Foreign media article recommends: Taiwan should increase its number of small motorized ships to strengthen its Taiwan Strait denial capabilities

Small surface warships of the Taiwan Navy are conducting drills off the coast of Kaohsiung; an article published in Foreign Affairs argued that Taiwan can rethink the direction of building a military with large destroyers and frigates as the core, and increase the number of smaller, more maneuverable surface combatants that can be deployed in a dispersed manner.

[Compiled by Chen Chengliang/Comprehensive Report] The Taiwan Navy has long relied on large surface combatants such as destroyers and frigates as the core of its fleet. However, former U.S. Pacific Command Commander Dennis Blair and former National Defense University War College Honorary Lecturer Liao Hongxiang believe that Taiwan should rethink the direction of its navy and add more, smaller and more maneuverable surface combatants to cope with possible cross-sea landings launched by China.

"Foreign Affairs" published an article by the two on the 4th, "How Taiwan Can Win the Strait: A Nimbler Navy Can Deny China." Blair served as commander of the U.S. Pacific Command from 1999 to 2002, and served as the U.S. Director of National Intelligence from 2009 to 2010; Liao Hongxiang is a senior adviser to the National Space Center (TASA).

The two pointed out that Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait about 160 kilometers, and the important task of the navy is to prevent China from using large amphibious ships to send troops across the strait. In the past, Taiwan preferred to build a surface fleet with large ships such as destroyers and frigates. The current shipbuilding plan also includes replacing old surface ships with large new ships.

The article advocates that Taiwan does not need to defeat the Chinese navy, nor does it need to gain control of the entire Taiwan Strait. The focus should be on preventing China from sending its invasion forces across the strait and making it difficult for the invasion forces to obtain protection, supplies, and reinforcements. Relevant analysts believe that this requires Taiwan to rethink its fleet composition.

Small ships are more dispersed and equipped with missiles and drones to improve survivability.

The two suggested that Taiwan could adopt smaller, dispersed and survivable surface combat platforms and integrate them with submarines, mobile missiles, drones, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems and resilient command and control capabilities to establish a defense architecture with "sea denial" as its core.

The author particularly emphasizes the difference between cost and survivability. The small frigates proposed in the article can cost less than US$200 million each, while the cost of large warships may reach about US$2 billion. Exchanging more numbers and dispersed deployment at lower costs can reduce the impact of the destruction of a single ship on the overall combat power.

The two therefore believe that Taiwan's goal is not necessarily to control the entire Taiwan Strait, but to make it difficult for China to safely transport, protect and continuously reinforce cross-sea invading troops, thereby improving its sea denial capabilities.