A summit, the first of its kind between Egypt and three countries from the Horn of Africa region, namely Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia, was held in the Egyptian city of El Alamein on Sunday, after an Ethiopian escalation that included an exchange of severing relations with Asmara and the expulsion of a diplomat with Cairo.
That summit carried messages of deterrence for Ethiopia, according to an expert in African affairs who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, especially in the files of the Nile, Sudan and the Red Sea, while adhering to the principles of stability in the Horn of Africa region.
In October 2024, a tripartite summit was held, bringing together the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, but this was the first time with the participation of the Sudanese army commander, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
According to the “Alamein Joint Declaration” issued by the Quartet Consultative Summit that brought together President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi with his Eritrean counterpart, Isaias Afwerki, Somali Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, and the head of the “Transitional Sovereignty Council” in Sudan, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, it addressed current regional and international issues and strengthened cooperation and coordination.
The leaders stressed the need to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the region, uphold the values of good neighborliness, reject interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region under any pretext, and work to support national institutions and promote political and peaceful solutions to conflicts.
The participants agreed to “support the unity of Sudan and reject the establishment of any parallel entities, encourage the resumption of the political process with Sudanese ownership and leadership, and support national institutions, in addition to completely rejecting any support for mercenaries.”
The summit stressed “support for the unity and sovereignty of Somalia, and rejection of any interference or measures targeting its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It also rejects any recognition or support for the so-called Somaliland, considering that this is considered an infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic.”
The leaders affirmed “the principle of freedom of navigation, and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the riparian states,” stressing “the complete rejection of any unilateral measures that harm the existing water uses of the two states downstream of the Nile River (Egypt and Sudan).”
They agreed to “establish a mechanism to follow up on the outcomes of this consultative summit, which will be held periodically, and whenever necessary, to enhance consultation and coordination among them.”
The Egyptian announcement of the summit came on Saturday, following two separate meetings between Al-Sisi and the President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, and his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, who touched on developments in the Horn of Africa region and strengthening the security of the Red Sea, amid affirmations of the rejection of interference in the internal affairs of countries.
Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud arrived in Cairo on Saturday, days after two visits to Djibouti and Ethiopia, during which he discussed strengthening relations and developing the region.
The summit came after the Tigray Liberation Front's escalation, in late September, against the federal government, days after the formation of a seven-party coalition, aiming to overthrow Abiy Ahmed's government. It was followed by an Ethiopian escalation by exchanging severing relations with Eritrea and expelling a diplomat with Egypt under the pretext of interfering in the country's internal affairs, despite Asmara and Cairo denying this.
Hussein Al-Behairi, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, believes that the summit carries a “message of deterrence” for Ethiopia with the presence of countries keen to maintain security stability in the Horn of Africa region, rejecting the diplomatic and political escalation that Addis Ababa is currently undertaking against Eritrea and Sudan, in an attempt to ignite the region with regional wars to cover up Ethiopia’s internal crises, most notably the conflict in the Tigray region.
The summit aims to preserve the balance of power in the Horn of Africa region, especially since it comes after the meeting of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia with the President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, and then with the President of Somalia a few days ago, according to Al-Behairi.
He explained that Somalia could play a balancing and mediating role between Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Egypt, in light of the notable political rapprochement between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
Although it is a summit aimed at pushing towards stability and calm, the indicators, according to Al-Behairi, suggest that the Horn of Africa region is heading towards further escalation and political and diplomatic tension in the near term, in light of Ethiopia’s insistence on a sea port of a military nature in the Red Sea, despite Egyptian and regional rejection.
In this context, Al-Behairi does not rule out the scenario of the outbreak of armed confrontations between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the aim of regaining the Eritrean port of Assab, as well as military confrontations between Ethiopia and Sudan due to Ethiopian interventions in Sudanese internal affairs and its involvement in fueling the conflict by supporting the “Rapid Support Militias”, in addition to the fact that the confrontations in the Tigray region have not ended.
The head of the interim Libyan “National Unity” government, Abdul Hamid Al-Dabaiba, seemed to be seeking to contain the armed formations in Al-Zawiya in the west of the country, while he escalated his tone towards oversight institutions and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, threatening to stop the salaries of workers in the Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control Authority, and return them to the unified salary scale.
