Escalation of fighting in Yemen: About 3,000 Houthis were killed and wounded within 4 days

The losses that the Yemeni armed forces announced that they had inflicted on the ranks of the Houthi group allied with Iran rose to about 3,000 dead and wounded within 4 days, coinciding with the continuation of battles on several fronts, and the escalation of attacks and attempts to infiltrate and circumvent, especially on the Taiz, Lahj, and Bab al-Mandab fronts.

The latest toll came after the Yemeni Armed Forces announced the implementation of 356 targeting operations within 24 hours, which they said resulted, according to their field estimates, in the killing and wounding of 476 members of the group, in addition to the destruction of command and control centers, weapons and artillery stores, and dozens of military vehicles and vehicles.

The Armed Forces spokesman, Colonel Majid Al-Nuzaili, announced on Sunday evening that 2,316 Houthi fighters had been neutralized, dead and wounded, within 72 hours, as a result of 756 targeting operations on the fronts of Kataf, Al-Baqa’, Al-Alab axis, Al-Jawf, Ma’rib, Al-Bayda, Lahj and Taiz, bringing the total toll announced during the four days to more than 2,792 dead and wounded, before taking into account the losses announced by other field sources during the same period.

In recent hours, much of the fighting was concentrated in western Taiz and areas connected to Lahj and Bab al-Mandab governorates, where government forces engaged in confrontations with the Houthis in Al-Waziyah, coinciding with thwarting an infiltration attempt in northern Taiz with artillery shelling, and confronting an attempt to bypass the Kahboub front.

In Jabal Habashi, government forces said that they repelled a Houthi attack on the Bani Bakari front, and prevented the group from establishing a new breakthrough, while the Rasan and Al-Alqama fronts south of Taiz witnessed clashes and exchange of fire.

According to military sources, government forces launched air and artillery strikes on Houthi positions and reinforcements in Al-Rubaie, Al-Ja'sha, Al-Zubaibiya, and Al-Bahabah, coinciding with the downing of a Houthi drone over Al-Kadha.

The media center in the Taiz military axis announced that 12 Houthis were killed and 13 others were wounded on various fronts of the axis, in addition to the burning of an armored vehicle and a military vehicle in Al-Kadha, and the destruction of a tank in the Al-Rubaie area.

The warplanes also targeted a ballistic missile launching pad in Jabal Uman, east of Taiz, at a time when government forces announced the elimination of a group of Houthis during an infiltration attempt on the air defense front northwest of the city.

In Al-Hawban, government forces launched air strikes on Jalila camp near Taiz airport, as part of a series of strikes targeting the group's military sites and capabilities in the governorate.

The confrontations extended to the Sabiha fronts in Lahj in the areas between them and Taiz, where the Houthi group launched simultaneous attacks on the Al-Tabara and Al-Agbara fronts, targeting the sites of Jabal Saif, Barah Amkhneef, and Jabal Amkhan.

Field sources said that government forces, supported by tribesmen, repelled attempts to advance and forced the attackers to retreat, noting that there were deaths among the Houthis and the capture of two of them.

After the failure of the attack, the group, according to the same sources, resorted to bombardment with drones and mortar shells on the positions of the defending forces and neighboring villages.

On the Al-Aghabra front, the confrontations were concentrated in the vicinity of Jabal Al-Bazala and the Al-Soura area, coinciding with infiltration attempts and military pressure in Ras Al-Ara, Al-Mudaraba and Kahboub.

Field sources said that the defending forces thwarted an attack in Al-Aghubrah, besieged infiltrating groups, captured a number of Houthi members, and seized weapons and equipment, in conjunction with air strikes that targeted the group’s sites, gatherings, and vehicles.

The sources also reported that populated areas in Al-Mudaraba and Ras Al-Ara were bombarded with Katyusha missiles, while military sources said that government forces destroyed a vehicle carrying a Houthi leader and his companions in Kahboub.

Field developments indicate that the Houthi group continues to send reinforcements to the front lines, especially at the Mawiyah Junction, Rasin and Al-Alqama, coming from Sanaa, Amran, Dhamar and Ibb.

On the other hand, government forces intensified their air and artillery operations on supply lines and assembly sites, in an attempt to contain the attacks and prevent the conversion of limited penetrations into fixed sites.

In Mokha and the western coast, sources said that government forces carried out raids on Houthi sites and gatherings inside the city, while field information reported that the group was working to establish trenches and barricades inside and around Mokha and towards Bab al-Mandab.

The spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, Majid Al-Nuzaili, said that the operations carried out within 24 hours included the western coast, Haradh, Al-Tuwal (northwest), Kataf, Al-Baqa’, Al-Alab axis, Al-Jawf (north), Ma’rib (east of Sana’a), Lahj, Taiz (southwest), and Al-Bayda (southeast of Sana’a).

