On September 16, von der Leyen invited Canada to become the EU's first "associate member" in her annual address to the European Parliament; the next day, Carney responded at the same podium: Canada and Europe are not allies that only appear in good times. At the same time, Trump threatened to impose heavy taxes on Europe if the move was made with bad motives. The three parties are all talking about an alliance, but they are speaking three different languages.
Let’s first dismantle the most tempting term “associate member states”. The current EU treaties do not have the legal status, rights and procedures of "associate member states". Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union only allows "European countries" to apply for formal accession to the EU; however, Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows the EU to conclude association agreements with third countries. Therefore, what von der Leyen proposed was not a printed membership card, but a political framework to be jointly defined by the 27 countries. Carney also said that Canada does not seek to formally join the alliance, and the name is not as important as the content. The final arrangement must be voted by Congress.
What really comes to fruition is alliances based on functions. Canada has become the first non-European country to participate in the EU's SAFE common arms procurement tool and has obtained a looser origin arrangement; Montreal Marconi has also become the first Canadian company to obtain a SAFE framework contract. Canada is also promoting the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank, which is still under preparation. In addition to Canada, eight countries have pledged support. These are more specific than the word "associate member" and are closer to what Carney said: the existing system is organized geographically, but the required capabilities are organized functionally.
The biggest accelerator for steering comes from the south. The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement was not extended for 16 years in July. Although it is still in effect until 2036, it has been reviewed year by year. In August, the US imposed a 50% tariff on approximately US$20 billion in Canadian goods, and in September it announced import restrictions and procurement inspections. Although the proportion of Canada's non-U.S. exports rose to 32%. 8. About 72% of merchandise exports still go to the United States, and a large part of the increase comes from gold exports to the United Kingdom. Dispersion is taking place and industrial restructuring is not yet complete.
Nor is Europe a cost-free alternative. Nearly ten years after the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was signed, ten countries have still not ratified it, and the investment protection and investment court system has not yet taken effect. 81% of Canadians support deepening integration outside the EU, but only 49% support formal EU membership. Support for proximity does not amount to authorization to accept the full obligations of supranational membership.
So this is not a farewell to America, but what Carney called "variable geometry" in Davos in January: coalitions with different partners on different issues. Canada is also expanding cooperation with China, India, Australia, Japan and other partners; the goal is not to be self-sufficient, nor to reduce dependence on the United States to zero, but to make any single power lose the ability to monopolize Canada's options. American pressure is the accelerator, not the entire cause.
In this regard, Taiwan can learn from three things: the decentralized standard is to form a credible alternative, not to return to zero; if the geographical club cannot enter, it can still use key minerals, AI, defense financing and supply chain capabilities in exchange for functional seats; the name can be vague, but the obligations, approvals, governance and consequences of default cannot be vague.
It can be seen that Carney did not dismantle geography itself, he dismantled geography’s monopoly on alliance qualifications. The test point of the Montreal Summit at the end of October is not whether a treaty can be signed immediately, but whether there is a negotiation mandate, clear scope, timetable, governance and approval path.
