
Cross-strait competition is extending from the military, diplomatic and economic space to the "rules space". Taiwan should establish a legal firewall to deal with Beijing's long-arm legal jurisdiction.
AI-generated summary
In recent years, China has promoted the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and judicial opinions against "Taiwan independence" elements in an attempt to establish overseas jurisdiction. This move is seen as an extension of China's state power in the legal field.
"Foreign Affairs" published an article "China's Legal Weapon" by Mark Jia, associate professor at Georgetown University Law School, on August 7, making an observation that Taiwan should be alert to: the law itself is also a state power. What really matters is not how many laws a country enacts, but whether it can make foreign governments, companies and individuals have to calculate the cost of violating these laws. For Taiwan, this means that cross-strait competition is extending from the military, diplomatic and economic space to the "rules space."
In the past, most discussions of mainland China's pressure on Taiwan focused on military aircraft, warships, diplomatic blockades and economic sanctions. However, the special thing about legal power is that it can change the behavior of Taiwanese people without actually entering Taiwan. In recent years, Beijing has successively established the "Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law", blocking foreign sanctions and foreign-related jurisdiction systems, showing that China has not only resisted the "long-arm jurisdiction" of the United States, but has begun to build its own legal long arm. The judicial opinions related to punishing "Taiwan independence" issued in 2024 also announced that criminal liability will be pursued for specific behaviors, and some cases can even be tried in absentia.
From the perspective of Taiwan's legal system, these norms cannot be directly implemented in Taiwan; what really needs to be vigilant is whether they have effects through a third place. Politicians, scholars, or business executives may begin to consider whether they can enter Hong Kong and Macau, whether they can go to countries with close judicial cooperation with China, whether their companies have assets in China, and whether their partners will keep their distance due to legal risks. As soon as these considerations begin to change behavior, Beijing's law has gained power.
This has also changed the shape of sovereignty competition. Traditional sovereignty emphasizes that "whoever controls the land makes the rules." However, power in the 21st century also means that even if one does not control the territory, the rules can still have effects outside the country through the market, finance, supply chain, and jurisdiction. The United States relies on the U.S. dollar, export controls and financial sanctions to build this power, and the EU creates the "Brussels effect" with its huge market. Now China is also combining market size, supply chain and national laws to establish its own radiation circle of rules.
Therefore, Taiwan cannot just ask "who controls Taiwan", but must also ask: Who has the ability to decide what Taiwanese people can do in the world? If Chinese law comes to influence the transactions of Taiwanese companies in third countries, the international activities of academics, and the choices of foreign companies in dealings with Taiwan, Beijing may gain partial control of the rules, if not territorial control.
Taiwan's response cannot just stop at "Chinese laws are invalid in Taiwan." The government should establish a legal firewall to prevent China's political judgments from having effects in third countries; it should also strengthen judicial coordination with countries with similar philosophies to prevent political prosecutions from being packaged as ordinary criminal cases; and at the same time help companies deal with compliance risks when laws and regulations conflict between China, the United States, Europe and Taiwan. Taiwan should also turn semiconductors, artificial intelligence, information security and supply chain governance into its own regulatory influence.
What Beijing is testing is not just the military boundaries of the strait, but also the regulatory boundaries of how far the law can go. What Taiwan needs to protect is not only its territorial waters, airspace and territory, but also its people’s freedom of movement in the international community from arbitrary jurisdiction by other countries. What is protected by military deterrence is the strait, and what is protected by legal deterrence is the regular boundary of sovereignty.

美國前總統川普21日在南卡羅來納州造勢,呼籲支持者將其視為選票候選人,藉此提升共和黨選民投票率。此舉旨在檢視川普對該州共和黨選民的影響力,並為其背書的候選人諾多恩催票,同時警告若失去國會多數將面臨彈劾風險。

針對柯文哲指民進黨立委沈伯洋參選台北市長「太弱」,導致蔣萬安選情無壓力,國民黨台北市議員詹為元表示不認同,強調沈伯洋背後有中央政府與民進黨龐大資源挹注,國民黨對選戰始終保持兢兢業業的態度。

玻利維亞國會因經濟部長艾斯皮諾薩缺席質詢,投票決議將其撤換。總統巴斯在面臨國內40年來最嚴重經濟危機與民怨壓力下,被迫解僱艾斯皮諾薩,並由環境部長品托暫代職務。

駐斐濟代表吳正偉於《島嶼商業》投書,呼籲太平洋島國論壇應堅守「太平洋之道」,由區域國家自主決定事務,避免淪為大國角力場。文中強調台灣作為長期發展夥伴,將持續遵循論壇共識,透過務實合作貢獻區域發展。

華府智庫「美國進步中心」發布報告指川普部署國民兵未降低犯罪,遭川普律師威脅若不撤回將面臨50億美元訴訟。該中心拒絕撤回,總裁譚登批評此舉意在噤聲。

The Hong Kong government has rejected Western criticism regarding the conviction of former leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, asserting they received a fair trial for undermining the PRC's fundamental system.