What did Benjamin Netanyahu know, and when, October 7, 2023? His former military secretary accuses his cabinet of having falsified a report which allows it to be established: in an interview published this Friday, October 9 by the Israeli daily Israel Hayom, Avi Gil affirms that the time of one of his calls to the Prime Minister, on the morning of October 7, 2023, would have been brought forward by eleven minutes on a document. It specifically calls into question the office of the Israeli Prime Minister: in January 2024, it would have required a stenographer to replace “6:40 a.m.” with “6:29 a.m.”, despite the digital timestamp. “Tzachi Braverman, (the chief of staff, Editor’s note) took his blue marker and simply wrote “6:29 a.m.” on the transcript,” reports Gil, who claims to have immediately reported the facts in writing to the Attorney General, Gali Baharav-Miara.
These two times correspond to two separate calls, made by Gil himself. At 6:29 a.m., he wakes Netanyahu up on WhatsApp: Hamas is launching rocket salvos at Israel and he suspects a large-scale surprise attack. At 6:40 a.m., he called him back on a secure line to send him the information collected in the meantime. “During these eleven minutes, I received information and information that I did not have during the first call,” he emphasizes. Changing the time of the second exchange would therefore make it appear that the Prime Minister had received this information from the first.
Time matters
Gil suspects Netanyahu of having wanted to make people believe that he had given his instructions earlier than in reality. His testimony is based on an old habit: recording the facts when they occur. Responsible for liaison between the Prime Minister, the army and the security services, he attended the most sensitive consultations. He served the prime ministers Naftali Bennett, Yaïr Lapid, then Benjamin Netanyahu, before leaving office in May 2024.
His story also goes back to the warnings received before the massacre. In July 2023, according to him, Ronen Bar, then director of Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security service, had warned Netanyahu of a risk of war: the divisions caused by judicial reform were weakening the country and could encourage his enemies to act. This warning, however, did not announce the attack of October 7. “He said he couldn’t say when, where or how,” Gil reports. To examine these threats, he claims to have proposed several times to the prime minister to bring together the heads of the army, the Shin Bet and the Mossad: “Once, he considered it, then refused.”
An agreement at the cost of a majority
Avi Gil also reports that before October 7, 2023, Ronen Bar had recommended on at least three occasions targeted strikes on the main Hamas officials in Gaza, with scenarios going so far as to target Yahya Sinouar, then leader of the movement in the enclave and main architect of October 7, and Mohammed Deif, head of its armed wing. According to him, these proposals were not followed by action, for fear of an escalation and while the government was seeking a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia at the time. After the first truce in November 2023, a new hostage release project was planned, according to Gil. Netanyahu reportedly asked him to present it to ministers, but then gave up after a threat from Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich which could have cost him his government. According to Gil, other hostages could have returned alive earlier.
