With the start of receiving requests to nominate lists for the Palestinian legislative elections, which will be held on the 28th of next November simultaneously in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, representatives of electoral lists raced to the committee’s headquarters in Al-Bireh and Deir Al-Balah to register their applications, in a scene that had been absent from the Palestinians for two decades.
The Palestinian Central Elections Commission published a video clip on its social media accounts, showing the opening of the doors of its main headquarters in Al-Bireh, and the entry of representatives of the electoral lists to register them among the first lists that will have the opportunity to register within a period of 12 days.
The committee confirmed, in a statement, that the early morning hours witnessed a large turnout from candidate lists in its offices in Ramallah and Deir al-Balah. She indicated in another statement at the close of registration for the first day of applications that she had received 6 applications for nominations for lists: “Future Palestine Coalition,” “Justice and Construction,” “Unity and Democratic Change,” “National Initiative,” “New Path,” and “Labor.”
The committee stressed that submitting a candidacy application does not mean final acceptance of the list, as all applications are subject to review and scrutiny to ensure that they meet the legal conditions, and that the required forms and documents are completed, before the decision is made and the list is officially notified within 3 days of submitting the application.
The “Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine” announced the submission of its own list bearing the name “Unity and Democratic Change,” indicating that it preferred to run in the legislative elections alone, instead of the option of joining a national list sought by “Hamas,” and apparently due to the failure of the option of heading for a unified leftist list with the “Popular Front” and other factions, which is an option that it preferred over any other options, and in the event of its failure, it would have preferred the option of the general national list. As sources from the front revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat a few weeks ago.
Magda Al-Masry, Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Front, said during a press conference in Ramallah that these elections aim to rebuild the Palestinian political system based on popular legitimacy, usually as they will be an entry point that establishes the restoration of national unity and an end to division, in a way that achieves the possibility of forming a national consensus government that works to unify the Palestinian regime and preserve the legal unity of the occupied territories in light of the challenges that the issue is currently experiencing.
The “Palestinian Popular Struggle Front” also announced the submission of a list called the “Future Palestine Coalition,” and it bore the number “1,” as it was the first list to register, and it included 114 male and female candidates from the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. Women constituted 40 percent of the list, while the percentage of youth reached 33 percent.
While the “National Initiative” list is headed by Mustafa Barghouti, Secretary-General of the “Palestinian National Initiative Movement,” along with a group of members of his party and figures representing independents.
Nominations for membership in the Legislative Council are made through electoral lists only, and individual applications for candidacy are not accepted, so that the number of candidates on the list is not less than 16 and not more than 132, while adhering to the minimum representation of women in accordance with the provisions of the law.
In this context, the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization confirmed that it is committed to holding legislative elections in accordance with the law in the entire jurisdiction of the State of Palestine (East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip), stressing, in a statement following a meeting held on Friday, that the participation of Palestinians in all these areas, and holding the ballot there simultaneously, are basic conditions for the unity of the electoral process, declaring its support for President Mahmoud Abbas’s call to immediately initiate a comprehensive Palestinian national dialogue, in a way that strengthens the unity of the electoral process. National ranks, protects the national project, and unites efforts to confront the challenges faced by the Palestinian people.
The Iraqi government announced, on Saturday, that it is holding direct talks with Washington to obtain an exemption for Iraqi airports from preventing Iranian airline flights under US sanctions, while armed factions and parties allied with Iran threaten to stage a sit-in at Iraqi airports in protest against Iraq’s compliance with the sanctions.
The Iraqi government says that the sanctions “impede the travel of patients, students, and visitors to religious shrines,” but government officials confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that “land crossings are still open between the two countries, and are witnessing normal movement of passengers and goods even after air navigation restrictions.”
The Prime Minister's Media Office stated that "the Iraqi government is conducting a direct dialogue with the American side to exclude some Iraqi airports from these measures."
The office explained that the exception “allows the resumption of flights for humanitarian reasons, related to treatment, study, religious visits, and the interests of civilians.”
Iranian airlines are originally responsible for transporting Iranians who come to Iraq in large numbers to visit shrines, or Iraqis who wish to travel to Iran, whether for religious visits, or who are pursuing their studies in Iran, or who go there for medical purposes.
A number of Iraqis complained, according to Agence France-Presse, that the implementation of US sanctions forced them to search for solutions. Some of them fear that they will no longer be able to receive treatment in Iran, while others are stuck in Iran and their only option is to return by land to their country, a journey that takes more than 12 hours.
Iraq joined several countries, including the United Arab Emirates, that suspended Iranian flights to and from its territory after US Treasury Secretary Scott Besent said that “all Iranian airlines will stop operating as of September 23.”
Foreign companies providing assistance to the Iranian aviation sector were given until September 23 to comply, by stopping supplying Iranian aircraft with kerosene fuel, for example.
