The Arabs in Israel are a dangerous security secret... especially in the elections
Quick Look
The article discussed the reasons for the failure of polls to predict the results of the US elections in the 2016, 2020, and 2022 cycles, explaining that the problem is not that voters lie, but rather the disparity in willingness to participate between groups, low response rates, and systematic biases that demographic correction alone cannot address, while highlighting the importance of evaluating poll methodology and record rather than relying solely on their reputation.
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Why It Matters
The article discussed the history of polling failures in the US elections since 2016, explaining that common explanations such as the 'silent voter' or lying supporters of Trump are not supported by evidence, and that the problem lies in the difference in willingness to participate between groups and the effect of party affiliation on the response.
Who is missing from the sample?
Polling in the last decade has been criticized for failures to capture voting trends. Although the common explanation for these failures is related to the “silent voter,” the pollster who hides his choice and then reveals it in the box. However, this phrase confuses two situations: a person participates and gives a misleading answer, and a person refuses to participate at all. The research evidence does not support lying about endorsing Trump as a general explanation. While it gives greater weight to the possibility of differences in willingness to answer between categories of voters, especially those most averse to institutions, according to the “Survey Practice” magazine.
A study published by the magazine in 2023 indicates that the tendency to avoid polls is linked to political alienation, and that the demographic correction may not address this absence. The presence of the appropriate number of men, rural residents, or non-universities does not guarantee the representation of their positions, if the respondents among them are more confident in the institutions than those who are absent. The problem here is the differences within the category itself, and not just the size of its presence.
In addition to this, there is a decline in response in general. In a review published by the Pew Center on September 16, it explained that declining participation and increasing non-response linked to party affiliation reinforced the need to weight the data using previous voting or political affiliation, along with age, education, and others. But he stressed the importance that this treatment improves accuracy on average and does not create an infallible measurement.
In light of the polarization that America is experiencing, it is not enough to explain these transformations by populism controlling the right and left in a similar manner. Polarization, alienation from institutions, and shifts in electoral alliances are interrelated factors, and their presence does not prove that supporters of both parties hide their opinions in the same way. Likewise, a voter can answer truthfully and then change his mind, or declare his intention to participate and later be absent. Here, estimating who will vote becomes as difficult as measuring who supports whom.
Confidence is built through the curriculum
The experience of the 2016 presidential elections remains present, but it requires careful reading. National polls captured Hillary Clinton's lead in the popular vote, while the influential failure was concentrated in crucial states. The IAPOR review identified problems including insufficient correction by education, and the movement of voters who made their choices late. In 2020, Trump's power was repeatedly underestimated despite the reforms that followed 2016, which revealed that addressing a previous defect does not guarantee the disappearance of sources of new error.
But generalizing failure to all elections contradicts subsequent reviews. IAPOR found that the 2024 polls were more accurate than 2016 and 2020, while continuing to underestimate the share of Republicans compared to Democrats. The average directional bias in the midterm elections was much smaller: an overstatement in favor of Democrats by about 0.1 point in 2018, and in favor of Republicans by about 0.6 points in 2022. These are averages that may hide adverse errors, and are not a testament to the accuracy of each poll.
One of the most prominent entities worth following is the New York Times/Siena, which topped the “Five-Thirty-Eight” classification published in January 2024, based on accuracy and transparency. It is useful to compare its results with the "Marst", "Emerson", and "CNN/SSRS" polls, which are published with methodological details. The reference here is to institutions whose work can be examined, not to a fixed final ranking of the best, nor to a guarantee of their success in the 2026 cycle.
IAPOR believes that a meaningful test includes record across multiple elections, funding disclosure, sample representativeness, interview history, and identification of the likely voter to participate. Also, the stated margin of error does not automatically cover all coverage errors and non-response. The average that combines several polls reduces their fluctuations, but does not eliminate a common bias between them. Therefore, the numbers should be read along with their approach, comparing similar results for the question and audience, rather than choosing the institution that matches the reader's expectations.
