The Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor report for 2026 showed that in 2025, Syria recorded the highest number of deaths or injuries in one country due to cluster munition remnants, with 68 cases out of 117 cases recorded globally.
This confirms the continued danger posed by the remnants of these munitions to civilians, despite the fact that no new use of them has been recorded in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024.
The Cluster Munition Monitor, a research and monitoring initiative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition, has released its 17th annual report, focusing on 2025 and including information updated through July 2026.
The Syrian Network for Human Rights has been a member of the Observatory for Syria since 2020 and contributes to providing it with information related to Syria. The network has documented the use of cluster munitions in Syria since 2012, including dead and injured victims and incident sites, identifying the responsible party, where possible.
The network attributed the cases of use it documented to the forces of the former Syrian regime and Russian forces, and it also documented the use of ISIS at least one type of cluster munition. The Syrian Human Rights Network issued a large number of reports and statistics in this field.
The International Monitor report has not recorded any known use of cluster munitions in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, and it does not include Syria among the countries in which it is believed or suspected that the use of cluster munitions during the years 2025 and 2026 led to new contamination.
During the monitoring period, the report documented the use of cluster munitions by Iran, Myanmar, Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine, and also recorded their use in Mali in May 2026, without being able to determine the responsible party.
The network, for its part, warned in a report issued on the occasion of the observatory’s annual report that the persistence of large gaps in services exposes survivors to difficulties in accessing basic care due to a lack of resources, especially outside the main cities. It also reports a shortage of emergency care services, rehabilitation, limbs, orthopedic devices, psychological and social support, and economic integration services.
The report stated that survivors face additional burdens due to long distances and high costs of accessing services, noting that the lack of investment in victim assistance, along with administrative restrictions and obstacles to the import of specialized equipment, have limited rehabilitation options and the effectiveness of the broader response to mine action.
The network pointed out that Syria is among 29 countries and regions known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants, and is not a signatory to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, despite its previous participation as an observer in some of the Convention’s meetings. However, the report does not record any new official step towards joining it. It urged the Syrian government to take formal steps to join the 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention, and to declare a permanent national commitment not to use, produce, store, or transfer these munitions.
Political sources in Baghdad believe that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi will be able to complete the remaining ministerial portfolios next week, while data indicate that the son-in-law of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will occupy the Ministry of Interior.
Parliament voted in mid-May, by a majority, on the Zaidi government, which consists of 23 ministries, 9 of which are still vacant and managed by proxy and are awaiting a decision these days.
The Ministries of Interior and Defense top the list of vacant portfolios, along with the Ministries of Higher Education, Planning, Culture, Labor, Housing, and Displacement.
The “coordinating framework” forces that dominate the government have been focusing for weeks on making final arrangements to fill the vacancies, but fierce competition within these forces for the remaining positions prevented them from being completed as quickly as necessary, in addition to the “American” obstacles they faced regarding choosing the appropriate figures to fill the positions, as Washington sets conditions on figures linked to the armed factions.
The American condition declined
A leader in the “coordination framework” informed Asharq Al-Awsat of the decline in the severity of the conditions imposed by Washington on potential people to fill positions, and confirmed that “Prime Minister Al-Zaidi was able, during the last visit to Washington, to persuade officials there to ease their conditions.”
Hence, the possibility of Laith Khazali, a leader in Asaib Ahl al-Haq, obtaining the position of Deputy Prime Minister is possible, as is rumored, “on the condition that he assumes ordinary service tasks and not sensitive security ones, and this is one of the American conditions,” according to what the leader said.
The United States of America had set strict conditions to prevent figures affiliated with armed factions loyal to Iran from reaching ministerial positions, and President Donald Trump prevented the leader of the “State of Law” coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, from becoming prime minister in January via a tweet on the “Truth Social” platform and threatened sanctions and halting aid to Iraq.
However, the leading source confirms that “the reservations placed by Washington on Al-Maliki do not necessarily apply to his aides or those close to him, including his son-in-law and nephew Yasser Sakhil, who is nominated for the position of Ministry of Interior.”
He adds: “All possibilities exist regarding accepting or rejecting some characters’ interrogation in the last moments.”
Vice Presidents
Aside from the nine ministerial vacancies that the political blocs are competing for, the file of selecting deputies for the presidents of the republic and the ministers is prominent in the current Al-Zaidi government, a file that may obstruct the process of completing the formation of the government, and spark widespread popular anger, according to some observers.
Political scenes talk about a silent conflict between the head of the “State of Law” coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, and “Asaib Ahl al-Haq” within the “coordination framework” forces. Al-Maliki opposes the idea of electing deputy prime ministers and 공화국; Due to “the lack of necessity and importance of the positions,” as he stated more than once, but he may have to accept this formula to pass his candidates to the Ministries of Interior and Higher Education. Asa'ib insists on assigning the position of Deputy Prime Minister to Laith Khazali, brother of Asa'ib Secretary-General Qais Khazali, in exchange for their votes for Al-Maliki's candidates.