He added that the forces used air weapons, drones, artillery, and other means, and that the operations led, according to field estimates, to the neutralization of 476 of the group’s members, killed or wounded, in addition to the destruction of command and control centers, weapons and artillery stores, and military vehicles.

This toll comes one day after the army announced the implementation of 756 operations within 72 hours, which it said led to the neutralization of 2,316 Houthis, and the destruction of missile launchers, weapons stores, reinforcements, and military vehicles.

The announced operations reflect the transition of fighting to a pattern that depends on depleting Houthi reinforcements before they reach the front lines, coinciding with the government forces' attempt to prevent the Houthis from expanding the scope of pressure on the fronts connected to Taiz, Lahj, and the western coast.

In Aden, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Yemeni Army, Major General Ahmed Al-Basr, held a military meeting to discuss the organization and arrangement of the armed forces, unify the efforts of military bodies and units, and enhance coordination and integration in carrying out tasks.

Al-Basr stressed the importance of raising the level of coordination and follow-up and enhancing discipline and efficiency of performance, at a time when military operations continue along a number of Yemeni fronts.

A Yemeni human rights body documented more than 278 cases of kidnapping and arrest that it said were carried out by the Houthi group during the past few days in nine governorates, against the backdrop of celebrating or preparing to commemorate the “September 26” revolution, in the latest indication that the group is tightening its measures to prevent manifestations of celebration of the occasion in areas under its control.

The Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms said that the arrest campaigns targeted citizens in Sanaa and its countryside, Hajjah, Amran, Dhamar, Ibb, Saada, Al Mahwit and Hodeidah, explaining that the arrests took place on public roads, homes, mosques and markets.

According to the report, the procedures included restricting a number of the kidnapped people and confiscating their phones and official documents, before taking some of them to secret detention places, according to what the network reported.

The network considered that the escalation of arrests coinciding with the “September 26” anniversary represents, as it described it, a restriction on citizens due to their positions rejecting the Imami ideology and the Houthi project, and said that targeting those celebrating the occasion or those preparing to commemorate it represents a violation of public rights and freedoms.

The network called on international organizations and human rights bodies to take action to uncover the whereabouts of the abductees and work to release them, calling for an end to the arrest and persecution campaigns against civilians in areas under the control of the Houthis, and holding the group responsible for the safety and fate of the abductees.

The new arrests are part of a broader toll that the network says it has documented since the outbreak of the war. According to its previous report, it documented 22,165 cases of arrest, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, and psychological and physical torture against civilians, during the period from September 21, 2014 until the beginning of August 2026.

The network said that about 5,326 kidnapped civilians are still in Houthi prisons, whose data its team was able to verify, noting that the list includes politicians, activists, media professionals, children, women, educators, social figures, mosque preachers, academics, students, lawyers, judges, doctors and employees.

The list also includes, according to the report, marginalized people, foreigners, African refugees, and traders, in addition to 54 employees of the United Nations and international organizations.

Regarding the issue of forced disappearance, the network said that it documented about 2,678 cases against civilians, including 158 women and 137 children, noting the group’s continued refusal to reveal the fate of a number of the disappeared or their places of detention.

She added that the effects of forced disappearance extend to the families of the victims, who, according to the report, remain in a state of constant anxiety and fear due to the absence of confirmed information about the fate and whereabouts of their relatives.

Regarding torture, the network reported that it documented 1,937 abductees being subjected to various forms of physical and psychological torture inside Houthi prisons, including 117 children, 43 women, and 89 elderly people.

She said that 476 kidnappers were subjected to what she described as the most severe types of torture, which led to death in a number of cases, including 18 children, 23 women, 25 elderly people, and an employee of the United Nations office in Yemen.

The network also documented the death of 166 abductees inside the Houthi group’s prisons, including 56 that it said were subjected to physical liquidation, 79 who died as a result of negligence inside the prisons, and 31 deaths due to heart attacks.

It also reported that 218 abductees suffered from disabilities and chronic diseases that it said were caused by torture, including 26 children, 12 women, and 49 elderly people, noting that the cases included total and partial paralysis, memory loss, and visual and hearing disabilities.

The network said that the incidents it documented reflect repeated patterns of violations in a number of regions, and held the group's leaders politically and legally responsible for them.

The head of the Yemeni Coast Guard Service, Major General Khaled Al-Qamali, said that the Houthis’ control over the city of Mocha, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea islands represents a “qualitative shift” in the nature of the threat posed by the group, and goes beyond targeting ships to expanding smuggling networks and enhancing the ability to monitor shipping traffic in one of the most important commercial lanes in the world.

