or engage in violent acts.
How has the nature of the threat changed?
The rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq represented a new phase of threats facing Jordan.
In 2016, the Kingdom witnessed a series of attacks and security confrontations, which began with an operation against a cell linked to the organization in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom, followed by an attack on an intelligence office in the Baqaa camp in the capital, and a suicide bombing that targeted a military site in the Rukban area on the Syrian border.
In December of the same year, Karak Governorate witnessed armed attacks that reached its historic citadel, and the Islamic State claimed responsibility for them.
The attacks did not end with the decline of the organization’s control over Syrian and Iraqi lands. In 2018, an explosive device targeted a security patrol in the Fuheis area, and investigations led to a cell in the city of Salt, whose members said the authorities were adopting the ideas of the Islamic State.
In November 2019, tourists, tourism sector workers, and security personnel were attacked with a knife in the ancient city of Jerash, while the country witnessed other attacks targeting security personnel in subsequent years.
This sequence reveals a difference in implementation methods, from coordinated bombings and armed cells to attacks carried out by individuals or small groups using firearms or sharp tools.
In his study published in 2025, entitled “Using Others to Spread Terrorism: How the Islamic State Tried to Spread Terrorism in Neighboring Jordan,” Henrik Gratrud investigated the organization’s methods of targeting Jordan between 2014 and 2018.
In the published study, the researcher concluded that the organization relied largely on encouraging its local supporters to carry out attacks, or direct some plans remotely via the Internet, instead of sending trained elements from its areas of control in Syria and Iraq.
The study found that cells linked to the organization planned to carry out 53 operations during the period it covered, seven of which turned into actual attacks, all of which were carried out by cells influenced by the organization’s propaganda without evidence that their operations were directed directly by its leadership.
Gratrud points out that this method allowed the organization to target its opponents outside its areas of control at a limited cost, while focusing its primary resources on the battles in Syria and Iraq.
The importance of these results is highlighted in distinguishing between operations that are directly organized or directed by a “terrorist organisation” and those carried out by individuals influenced by its ideas without a direct organizational link being proven.
Our attack on Karak and Amman, what does the background of the perpetrators reveal?
On October 23, 2026, gunmen opened fire during a funeral ceremony inside the St. George Orthodox Church in the village of Hamoud in Karak Governorate, killing nine people and wounding 34 others.
On October 26, the Public Security Directorate announced the arrest of three people accused of carrying out the attack, after determining their whereabouts inside an abandoned house in Karak Governorate.
According to a statement published by the Jordanian News Agency, Petra, the directorate said that the gunmen refused to surrender and opened fire on the security force, which was able to control and arrest them after they were all wounded.
On November 3, the Public Prosecution of the State Security Court announced the end of the investigation into the case and referred it to court, after bringing charges related to carrying out terrorist acts that led to the death of nine people, possessing weapons and ammunition for terrorist purposes, conspiring to carry out terrorist acts and promoting the ideas of a terrorist group, according to a statement published by Petra.
Less than two weeks after the church attack, Amman witnessed a new attack targeting a Public Security officer near the Sri Lankan embassy.
The Public Security Directorate said, in an official statement on November 5, that a person surprised Corporal Jawad Ali Khalaf al-Salaita and assaulted him with a sharp object while he was performing his duty on Medina Street, which later led to his death.
The directorate added that an officer was injured in the face during a security patrol intervention to control and arrest the attacker, and described the attack as a "terrorist act," noting that preliminary investigations showed an intention and prior planning to target security personnel.
But what brought the two attacks back to the forefront of the counter-terrorism debate was not their timing or method of implementation alone, but rather the prior judicial background of some of the accused.
According to the judicial papers seen by the BBC, the perpetrator of the Amman attack, (M.M.H.), had previously been convicted in a terrorist case related to planning to attack a security center in Irbid Governorate and attempting to join the Islamic State.
Judicial papers show that the accused, born in 1994, was one of three defendants in a case dating back to 2020, related to promoting the ideas of the Islamic State and planning to carry out an armed attack targeting the northern Irbid security center.
In February 2022, the State Security Court issued a ruling to put him in temporary labor for nine years for the felony of conspiracy with the intent to commit terrorist acts, three years for the felony of promoting the ideas of a terrorist group, and four years for attempting to join terrorist organizations.
After applying the most severe penalty, the final sentence was set at nine years, calculated from the date of his arrest on February 3, 2020, before the Court of Cassation upheld the ruling in June 2022.
On the other hand, judicial papers seen by the BBC show that one of the main defendants in the Karak Church attack, H.Z., had previously been convicted of conspiring to carry out terrorist acts and promoting the ideas of the Islamic State.
According to the facts of the case examined by the State Security Court, the main accused was one of four others who agreed to carry out an armed attack targeting soldiers in the Jordanian-Israeli border area, before the security services were able to thwart the plan.
In March 2023, the State Security Court issued a ruling to put him in temporary labor for seven years for the felony of conspiracy with the intent to commit terrorist acts, and four years for promoting the ideas of a terrorist group.
After applying the most severe penalty, the final sentence was set at seven years, calculated from the date of his arrest in February 2021, and the Court of Cassation upheld the ruling in November 2023.
However, the previous conviction alone is not sufficient to prove that the two recent attacks were carried out under the direct direction of ISIS, unless investigations reveal evidence proving this connection.
Is tougher sanctions enough to prevent repeated attacks?
According to the Cabinet statement published by the Jordanian News Agency, Petra, the proposed amendments include doubling the minimum sentences from five to ten years, and raising them from ten to 15 years in some cases, as well as combining the lengths of sentences for multiple crimes, instead of being satisfied with the highest punishment.
The proposed amendments also include imposing precautionary measures on convicts after the end of their sentences, including electronic monitoring, tracking, and house arrest, for a period determined by the court.
The government said that the amendments will be referred to the House of Representatives within two weeks of their announcement, to be discussed and approved in accordance with constitutional procedures.
However, the debate sparked by the recent attacks is not related to the length of the sentence alone, but rather what happens inside the correctional and rehabilitation centers and after leaving them.
Increasing the length of imprisonment may limit the ability of some convicts to commit attacks during their detention, but it alone does not provide an answer to the extent to which their convictions have changed or their likelihood of returning to violence after their release.
The last two cases raise questions about the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs, the ability of competent institutions to assess the possibility of repeating crimes, and how to deal with cases that may pose a danger after the end of the sentence.
