The US military struck three Iranian crude oil tankers, one of them off Kharg Island, in response to the Revolutionary Guards launching ballistic missiles towards an American aircraft carrier and destroyer, in what appeared to be an expansion of the tanker war in the Strait of Hormuz.
The US Central Command (Centcom) said that it permanently disabled a tanker near Kharg Island, the main center for Iranian oil exports, and the "Stark 1" near Jask, east of the Strait of Hormuz, and completely destroyed the "Kailo" in the Gulf of Oman after evacuating its crew. Centcom Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said that targeting two American ships would be met with a “greater economic cost” by removing three Iranian ships from service, hinting at the destruction of “Iran’s limited and exposed oil fleet.” US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned that the United States would destroy Iranian oil tankers and sink them if Tehran continued to fire on American ships.
The British Maritime Trade Operations Authority reported that several commercial ships in the northern Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman were exposed to fire that disabled them, without confirming any casualties or environmental damage.
US President Donald Trump said that Washington controls Hormuz, and downplayed its importance in the future. He also threatened to strike Jabal Ax near Natanz “very soon” if Washington detected developments that would raise its concerns.
US President Donald Trump's insistence on describing the war with Iran as a "simple matter" cannot be separated from the approaching midterm elections next November. He has presented himself as rejecting long wars, and needs to convince voters that the confrontation has not turned into a new quagmire, and that its high cost does not mean losing control over it.
That is why the phrases he has used recently perform two related functions: to consolidate the image of American victory and to reduce the political weight of the war in a difficult electoral race for Republicans.
However, this language hides an actual shift in the White House’s calculations. Trump has not abandoned his ultimate goals, most notably preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon and ending its ability to exercise regional influence. However, he has become more sensitive to the timing and size of the use of force, after energy prices, human casualties, although limited, and ammunition depletion; Increasing internal stressors.
Contain until November
A number of Trump's senior aides, including his Vice President, J.D. Vance, and Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, are pushing to keep the escalation under a controlled ceiling until the elections, while giving priority to sanctions, blockades, and economic pressure. Reuters quoted a White House official as saying that pressure on Iran continues, “but November is a priority.” Sources also talked about the possibility of a return to more severe strikes after the elections, without a final decision being taken yet.
These pressures do not mean that Trump is completely subject to partisan calculations, but they narrow the margin of his options. A Reuters/Ipsos poll showed that only a quarter of Americans see the war as worth its cost, while aides are trying to prevent it from becoming a dominant issue in the elections. Calling it a “limited military conflict,” despite its cost exceeding $37.5 billion and the killing of 18 American soldiers, reflects an attempt to remove its character of war and reduce its presence in the voters’ consciousness. However, the electoral calm remains fragile, as any Iranian strike that kills Americans, threatens vital installations in the region, or disrupts the Strait of Hormuz more broadly may force Trump to respond forcefully before the elections. While he wants to avoid an all-out war, at the same time he cannot afford to be accused of weakness or allow Tehran to appear as if it is imposing the rules of engagement. On the other hand, Tehran is aware of this dilemma, and its strategy appears to be based on “steadfastness and prolonging the confrontation,” hoping that rising fuel prices and declining support for the war will weaken the Republicans. But by continuing the attacks, it risks giving Trump the political justification he needs to move from containment to escalation.
After the elections is not without restrictions
After November, the pressure is likely to ease, which could give Trump greater freedom to target oil facilities, expand the blockade, or strike remaining Iranian missile and nuclear capabilities. His administration is already working on a post-war strategy, based on containing Iran regionally and forming a broader coalition to confront it. However, the outcome of the elections will also determine the limits of this freedom. If Republicans retain both chambers of Congress, Trump may more easily obtain the funding necessary to replenish munitions and continue operations. However, if one of the two chambers switches to the Democrats, Trump may face more severe oversight and battles over funding and war powers, even if he remains able to carry out limited strikes in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of US forces.