Al-Qamali revealed, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, that ships used by the Houthis for smuggling are now cruising the coast of the Red Sea openly, without turning off the tracking devices, after they had previously turned them off for fear of being caught by the Yemeni Coast Guard.

He warned that the risks associated with controlling coastal and island sites are not limited to weapons smuggling, but rather include the smuggling of communications equipment, dual-use technologies, drugs, and military components.

Major General Al-Qamali stressed that confronting these networks requires “linking surveillance and interception systems on both the Yemeni and African shores,” and dealing with the smuggling route as an integrated network extending from the Somali coast and Djibouti to Bab al-Mandab and the western Yemeni coast.

The head of the Yemeni Coast Guard confirmed that the recent developments in Mokha, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea islands have changed the nature of the Houthi threat. According to his assessment, it is no longer limited to the direct military aspect or freedom of navigation, but rather extends to smuggling networks and potential links with armed organizations in the region.

He explained that controlling these sites gives the Houthis greater ability to secure and expand maritime supply routes between the western coast of Yemen and the Horn of Africa, taking advantage of the nature of the geographical area and the intensity of the movement of small boats and boats.

He added: “Instead of relying on a single route, the group can now use multiple coastal and island locations to receive, hide, and redistribute shipments. But what is most dangerous is the diversity of materials that can be transported through these routes. In addition to weapons, the extension of smuggling networks across the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast opens the way for the transfer of communications equipment, dual-use technologies, drugs, and military components, with the possibility of changing routes and means of transportation to avoid interception.”

The Charge d'Affairs of the US Embassy in Riyadh, Neil Hope, accused Iran of owning ships that operated in the Red Sea and had previously carried out cyber and intelligence operations for the benefit of the Houthis, as well as transporting components for missiles and drones, and participating in transporting oil through what is known as the "Shadow Fleet."

In this context, Al-Qamali pointed to what was reported by UN investigations regarding the Houthis’ diversification of their supply chains and sources of obtaining weapons and equipment, considering this an indication of the development of their organizational and operational capabilities.

The head of the Yemeni Coast Guard warned that the Houthis had moved from having the ability to target ships to possessing strategic geographical locations that would allow them a broader scope for monitoring, early warning, and targeting near Bab al-Mandab.

He said, “The presence of coasts, islands, and sites close to the strait under the control of a party that possesses missiles, drones, and armed boats raises the level of risks facing passing ships, increases the possibility of disruption to navigation, and increases the costs of insurance and protection, in addition to the possibility of prompting some shipping companies to redirect their flights away from the region.”

He continued by saying: “The danger does not necessarily lie in the Houthis’ ability to completely close Bab al-Mandab, but rather in their ability to keep the risks facing international shipping traffic at a high level, and to use the sea corridor as a pressure card whenever they want.”

The International Maritime Organization's follow-up to Red Sea security shows its continued interest in the attacks targeting ships and sailors in the region. In July 2026, the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Secretary-General to submit reports on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Major General Khaled Al-Qamali touched on another dimension that he considers worrying, which is the possibility that controlling sites in Bab al-Mandab will create a more suitable maritime environment for expanding existing communications between the Houthis and armed networks in the Horn of Africa, most notably the Somali “Al-Shabaab” movement, through paths that are difficult to fully control.

He warned of the possibility of the relationship moving from weapons exchange or smuggling to broader cooperation that includes financing, equipment, expertise, technology, and communications, benefiting from the existing smuggling networks between Yemen and Somalia.

This occurrence, according to Al-Qamali’s estimate, would transform Bab al-Mandab from a logistical corridor into an operational link between the Houthis and armed groups in the Horn of Africa, and expand the scope of the threat to include the Gulf of Aden and the region opposite the Yemeni coast.

Major General Al-Qamali stressed that the security measures inside Yemeni waters, although important, are not sufficient alone to deal with smuggling routes extending through the Somali coast, the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti and Bab al-Mandab.

He called for strengthening direct cooperation between the Yemeni Coast Guard and its counterparts in Somalia and Djibouti, especially in exchanging maritime and intelligence information, tracking suspicious boats, and coordinating interception operations.

According to Al-Qamali, this cooperation includes monitoring the movement of ships and fishing vessels that are used to transport weapons, drugs, and equipment. Pointing out that “field follow-up over the past years has shown that combating smuggling in Bab al-Mandab is not achieved by controlling the Yemeni side of the corridor alone, but rather requires linking the monitoring and interception systems on the Yemeni and African banks together.”

The head of the Yemeni Coast Guard Service concluded that dealing with the Somali coast, Djibouti, Bab al-Mandab, and the western Yemeni coast as parts of a single smuggling network is the basis for preventing the Houthis or armed groups in the Horn of Africa from exploiting them, and preventing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from turning into an area where these networks move more freely.