Al-Dabaiba took advantage of his participation in a meeting he gathered, on Saturday evening, in the “Sons of the Homeland Forum” with notables, wise men, and social and military leaders from Zawiya and Misrata, to attack the institutions of administrative oversight and the Audit Bureau, in an indication of the continuing political conflict between his government and institutions associated with the competing authorities in eastern Libya.
Al-Dabaiba said: “The Administrative Control and Audit Bureau do not follow us,” and added: “From tomorrow, I will stop their salaries and return them to the unified schedule.” He also mentioned in his speech the name of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh.
Al-Dabaiba’s statements reflect the continuing dispute over the powers of oversight institutions and spending and salary arrangements between the competing authorities in eastern and western Libya, while he is trying to strengthen his political position in the face of calls to form a new executive authority that will lead the country to elections.
Al-Dabaiba also called at the forum, which was attended by prominent leaders of the armed formations in Zawiya, including Hassan Bouzriba, head of the Stability Support Agency, and Othman Al-Lahab, commander of the 103rd Infantry Battalion, known as “Al-Salaa,” to end their differences immediately, in a move that carried the title of reconciliation and unification of ranks, but it also came in the wake of a series of contacts and meetings that Al-Dabaiba conducted with leaders of armed formations from the city, including figures who had previously pledged to end their influence and extend state authority.
The meeting came at a time when Al-Zawiya was witnessing security tensions and disputes between rival armed formations, and after a series of contacts and meetings that Al-Dabaiba held with leaders from the city.
Al-Dabaiba said that the unity of Libya and the rejection of division among its people are the basis of any path that leads to stability and elections, calling on the people of Zawiya to “enhance understanding” and “give priority to the language of dialogue,” and to direct their efforts to building and developing the city and addressing the needs of its residents.
He praised what Al-Zawiya provided to the state, stressing his government’s support for the city and its people, stressing that dialogue, reconciliation, and refusal to return to conflicts and fighting represent the path to stability and elections.
Al-Dabaiba called on Bouzriba and Al-Lahab to end the differences and disputes between them, saying that the corner should not become a repellent for projects.
This call reveals a different nature of the government’s dealings with the armed forces in Zawiya, as Al-Dabaiba did not talk about dismantling its formations or ending the influence of its leaders, but rather called on them to settle their differences and maintain stability within the city.
This comes months after his public pledges to dismantle armed formations and extend state authority. Last July, he said that his government was “continuing with its security plan,” and would not back down from dismantling militias and armed formations, adding that he wanted to pave the way for the next government so that it would not find “gangs controlling the state.”
Libyan affairs researcher Jalal Harchaoui believes that reading Dabaiba’s move as merely a return to alliance with armed formations is not accurate.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Al-Dabaiba is “taking advantage of the opportunity” and exploiting the recent developments in an attempt “to extract the two main Zawiya tribes, (Awlad Abu Hamira) and (Awlad Al-Saqr), from the embrace of the family of (Field Marshal Khalifa) Haftar (commander of the National Army stationed in the east of the country), seeking to link them into a close alliance with Misrata, which supports Al-Dabaiba.”
He pointed out that Al-Dabaiba had been working on this endeavor for months, but the task became, in his estimation, easier after the arrest of a sabotage cell in Ain Zara about a month ago.
He explained that when Al-Dabaiba recently spoke about “militias” in Zawiya, he was mainly referring to other organized crime groups in the region, noting that he “did not speak negatively about the armed groups responsible for the security of the refinery and other vital areas, at least during the past two years.”
He continued, saying: “Maybe he had problems with them in 2023 and 2024, but not since last year.”
The final statement of the “Sons of the Homeland” forum went beyond social reconciliation, as the participants declared support for the continuation of the “national unity” government until the presidential and parliamentary elections were held, and called for holding an expanded national meeting in the western region in the presence of Al-Dabaiba.
Escalating disputes within the Libyan House of Representatives are putting Aguila Saleh’s presidency of the House at stake, after a meeting of 65 representatives with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, opened the door to moves to amend the internal regulations and re-elect the House leadership.
Following the meeting between Haftar and the representatives, speculation escalated regarding Saleh’s fate, and social media platforms were filled with various leaks about what took place during the meeting. Among those who talked about a green light to remove him, those who suggested that his resignation would be imminent, and those who believed that he was still able to contain the situation, based on his tribal weight and regional relations.