Regardless of the conflicts between the political blocs over ministerial positions, especially related to the vice presidents, many believe that it will cause a great popular uproar if four deputy prime ministers and two vice presidents are chosen, given the resulting new financial burdens on the state treasury, especially in light of the financial crisis that the country is going through and the government’s inability to deliver the salaries of employees in the public sector on time.
In August 2015, former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi decided to abolish the positions of Vice President of the Republic and Prime Minister as part of a package of reforms he implemented in response to popular demands and protests. However, in October 2016, the Federal Court issued a ruling stating that it was unconstitutional to abolish the position of Vice President of the Republic and restore it as a constitutional obligation to prevent a vacuum. However, the successive governments that followed the federal fatwa avoided the actual broad activation or filling of these positions according to political consensus, financial pressures, and reformist tendencies. However, the political ambitions to obtain these positions have re-emerged again in the current session, fueled by the desire of the various political forces to obtain government positions under the custom of quotas adopted politically in Iraq since 2003.
Possible session
Political and legislative affairs researcher Saif Al-Saadi believes that the House of Representatives session to pass the ministry vacancies is likely to be held at the end of next week, not this week, and he believes that it “can be extended for another week or more, due to disagreements and trade-offs between the ministries, the deputy prime ministers, and the vice presidents of the republic.”
Al-Saadi confirmed, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, that there were “deep differences” between Asaib Ahl al-Haq and State of Law, due to “a loss of confidence on the part of Al-Maliki, who sees the possibility of repeating the scenario of the first session unless he obtains guarantees.” In reference to the government voting session in Parliament last May, in which the Shiite forces, especially Asaib, did not vote for Al-Maliki’s candidates for the Ministries of Interior and Higher Education.
Al-Saadi talked about “an agreement, in addition to a request from Al-Zaidi, that the positions of the Ministries of Defense and Interior be held by officers who have military and security experience, and this agreement is what prevents Yasser Sakhil from passing the Interior portfolio.”
Al-Saadi points out that an agreement was reached to choose “four deputy prime ministers, while the legal article stipulates that the Prime Minister must have two deputies in the first electoral cycle, but the Prime Minister is forced to satisfy the political blocs with these positions more than the actual need for them.”
Three informed Palestinian sources revealed that there are attempts by Palestinian factions, including Hamas, to form a broad coalition list in the legislative elections that are scheduled to take place at the end of next November, to convince the prominent Fatah leader, and prisoner in Israeli prisons, Marwan Barghouti, to be at the top of this list.
The three sources confirmed, in separate statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, that contacts are being made by leaders of the Hamas movement and the Fatah Democratic Reform Movement led by Muhammad Dahlan, with figures close to Barghouti, to try to persuade him to join the coalition that the Islamic Movement and the Fatah movement’s dissident movement are seeking to form, and that includes other factions, or at least is supported by factions from abroad without direct participation in the elections.
Two sources indicated that no confirmations had been received from Barghouti or those close to him, as to whether Assir, who is very popular with the Palestinians, would be at the top of that list or one of its members. While the third source ruled out that Barghouti would agree to such an option, in light of the pressure he is under from the leadership of the Fatah movement to confirm that he is part of the movement’s list, and not from outside it.
While one of the sources said that there were also contacts taking place with the Fatah leader Nasser al-Qudwa, to join the broader coalition list, two sources said that they had no knowledge of that.
The role model is a Fatah figure who sparked controversy after he formed the Palestinian National Forum to participate in the legislative elections that were to be held in May 2021, which prompted the Fatah movement to expel him, as he was seeking to run in the elections with Marwan Barghouti, and with the participation of other figures from the movement.
Al-Qudra is considered close to Barghouti, and he is also in contact with Marwan’s family, especially his wife, lawyer Fadwa Barghouti, who was on the list for the 2021 elections, before it was cancelled.
On October 5, 2025, the Fatah Central Committee agreed to reinstate Nasser al-Qudra as a member of the movement, after a letter he addressed to the Palestinian President and leader of the movement, Mahmoud Abbas, in this regard.
It appears that Hamas, and those who participate with it in the coalition, are trying to resort to role models to convince Barghouti to head the factional electoral list, the majority of whose members will be technocrats, as confirmed by two sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.
One of the sources explained that the “Hamas” and “Islamic Jihad” movements will nominate independent figures, including academics and others who are loyal to the two movements, to participate in the list, while the “Dahlan Movement” is the only one that will put its leaders on the list, and there may be leaders from the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” if it decides to join this electoral alliance.
The majority of the Palestinian factions hope that a comprehensive national decision to postpone the elections will be agreed upon, in light of the possibility of them occurring in a way that guarantees them being conducted fairly and without Israeli or other interference or obstruction, amid ongoing efforts to hold bilateral meetings in preparation for a comprehensive national dialogue, as there are leaders from several factions in Cairo to discuss these issues.
Some factional objections, and the intervention of factional leaders and Arab parties, prompted a decision to stop holding the National Council elections, which took place in several countries recently.