Also, the military restrictions will not end after the elections. Reports revealed a shortage of interceptor missiles and offensive ammunition, and disagreements within the administration regarding war estimates, reports denied by the White House and the Pentagon. Therefore, the post-election period may be a longer period of economic and military pressure, rather than a single decisive attack. Therefore, Trump appears to be subject to internal pressures at the timing of escalation, more than he is subject to them regarding the goals of the war. He wants to get through the November elections with the least amount of losses and high prices that Tehran is betting on, then restore freedom of movement. But any major bloody incident or Iranian and Israeli miscalculations may turn the postponed escalation into a confrontation that imposes its own timing.
Iran attacked the effort of the United States, Britain, France and Germany to issue a resolution from the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency referring its nuclear file to the Security Council, claiming that the move reveals “the complete failure of the snapback illusion,” in reference to the return of UN sanctions on Tehran last year.
The Iranian mission to international organizations in Vienna wrote on the “X” platform that Washington and the three European countries “intend once again to present a resolution against Iran in the Board of Governors, and to send the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council in New York.”
The mission added: “It seems that they themselves do not even believe in (snapback) and returning the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council’s agenda, which they have done previously and promoted on a large scale.”
She considered the move “evidence of the complete failure of the snapback illusion,” and described the new draft resolution as a “desperate attempt” that will not achieve any gains for the Western parties.
The mission pointed to the step taken by France, Britain, and Germany in August 2025 to activate the mechanism to re-impose United Nations sanctions under the 2015 nuclear agreement. Russia and China opposed the legality of the measure, but the UN sanctions were officially re-imposed in September 2025 after the Security Council failed to extend the exemptions.
Tehran maintains that Resolution 2231 issued by the Security Council has expired in accordance with its provisions, and rejects any attempt to revive previous resolutions or rely on mechanisms that it says have expired, considering them “devoid of legal validity and illegitimate.”
Project under negotiation
The quarterly meeting of the agency's Board of Governors begins next Monday in Vienna, amid a US-European move to mobilize support within the 35-nation council for the draft resolution.
Diplomats and a project reviewed by Reuters revealed that the United States, Britain, France and Germany are seeking to refer Iran to the Security Council for the first time in 20 years, due to what they consider to be non-compliance with their obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation.
Under Iran's obligations as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it must declare all nuclear materials and activities and allow IAEA inspectors to verify that they have not been diverted from peaceful uses.
The draft stipulates that the Director General of the Agency, Rafael Grossi, be requested to refer the resolution and previous resolutions related to Iran to all member states of the Agency, in addition to the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.
It also reiterates Tehran's call to “urgently address its non-compliance with the safeguards agreement,” and to take the steps that the agency and the Board of Governors deem necessary to enable Grossi to provide guarantees regarding the “correctness and completeness” of Iranian declarations.
The draft has not yet been formally presented, according to diplomats who said that negotiations on its wording are still ongoing, allowing Council members to propose amendments before putting the text to a vote next week.
Disagreement over inventory and inspection
On June 12, 2025, the Board of Governors had previously adopted a resolution concluding that Iran had violated its obligations related to safeguards and non-proliferation, due to its failure to fully cooperate with an investigation into traces of uranium found in undeclared sites.
The next day, Israel began bombing Iranian nuclear facilities, before the United States joined the attacks shortly after, destroying or causing serious damage to Iranian enrichment facilities.
Since those strikes, Tehran has not allowed IAEA inspectors to return to the sites that were bombed or to verify the remaining stock of enriched uranium.
Before the attacks, the agency estimated that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to the level of 60 percent, and considered the size of the stockpile at this level “an issue of grave concern.”
According to agency standards, this quantity, if enriched to a higher degree, is sufficient to produce fissile material for about ten nuclear weapons. Iran denies that it is seeking to build an atomic bomb.
Moving the file to the Security Council is unlikely to lead to concrete punitive measures, given that Russia and China have veto power.