Representative Essam Al-Jahani, who attended the meeting between the representatives and Haftar, said that “it was agreed at the meeting to support the unification of Parliament for the sake of reforms, most notably amending the list and choosing a new presidency, and continuing to support the (4+4) agreement and the constitutional amendment.”
The post by Al-Jahani, one of the most prominent voices of the anti-Saleh parliamentary bloc, was widely circulated, prompting some to describe the meeting as the night of “the fall of Saleh’s Aqila,” and put forward names to succeed him, such as MPs Jalal Al-Shuwaihdi and Saad Al-Badri.
On the other hand, a member of the Libyan House of Representatives, Ali Al-Takbali, confirmed that “Aguila’s name was not mentioned during the meeting,” and that “amending the internal regulations - which is the demand raised by some representatives during their speech - will pave the way for elections to choose a new presidency, not to immediately remove Saleh.” He pointed out that “the tension between a broad parliamentary bloc and Saleh calls into question the council’s ability to work under his leadership in the future.”
As for Libyan political analyst Abdul Hakim Fanoush, he sees “exaggeration” in talk about Saleh’s fate over the past two days, despite the amendment session not being held yet, and the lack of a clear signal from Haftar regarding the demands for his removal.
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Fanoush agreed with opinions that believe that “Saleh’s delay in dealing with and approving the (4+4) parliamentary agreement may have created tension between him and the leadership of the National Army.” “Being one of the signatory parties to it,” he pointed to Saleh’s meeting with the head of the Supreme Council of State, Mohamed Takala, in Turkey and their announcement of the resumption of communication on the laws of the “6+6” committee, which is a path far from the “4+4” agreement.
Fanoush believes that this “most likely suggests that Saddam Haftar, the son and deputy commander-in-chief, stood behind the bloc seeking to remove Saleh, and there was a difference in opinion between him and his brother Khaled, the Chief of General Staff.”
According to the “4+4” agreement concluded at the end of August, under UN sponsorship, between the “unity” government and the “National Army,” a new authority will be formed, consisting of a presidential council and a unified government that will pave the way for elections within two years.
Fanoush believes that “the decision to remove Saleh has not been taken yet; No media outlet, including those affiliated with the General Command, promoted a specific parliamentary figure to succeed him.” He also pointed to “the continued presence of parliamentary voices that support his survival, and to his close relations with regional countries that may, like him, have reservations about the (4+4) agreement due to the ambiguity of its details, or its conclusion far from their decision-making circles.”
According to the statements of representatives who attended the meeting, Libyan political analyst Omar Abu Asaida believes that he concluded that a session was held with a quorum exceeding 120 representatives, which allows the “4+4” agreement to be included in an amendment to the constitutional declaration regulating the transitional period, and to change the regulations in preparation for the elections to renew the presidency of the Council, which is likely to be held next Monday.
In his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Abu Saida criticized the efforts of voices in western Libya to involve Haftar’s sons in any event or development in the east and south, and talk about a competition for influence between them.
Despite his acknowledgment that the coincidence of the internal dispute in Parliament with the conclusion of the “4+4” agreement provided indications suggesting the existence of a discrepancy in positions, he believes that the proponents of this proposal “ignore previous criticism by a number of representatives about Saleh’s monopoly on decisions under the dome of Parliament, and his monopoly of political deals with the Supreme Council of State, in addition to the fact that his long stay encouraged his removal in the hope of succeeding him.”
He pointed out that there are those who are currently pushing the name “Representative Al-Salihin Abdul Nabi because he, like Saleh, belongs to the Al-Ubaidat tribe in order to avoid the objection of this tribal weight.”
He concluded that “the scenarios are still open,” and that “Saleh may try to attract votes in the next session that would qualify him, if he does not step down, to run again for presidency of the Council,” pointing to a promotional campaign led by his supporters on social media platforms that “recalls his role in supporting (the National Army) in 2014 and 2015.”
Meanwhile, civil activist Ahmed Al-Tawati, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, considered that the momentum around the fate of the Presidency of Parliament is inseparable from “Libyans’ boredom with councils and authorities and their role in deepening division, clinging to chairs, obstructing elections, and ignoring their livelihood.”
For years, Libya has been experiencing a division between two governments: the interim “National Unity” headed by Abdul Hamid Dabaiba in Tripoli, and the Osama Hammad government appointed by Parliament and supported by Khalifa Haftar, which administers the east and some cities in the south.
