◎ Chen Qingyun
Drones have evolved from tools for people's livelihood to an indispensable asymmetric combat force in modern warfare. The Ukraine-Russia war further proved that drones are a complete industrial chain that combines chips, communications, navigation, artificial intelligence and information security. The government is in the right direction in promoting the transfer of drone technology and industrial development; however, it has recently been reported that manufacturers are suspected of using Chinese-made components as domestic products to obtain government bids, which inevitably makes people question: Is it the Taiwanese industry or the Chinese supply chain that the country has invested huge budgets in supporting?
Preventing the risk of disconnection and national security backdoors
The Eighth Army Corps purchased defense drones, but the unscrupulous manufacturer was caught using Chinese parts to assemble them. Schematic diagram. (File photo) The drone industry involves major budgets and national security. It is the oversight responsibility of Congress for the opposition parties to review the budget in accordance with the law, track the effectiveness of technology transfer, and inspect the procurement procedures and product sources. Supervision is not about blocking industrial development. The larger the budget and the more important the plan, the more clearly the purpose of funds and policy benefits should be explained to build social trust.
However, the purpose of supervision should be to identify loopholes and promote improvements, rather than deleting the budget for the sake of deleting the budget. If the government proposes a complete industrial policy, reasonable technology transfer prices, a clear localization process and verifiable performance indicators, Congress should also provide necessary support. Faced with the national goal of establishing an independent drone supply chain, the government and the opposition should work together to safeguard the bottom line of national security.
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In particular, drones used in national defense and critical infrastructure must have "zero tolerance" for the counterfeiting of Chinese-made components. This is not just an issue of origin labeling, but also involves the risk of data leakage, remote control and disconnection. A drone labeled "Made in Taiwan" may actually have a national security backdoor if its core chip and flight control system are still controlled by China and appear to be domestically produced.
Therefore, the "de-Chinese" approach to drones is not an ideology, but a matter of national security risk management. The government should establish a traceability system for the source of components and components, and conduct phased inspections from bidding, acceptance to mass production; those who falsely label or use Chinese-made components in violation of regulations should terminate the contract, recover subsidies, and be held accountable in accordance with the law.
From "domestic assembly" to "core independence"
However, "de-China" cannot only be a ban, but also requires building up one's own capabilities. If Taiwan lacks key technologies such as motors, flight controls, and communication modules, companies will still face difficulties in mass production. In addition to purchasing finished products, the government should also invest in research and development, assist in testing and verification, and support mass production with stable orders, so that Taiwan's drones can truly move from "domestic assembly" to "core independence."
Technology transfer is only the starting point, not the end. True industrial independence is not about buying a few design drawings, nor is it about replacing foreign parts with Taiwanese labels. What Taiwan needs is a safe, trustworthy, and uncontrolled supply chain. Budgets need to be monitored, Chinese goods need to be strictly inspected, and industries need to be supported. All three are indispensable in order to protect Taiwan at critical moments.
The government should allow Taiwan's drones to truly move from "domestic assembly" to "core autonomy." The picture shows that the Ruiyuan II UAV developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences has been confirmed to be mass-produced. (File photo, taken from the website of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) (The author is the former director of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the Legislative Yuan)
