Huang Renxun's extramarital affair raises suspicions of Chinese chip infiltration! Lee Chung-hsien warns: Taiwan’s national security system may have loopholes

After Nvidia CEO Jen-Hsun Huang admitted his extramarital affair on the 8th, his relationship with Huang Le, CEO of Singapore Data Center Company, who is suspected of working for Chinese intelligence agencies, is evolving into the latest geopolitical storm between the United States and China. In this regard, scholar Li Zhongxian said that when Taiwan is the core of the global semiconductor industry, but has long faced Chinese penetration and military threats, Taiwan will naturally become an important field for various intelligence activities. If we still have system loopholes in protecting our own technology and preventing illegal chips from flowing to hostile forces, then how much more peace of mind can we have with the most advanced chips?

Li Zhongxian said in a Facebook post that with the recent news about Huang Renxun and Huang Le, many people have focused on the extramarital affair, but what I am more concerned about is how much price is China willing to pay to obtain the most advanced chips, artificial intelligence technology, and related industry and policy intelligence from the United States and Taiwan? Will China give up on the tasks that Zhao Weiguo of Ziguang Group failed to complete? As long as China wants to catch up with the United States in the fields of semiconductors and artificial intelligence, it will definitely continue to look for various channels. From corporate mergers and acquisitions, talent poaching, technology theft, chip smuggling, to approaching people who hold key information through interpersonal relationships, the means may be different, but the purpose is clear. The target will not only be Taiwan, but any company with key technologies around the world.

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Li Zhongxian pointed out that the most noteworthy thing about Huang Renxun's incident is not his personal feelings, but the US intelligence agency's suspicion that China may approach him through Huang Le to collect Huida's business and policy information. According to media reports, Megaspeed, a Singaporean company where Huang Le once worked, is under investigation by the United States regarding chip export controls. What China really wants to control may not only be the physical chips, but also who can get priority in obtaining the chips, the planning of next-generation products, and the U.S. government’s export control policy towards China. Of course, there is currently no public evidence to confirm that Huang Renxun leaked secrets, and related espionage charges remain to be investigated. However, the national security risks revealed by this incident must not be regarded as just sexy news.

Lee Chung-hsien continued: China will take these measures against the United States, but won’t it also take them against Taiwan? Are Taiwan's national security agencies capable of handling these issues? Can our legal and law enforcement systems really keep up with changes in information technology? I once heard a story told by the chief of IOC. Once, a smuggling ship was seized. In order to avoid detection, the smugglers quickly threw away drugs and other prohibited items. However, the most secret and precious space on the ship actually contained a chip. This incident left a deep impression on me. If I think about it carefully, this is actually very reasonable. After the information technology revolution, chips are no longer just ordinary commodities, but strategic resources supporting artificial intelligence, military technology, drones, communication systems and national security. To some criminal groups and the buyers behind them, advanced chips may be worth far more than drugs. Drugs can make people make money, but advanced chips can allow a country to change the situation of military and technological competition.

Li Zhongxian added, what really makes me feel ridiculous is that the officer went on to tell me that he was caught smuggling chips but could not find appropriate legal charges. In the end, he used forged documents to handle the case because the actual destination of the chips did not match the place declared in the customs declaration documents. Taiwan does not have no laws controlling the export of high-tech goods. The "Trade Law" already has export controls and related penalties for strategic high-tech goods, and the "National Security Law" also has provisions for protecting the country's core and key technologies. The question is, are these laws sufficient in the face of multinational enterprises, third-party transshipment, cloud computing power leasing, technology outflow and intelligence penetration? Can different national security agencies cooperate effectively? Can law enforcement officials identify the real end user behind a batch of chips?

Li Zhongxian analyzed that the most ridiculous situation is that smugglers already know the strategic value of the chip, but our system may still be stuck at the stage of checking whether the customs declaration documents are correct. What is even more incomprehensible is that Taiwan faces such a clear national security threat, but the Legislative Yuan is still arguing over the defense budget for drones, anti-drone systems, and tactical intelligence integration. Recently, civil society groups have even publicly called on the eight KMT legislators who ran for county and mayor elections, including Legislator Xie Longjie, who elected Tainan mayor, hoping that they can support the additional defense budget that is related to Taiwan's drone combat capabilities. While China is actively acquiring advanced chips and expanding its artificial intelligence and military technology capabilities, some politicians in Taiwan are thinking about the next election rather than the next possible war.

Li Zhongxian emphasized that we often understand national security as warships, missiles and fighter planes, but ignore that modern warfare has already extended to chips, algorithms, supply chains, data centers and human relationship networks. Technological prowess does not automatically translate into national security. Taiwan has a world-class semiconductor industry, but it does not mean that we have world-class technology security governance capabilities.

This is why I think what Taiwan is really concerned about in the Jen-Hsun Huang incident is not who had an extramarital affair with whom, but whether China has the ability to gradually get closer to the core technological assets of Taiwan and the United States through business contacts, interpersonal relationships, and cross-border transactions.

Li Zhongxian bluntly said that when Taiwan is the core of the global semiconductor industry, but has long faced Chinese penetration and military threats, Taiwan will naturally become an important field for various intelligence activities. If we still have system loopholes in protecting our own technology and preventing illegal chips from flowing to hostile forces, then how much more peace of mind can we have with the most advanced chips? The most worrying thing is not that China does not know how important the chip is, but that China has known it for a long time, but there are still some people with political power in Taiwan who do not really understand this matter.