The discount is beyond the numbers
So far, the cost of living and the economy are the factors capable of turning mood into a vote. In the Times/Siena poll, Democrats gained an advantage in confidence in addressing the cost of living, health care, and immigration. Participants in the Emerson survey also ranked the Iran war, jobs, and tariff policy among the most important issues. This makes developments in the war, fuel prices, and actual income influential factors, without assuming that an improvement in a single economic indicator will automatically change partisan choices.
The second factor is mobilization. Emerson found that 78 percent of Democrats are very enthusiastic about voting, compared to 66 percent of Republicans. But it is declared enthusiasm, which needs organizational translation. On the other hand, Reuters reported on September 27 that Republicans are spending more money in dozens of House of Representatives races, which were previously considered safe, with an advantage in advertising reservations. Emerson believes that money expands the ability to reach voters, but it does not guarantee their persuasion.
Third, the quality of candidates, local reputation, and district boundaries remain influential in converting national support into victories. AP's coverage of New Hampshire has warned that Democratic optimism is colliding with Republican fiscal advantages and image problems for the Democratic Party. Therefore, the voter's dissatisfaction with the president is not enough to guarantee his vote for all his opponents, and he may choose candidates from two different parties depending on the position and the available alternative.
Early voting changes the timing of the competition, but it does not alone reveal its outcome. Data from the Electoral Innovation and Research Center show the difference in the beginning of voting between states, with in-person voting beginning in some of them on September 18 and expanding during October. The number of ballots returned does not equal declared votes for a party. Registered party identity does not necessarily reveal choice, and a lead in voting may be a change on polling day rather than a net increase in participation. So far, national polls give Democrats reasons for optimism and give Republicans a warning to mobilize. As for controlling Congress, it requires monitoring local races and actual turnout during the remaining weeks.
A decade of doubts... What did the polls get wrong?
The crisis of confidence did not begin with Donald Trump's victory in 2016, but that election gave it exceptional strength. The most prominent criticism is that the media industry presented fallible estimates as if they were almost certain knowledge, and then the public confused the failure of some state polls with the failure of all national polls. • 2016 Voters that were not well represented by the samples: A review by the American Association for Public Opinion Research showed that national polls came close to the popular margin, while measurements failed in crucial states. Reasons included weak weighting by education, and late transitions among undecideds. Therefore, “the voter who lies” was not a proven and comprehensive explanation for the surprise. • 2020 reforms did not prevent the recurrence of the defect: Polls confirmed Joe Biden’s victory, but they exaggerated his advantage and reduced the strength of Republicans. IAPOR considered the national presidential measurement error to be the largest in four decades. According to Pew, the possibility that Trump supporters who were least willing to answer did not resemble those who participated came to the forefront of the discussion, even after controlling for demographic characteristics. • 2022 The problem of expectations as well: The “red wave” narrative raised questions about the media’s selection of polls. But a subsequent IAPOR review put the average bias in favor of Republicans at just 0.6 points, a reminder that inflating expectations does not necessarily equal the collapse of all measuring tools. • 2024 Improved with reservations: Polls were more accurate than the previous two presidential cycles, but they still underestimated Republican strength relatively. One of the criticisms is the closeness of the results, which raised suspicions that the institutions were keeping pace with each other. However, IAPOR tests did not find evidence to support this interpretation. Common objections remain about the ambiguity of funding, the publication of selected results, the poor formulation of questions, and the difficulty of estimating turnout. Also, increasing the sample size does not automatically correct its bias, and the statistical margin of error does not include all sources of uncertainty. The American Association for Public Opinion Research says the reliability of coverage is weakened when polls of adults are compared to polls of voters likely to participate, or small differences are presented as major shifts. She adds that what is most important is that the credibility of the poll is measured by its approach, record, and transparency, and by whether it declares the limits of its knowledge, not by its ability to produce a headline that satisfies a political audience.
What to Watch
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
Polls will continue to underestimate Republicans' relative strength in the 2024 election despite their overall accuracy improving
Likely · Within weeks
Open Questions
- Will the accuracy of polls improve in the 2026 elections with more transparent approaches?
- What is the long-term impact of losing confidence in polls on the democratic process?
- Can new methodological corrections effectively address party affiliation bias?







