Huida CEO Huang Renxun confessed to having an extramarital affair with Huang Le, a woman suspected of being a Chinese spy, which attracted international attention. Zhang Kunyang, a researcher at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, USA, revealed that he and Huida had had a confrontation over China's procurement of chips and comprehensively analyzed Huida's relationship with China.
Zhang Kunyang said on Facebook on the 9th that in the past few years, he has done a lot of research on the Chinese military’s use of Huida chips, DeepSeek, and military-civilian integration, so he wanted to share some observations with everyone based on his own research and Washington’s experience.
Zhang Kunyang first mentioned that Huida's board of directors has launched an independent investigation into Huang Renxun, trying to clarify whether Huang Renxun has become the target of Chinese intelligence operations. The U.S. Congress has also asked Huang to provide an explanation for his contact with female spies and the company's security mechanism. At this stage, there is no evidence that Huang Renxun deliberately leaked secrets to China, and he cannot be deemed to have problems because of his personal relationship.
However, Zhang Kunyang emphasized that if Huang Renxun's status in the U.S. technology industry and government decision-making circles is taken into account, this matter does deserve serious investigation. Moreover, Huida has been very active in lobbying in Washington in the past two years, hiring a large number of people familiar with government, Congress, and science and technology policies to lobby the White House, the Department of Commerce, and Congress in the hope of relaxing restrictions on chip exports to China.
Zhang Kunyang pointed out that Huida has been very active in contacting think tanks and scholars who study China's technology, semiconductors and export controls in recent years. When relevant articles criticize Huida's China business, the company will often proactively contact the researchers, try to challenge the research conclusions, and persuade them to accept the company's policy stance.
Zhang Kunyang believes that companies certainly have the right to refute research. However, if companies use their resources, connections and institutional relationships to put pressure on researchers with different opinions, or even try to silence critical voices, this should be a cause for concern.
Zhang Kunyang revealed that he himself had a head-to-head confrontation with Huida. Last year, he and his research team published a study on the military application of DeepSeek, revealing how the Chinese People's Liberation Army uses DeepSeek in military command, drones, intelligence analysis and smart operations. At the same time, he also found Chinese military research institutions to continue to "seek to purchase" Huida chips.
Zhang Kunyang said that after the publication of this study, Huida took the initiative to meet with him and arranged for someone who seemed to have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to debate with him the issue of the Chinese military's use of Huida chips and U.S. export controls.
Zhang Kunyang said that his research in April this year also found further evidence that Chinese institutions are seeking H200 chips. In the bidding documents of some Chinese universities and state-owned institutions, although some procurement projects say "domestic chips," the technical specifications are consistent with Huida's H200.
Zhang Kunyang revealed that in the investigation report released by Bloomberg on June 1, he also assisted in the research standards to identify the relationship between Chinese universities and the People's Liberation Army and the national defense industry. It was found that at least 7 universities related to the Chinese military are seeking to obtain the right to use H200 chips, including Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Northwestern Polytechnical University and other "seven national defense universities", and more than 25 related institutions are using or seeking to obtain other Huida chips.
Zhang Kunyang said that "seeking procurement" does not mean that the chips have been successfully obtained, but these documents at least show that even if China vigorously develops domestic semiconductors, the relevant scientific research systems of the People's Liberation Army still have actual demand for high-end AI chips from the United States, and these are all evidence found in Chinese procurement documents.
Returning to the spy scandal involving Huang Renxun, Zhang Kunyang believes that the outside world may be too focused on the issue of whether commercial secrets have been leaked, but from the perspective of intelligence work, there is no need to go to this step. After all, Huang Renxun has met with Trump many times and discussed U.S. AI and export control policies. Huang also often contacts senior U.S. government officials, members of Congress, and CEOs of other global technology giants.
Zhang Kunyang analyzed that if China’s Ministry of National Security can learn from people close to Huang Jen-Hsun what he talked to Trump, the White House’s attitude towards export controls, how Huida assesses Sino-US technology competition, and even other technology industry CEOs’ views on China and Taiwan issues, then this information itself is already of great intelligence value.
Zhang Kunyang said that what deserves more attention is whether long-term contact with communist spies may affect Huang Renxun's own judgment, such as how he views Taiwan's security, how he understands China's threats to U.S. technology companies, and how he explains to Trump the impact of China's export controls.
Zhang Kunyang believes that if someone can slowly influence Huang Renxun's ideas, and Huang can directly communicate with the President of the United States and other decision-makers, then this channel of contact is already very valuable to the intelligence agency.
Of course, Zhang Kunyang emphasized that he was not saying that these things had happened, but if he really only asked whether the chip design had been stolen, he would probably ignore the intelligence risks that really need to be assessed.
Next, Zhang Kunyang mentioned that there are sometimes conflicts between Huida's commercial interests and U.S. national security. There is a saying in Washington that "the United States should allow Huida to continue selling chips to China in order to maintain its technological advantage." However, judging from the research he and his team have done in the past two years, China's military-civilian integration system can connect the scientific research activities of universities, enterprises, and the military. Of course, Huida can say that it does not sell chips directly to the People's Liberation Army, but this statement does not fully answer the ultimate purpose of the chips.
Zhang Kunyang said that Washington should more carefully examine Huida chip end users, third-party procurement and cloud computing channels, and ensure that when formulating export policies, it will not rely too much on the company's own claims.
Zhang Kunyang pointed out that "chips are the oil of the 21st century." Huida, as one of the most important companies in the world, has an absolute responsibility to do more to ensure that advanced chips will not flow into the Chinese market, allowing the CCP to promote artificial intelligence and the People's Liberation Army's "intelligent warfare" capabilities.