Failure to comply with the US ban exposes these companies to the risk of being included in the “blacklist”, thus isolating them from the dollar financial system.
For its part, Khomeini Airport in Tehran announced, on Saturday, the continuation of flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam and Afghanistan, according to their previous schedules, noting in a press statement that “the canceled flights included the destinations of the Emirates, Iraq, Oman and Georgia.”
Politically, Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Iranian leader for international affairs, attacked the decision to close Iraqi airports, including Najaf airport, to Iranian flights, sending a message to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, while describing the “coordination framework” as “empty” as a result of his silence on this decision.
Velayati wrote, in a post on “X” on Friday evening, that “the enemy is trying to undermine (the unity of the arenas) from within to compensate for his defeat in the military field,” considering that “this division was evident today in Najaf, where the airport, which was a gateway for visiting religious shrines, was closed.”
Addressing the Iraqi Prime Minister, he added: “Mr. Al-Zaidi, legitimacy does not come from Washington, but from Najaf.” Velayati continued, “(The coordination framework) was built on the trust of the resistance and the blood of the martyrs,” considering that “his silence today is an empty frame on the wall of power,” before affirming that “the arenas bound by blood are not disintegrated by conspiracies.” Khamenei's advisor concluded: “From Sanaa to Najaf, the resistance front is united.”
The head of the “Al-Nujaba Movement” faction, Akram Al-Kaabi, launched a sharp attack on the political positions that could cut off air traffic between Iraq and Iran, calling on citizens to prepare for a sit-in inside Iraqi airports until the American decision is broken.
Al-Kaabi said: “We are not waiting long. If the matter is not addressed, American hegemony is removed, and aviation is not restored, then we call on the people to stage a sit-in at Iraqi airports until the decision is broken.”
The First Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Adnan Faihan Al-Dulaimi, a leader in the Asaib Ahl al-Haq movement, threatened to hold a parliamentary session to nullify the government’s decision if it did not retract it.
In a press statement, Al-Dulaimi denounced what he described as “the government’s acquiescence to the (US Treasury’s) measures regarding the ban on civil aviation with Iran,” warning of “the repercussions of this decision and the possibility of Tehran reciprocating, which may affect the economic reality and deprive Iraq of gas supplies to electric power plants.”
An official in the government of Maysan Governorate, bordering Iran, said that the border crossings with the eastern neighbor are open without restrictions. The official confirmed in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “the Al-Shayb crossings in Maysan and Zurbatiyah in Wasit Governorate and Al-Shalamcheh in Basra are still receiving Iranian visitors and food and other materials imported by Iraq.”
A Kurdish official in Sulaymaniyah Governorate told Asharq Al-Awsat that the crossings from the Kurdistan region are operating at their normal capacity with Iran.
The number of main official land crossings and ports between Iraq and Iran is 9, in addition to other unofficial crossings, all of which are used for commercial exchange, in addition to the passage of travelers and visitors for religious tourism purposes.
In addition, political activist Ghaleb Al-Daami confirmed that “Iraq is essentially committed to the sanctions on Iran, and they are not limited to airlines only.”
Al-Daami said in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) is holding 12 billion US dollars belonging to Iran, and has not been able to disburse it to it until today. Al-Daami pointed out that “the aviation blockade is a partial blockade,” ruling out that it would have a significant impact on Iran, reminding that “the parties and entities that oppose Baghdad’s compliance with the sanctions did not oppose Iran preventing Iraqi oil tankers from passing through the Strait of Hormuz.”
However, Al-Daami explained that “the land borders are still open between the two countries through 12 crossings that can be used to compensate for flights as much as possible.”
Legal expert Saif Al-Saadi said, “Iraq closed its airports to Iranian aviation under duress, to avoid American sanctions that might cause the civil aviation system great losses.”
Al-Saadi said in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that although unilateral sanctions do not have an automatic binding force on Iraqi state institutions like UN Security Council resolutions, because the Iraqi banking system is subject to the requirements of the global financial system and dealing in the dollar linked to the US Treasury, Iraqi institutions and companies are forced to comply with the sanctions in order to “avoid harsh penalties if they violate the restrictions.”
In the same context, writer Falah Al-Mishaal said that “Iraqi public opinion sympathizes with the besieged people, because of the harsh siege that the Iraqis were subjected to during the nineties,” but he pointed out that “it is difficult to overcome reality under the current circumstances; This is because violating the blockade will harm Iraq, putting it before a choice that must be adhered to,” he said, holding Iran responsible for what happens “as a result of its insistence on possessing nuclear weapons.”
On the second anniversary of the assassination of the former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, the party did not succeed in completely overcoming the absence of the man who held its leadership for more than three decades, and turned the General Secretariat into a political, organizational, military and popular center of gravity that is difficult to replace.
