The US military announced that it will change the "Indo-Pacific Command" (USINDOPACOM) back to its old name "Pacific Command" (USPACOM). Ding Xueliang, an emeritus professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, pointed out that this incident reflects the US intention to concentrate limited resources on dealing with China. A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense responded on the 25th that "the name change is the US military's own business," but at the same time emphasized that it hopes the US side will do more "things that are truly conducive to enhancing mutual trust and promoting regional peace and stability."
Ding Xueliang published an article in the "Indo-Pacific" and pointed out that one of the reasons why the US military switched to the "Indo-Pacific Command" in 2018 is that there are several islands of extremely high strategic value in the Indian Ocean. Military facilities have been established on the islands, there are plans to expand, or preparations are being made for construction. The sea areas surrounding these islands are vast and are under the jurisdiction of different countries. In addition to India, there are also European maritime powers. The United States must negotiate with these countries. Once a major crisis occurs in the Pacific region, the US military can borrow these islands temporarily or in the short to medium term to deploy armed forces and communication stations.
The second reason is that the Indian Ocean is close to the Strait of Hormuz, Asia's energy transportation artery. As long as it controls this strait and surrounding waters, it can exert huge long-term pressure on the opponent's military and economy. The third reason is that once the cables under the Indian Ocean are destroyed or controlled, the US military will be unable to maintain normal communications with its European allies.
Ding Xueliang believes that when the United States included the Indian Ocean under the jurisdiction of the Pacific Command, its intention was that all new combat readiness expenses in the Indian Ocean region would be mainly paid by the Indian government. However, New Delhi only regards disputes and conflicts on land as its primary strategic security priority. Faced with the Muslim armed forces in Pakistan and Kashmir, especially the civil defense and military layout on the border with Tibet, India's top decision-makers have no time to be distracted.
Therefore, if the United States wants to expand military facilities on the Indian Ocean islands, it can only pay for it out of its own pocket. However, US President Trump has "complained a lot" about this. Therefore, minimizing the security burden of the United States on the Indian Ocean is in line with his business calculations.
For China, Ding Xueliang believes that the renaming of the Indo-Pacific Command to the Pacific Command has both advantages and disadvantages for China’s strategic implications. The positive side is that it is difficult for the United States to invest sufficient military resources in the Indian Ocean, and the degree to which energy shipped from the Strait of Hormuz is strictly controlled by the U.S. military is on a downward trend. The disadvantage is that the U.S. military's reduction in military investment in the Indian Ocean must be due to the realization that the U.S. government's financial resources can only be allocated more concentratedly, and the war assets of the Pacific Command must be more concentrated in the core. Regardless of whether the Democratic Party or the Republican Party comes to power, the U.S. government has never concealed that their primary opponent in the Pacific is China.
Therefore, the US military has placed the Indian Ocean in a peripheral position, with the goal of concentrating resources as much as possible to deal with China, especially the expansion of China's military power. Once the US military obtains more resources, it can still incorporate the Indian Ocean into its comprehensive strategy in time.
