On Thursday, October 1, 2026, European Union interior ministers reached a final consensus on legislation regulating how to remove those whose asylum requests have been rejected from EU countries, and where they can be sent when they cannot be deported to their countries of origin. The decision reveals a clear political shift, which accelerated after the unprecedented Ceuta crisis last summer, according to the Tagesschau website.
The Council of the European Union finally approved a new European deportation regulation, after approval by the European Parliament in June, thus ending the legislative process. One of its most prominent elements is allowing the establishment of what are known as “return centers” outside the European Union. Persons against whom a final decision to leave may be transferred to a third country, even if it is not their country of origin, provided that there is an agreement with it and it respects international human rights standards and the principle of non-refoulement. Unaccompanied minors are excluded from these arrangements.
The European problem: many decisions... and little deportation
This new hardening comes in an attempt to address a chronic problem that Europe has not been able to solve despite years of reforms. In 2025, the actual implementation rate of return decisions did not exceed 28 percent, which is nevertheless the highest rate recorded in ten years. In other words, most people who are ordered to leave do not actually leave. The European Parliament attributes this to many reasons, most notably the difficulty of determining the country of origin in some cases, the refusal of some countries to take back their citizens, as well as the failure of some people to comply with departure orders, as stated on the European Parliament’s website.
Therefore, the new regulation is not limited to external deportation centers. It creates a “European Return Order” to facilitate the identification of deportation decisions between member states, and requires those obligated to leave to cooperate with the authorities. Refusal to cooperate can, according to national law, result in the reduction of some benefits, deprivation of incentives for voluntary return, and the imposition of fines or even criminal penalties in some cases. As for persons classified as a security risk, they may be detained for more than 24 months, and long or indefinite restrictions may be imposed on them before they are allowed to return to the Union if this is proportionate to the danger.
Ceuta...the moment that accelerated the transformation
This debate is accelerating in Europe after the "Ceuta shock." On July 30, tens of thousands of Moroccans entered the Spanish enclave within a very short period, amid a wave of misinformation on the Internet. A study issued by the European Parliament's research service estimates the number at about 80,000 people. Most of the arrivals were returned to Morocco within days, but the crisis revealed the sensitivity of European borders to a sudden mass arrival of this size.
Most importantly, the Ceuta crisis changed the nature of the debate. From the perspective of a number of European governments, migration is no longer only a humanitarian and security issue, but it could also become a means of geopolitical pressure or the result of organized disinformation and smuggling campaigns. Therefore, German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt supported the establishment of exceptional rules that allow in times of crises not to apply traditional asylum procedures in the usual way, considering that the arrival of tens of thousands simultaneously due to misinformation or smuggling networks requires a different intervention mechanism, as reported by the German News Agency.
This trend is consistent with the path announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in September, towards a European crisis response framework that allows temporary flexibility when migrant flows are believed to be directed or “weaponized” against the Union. However, the final details of this framework are not yet clear, while the idea intersects with the crisis mechanisms that already exist in the new European asylum system.
Germany is at the forefront of the extremist camp
Several countries, including Germany, Austria, Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands, are working to support the idea of external return centers. German Interior Minister Dobrindt announced that preliminary talks are being held with third countries, hoping to reach a concrete agreement to establish one of these centers before the end of the year, without revealing the countries with which Germany is officially negotiating.
This is where the practical problem begins. Issuing a law within Europe is much easier than convincing a country outside it to receive people who are not its citizens for potentially long periods. This means that the success of the project will depend on diplomacy, money, trade incentives and European visas as much as on immigration legislation itself. The European Commission acknowledges that the return policy depends on the cooperation of third countries, and that the Union is already using tools including finance, visa policy and trade to enhance this cooperation.
Significant human rights obstacles
International experiences do not provide a completely reassuring answer. A European Parliament study of Australia's experiences with Nauru and Papua Guinea, the previous British project with Rwanda, and the Italian model in Albania concluded that offshoring can be expensive, limited in number and subject to frequent legal challenges. In the British case, for example, the Rwanda project ended after spending huge sums of money without transferring significant numbers, while the Italian model in Albania faced a series of judicial objections.
There is also the more difficult legal question: Europe can transfer the person outside its borders, but it cannot simply transfer its legal responsibilities with him. The regulation requires respect for human rights and the principle of non-refoulement, while human rights organizations warn that monitoring the conditions of people inside centers located in third countries will be more complicated. European Parliament research also predicts that these centers will become the subject of a series of disputes before the courts over detention conditions, the legally responsible state, and access to justice.
The irony is that the European Union is toughening up at a time when the numbers of irregular entry and asylum applications have actually declined in recent years. This suggests that the transformation is not driven by numbers alone, but also by the European political mood, security concerns, pressure from right-wing and populist parties, in addition to the shock of sudden incidents such as Ceuta.
Consequently, observers point out that the new decision is not just a technical amendment to the deportation rules, but rather a sign of the transition of European policy from managing immigration within the Union’s borders to trying to manage it abroad as well. However, a lot of work remains, especially in terms of finding countries willing to host return centres, ensuring that they do not turn into open detention areas, and proving that the regime is indeed capable of increasing deportations.