Hezbollah is commemorating the second anniversary of the assassination of Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safi al-Din, on Sunday, as it holds a popular festival at the shrine of Nasrallah in the southern suburb of Beirut, during which its new Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, speaks, amid measures that include closing the roads leading to the shrine site from the Old Airport Road side and the Ziad Rahbani Highway, and diverting traffic to other roads.
It does not seem that the current Secretary-General Naeem Qassem has succeeded, according to those close to the party and those opposed to it, in filling the void left by his predecessor, while on the other hand, an increasing shift has emerged in the decision-making center within the party, with the margin of internal initiative declining in favor of the decision coming directly from Iran.
The party's opponents say that the issue is not only related to the difference in charisma and public presence between the two men, but rather the nature of the role that Nasrallah played within the party. He combined the political, organizational, and military leadership in his person, and formed the primary link with the public and the Iranian ally, while the party today appears to have a more collective and organized leadership, but with a more direct Iranian role in making choices and decisions.
While those close to Hezbollah believe that it was able, despite the blows it received, to reorganize its ranks and maintain its cohesion under the leadership of Naim Qassem, its opponents believe that the aftermath of Nasrallah revealed a leadership crisis and a decline in the ability to mobilize, in addition to the emergence of internal divisions as a result of Qassem’s performance.
Political writer Dr. Qasim Kassir, who is closely familiar with Hezbollah’s position, acknowledges that the party after Nasrallah “faced many obstacles, internal and external, after a long period of central leadership during which Nasrallah held the reins of the party for about 33 years, from 1992 until 2024, before he was assassinated in very difficult circumstances,” pointing out that “despite the loss of the two secretaries-general (Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din) and a number of his cadres.” And its leaders, Hezbollah succeeded in reorganizing its ranks and arranging its security and organizational conditions under the leadership of Sheikh Naim Qassem.
Kassir believes in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “the party faces new challenges today, and this has prompted it to adopt a different performance, both internally and externally.” He added: “If (Hezbollah) was in a previous stage a major regional player, today it is largely focused on its internal situation, southern Lebanon, and confronting Israel.” He continues: “It is true that he is no longer the most powerful political player on the internal scene as he was before, but he is still a basic political force, and internal and external forces still deal with him as a major party in the Lebanese equation.”
In response to a question about the charisma that Nasrallah enjoyed, and which many believe that Qasim lacked, Kassir says: “There is no doubt that this charisma was special, but Sheikh Naim is a very important organizational and administrative figure, and he succeeded in reorganizing the party’s ranks and maintaining its cohesion at an extremely difficult stage, considering that the party is facing a new stage that requires new performance, whether on the political, military, or jihadi level.”
On the other hand, Jad Al-Akhawi, head of the “Coalition of Lebanese Democrats” and a (Shiite) opponent of Hezbollah, believes that “it is difficult to say that Naim Qassem has so far been able to fill the void left by Hassan Nasrallah. The issue is not related to charisma alone, but rather to the nature of the leadership that Nasrallah built over more than three decades, and his ability to combine organizational, political, and military leadership and communicate with the party’s audience. Qasim, on the other hand, came from an organizational and ideological background more than a popular one, and for decades he was Deputy Secretary-General and not the primary center of gravity.
Al-Akhawi said in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “what is striking about Qasim’s appearance is the nature of his appearance. He appears on the screen, but without that direct contact with the audience, which was an essential part of Nasrallah's image. Indeed, some of the looks appear to be very controlled and directed to the point that they sometimes give a visual impression as if we are in front of an image or character produced by artificial intelligence more than we are in front of a political leader interacting directly with his audience.”
He adds: “Nasrallah was not just Secretary-General, but for the party’s audience, he was part of the mechanism of mobilization, persuasion, and decision-making. As for Naeem Qasim, it has not yet been proven that he was able to inherit all of these jobs together. Therefore, the question is no longer just whether Qasim is able to fill Nasrallah’s void, but rather whether (Hezbollah) itself is capable of producing similar leadership after the collapse of a large part of its old leadership structure.”
For her part, the political activist and professor of psychology at the Lebanese University, Dr. Mona Fayyad, stops at Hezbollah’s ability to mobilize people, considering that it has declined significantly under Qassem’s General Secretariat, noting that “the party suffers from internal divisions between those who support Qassem and those who oppose him, which has affected the way decision-making is made and the stage is managed.”
Mona Fayyad believes that Qasim’s current performance “serves Israel,” which makes targeting him not in its interest. You also see that decisions within the party are now coming directly from Iran, with the Lebanese decision-making margin declining to its minimum limits.
In this context, Fayyad speaks of Iranian “desperation” to keep the Iranian ambassador in Beirut, “because his role goes beyond diplomatic work to security tasks,” describing him as an “intelligence man” whom Tehran seeks to keep to complete his duties.
