Another facet of the Sudanese presence in Egypt was demonstrated by the flow of investments and capital in various economic sectors, changing the traditional picture regarding the burdens of expatriates, including groups of Sudanese fleeing the war.
Many Sudanese capital moved to invest in Egypt after the war that broke out in mid-April 2023, according to Sudanese sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat about the volume of Sudanese business in the Egyptian market, estimating it at millions of dollars, the bulk of which is concentrated in the real estate market, in addition to industrial and commercial activity.
Because of the Sudanese war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, about one million and 200 thousand Sudanese fled to Egyptian cities, according to official statistics, along with millions of others who have been living throughout Egypt for years.
The increase in the Sudanese presence in Egyptian neighborhoods sparked widespread controversy, as a result of some media criticism and on social media platforms, especially at the beginning of the war due to the “Sudanese blocs” in popular areas, and their impact on “the rise in residential unit rents” and the pressure on state resources.
The head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, during his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, in the city of El Alamein (on the Mediterranean coast), last Sunday, praised Cairo’s political and humanitarian support for his country, and appreciated “hosting large numbers of Sudanese who were forced to leave their country because of the war,” according to the Egyptian presidency.
The wave of criticism of the intense Sudanese presence declined, after the number of voluntary returns of Sudanese to their country increased in recent months, facilitated by the authorities of the two countries. However, these trips did not result in the return of all those fleeing the war, especially after many Sudanese families decided to reside in Egypt, for considerations of studying for their children, or their involvement in work inside the country.
There is no accurate ability to count the overall movement of Sudanese capital, as a large portion of the business takes place outside the official paths, according to former Egyptian ambassador to Sudan Hossam Issa, who told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the economic sanctions imposed on Sudan push many Sudanese to manage their capital away from bank transfers.”
Issa believes that “evidence of Sudanese investments in Egypt indicates that their investments are estimated at millions of dollars, given the nature and characteristics of those currently residing in Egypt,” noting that “a large percentage of elites, businessmen, senior officials, ambassadors and party heads constitute a large percentage of the Sudanese presence currently, and the majority of them have resorted to investing in real estate in the first place,” in addition to “investing in other sectors, such as services trade.”
Last December, Hassan Al-Khatib, the Egyptian Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade, said that the volume of Sudanese investments in Egypt amounted to about $79 million during the year 2024, a growth of 39 percent compared to the previous year.
He added during the activities of the Egyptian-Sudanese Business Forum that more than 3,320 Sudanese companies are operating in the Egyptian market, which is a positive indicator of the development of economic relations between the two countries.
The Sudanese presence after the war was not limited to the capital, Cairo, and major cities such as Alexandria (north) or Aswan (south), but it extended to include the majority of new cities, according to the Secretary-General of the Federation of Sudanese Chambers of Industry, Abbas Ali Al-Sayyid, who said that “many families preferred to remain in their place of residence in Egypt and not return despite the improvement of conditions in some states in Sudan because they were linked to businesses and investments inside the country.”
The real estate sector is at the forefront of Sudanese investments, according to Al-Sayyid’s estimate, who told Asharq Al-Awsat: “In addition to the real estate market, Sudanese business has increased in the industrial and commercial field. Most Sudanese industries have established production lines in partnership with Egyptian factories, especially in food products,” in addition to “small activities in trade and services.”
Egypt became one of the first destinations for the movement of Sudanese capital after the war, according to the estimation of the economic advisor and former director of the Information Center at the Sudanese Ministry of Finance, Adel Abdel Aziz Al-Faki, who said that “the old economic ties and geographical proximity helped in the transfer of many Sudanese investments to the Egyptian market.”
Al-Faki believes, in statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “the first trend in investment was in the real estate market, given its guaranteed gains,” but he pointed out that “there are many Sudanese brands that have moved to manufacturing in Egypt, where it has become their home, including frozen meat and food commodities such as sesame and tahini,” noting that “these products are distributed to the community residing in Egypt, and the other part of them goes to Sudan.”
In November 2024, Cairo hosted the Egyptian-Sudanese Forum for businessmen from the two countries, to discuss establishing joint investment projects in the Egyptian market, especially in the fields of manufacturing, transportation, and ports.
Most Sudanese investments in the real estate market are concentrated in new cities, especially the Fifth Settlement, Al-Rehab, and Madinaty areas (east of Cairo), according to the director of the International Relations Unit at the Sudanese Center for Strategic Thought and Studies, Makki Al-Maghrabi, who said, “Sudanese investment in the Egyptian real estate market is not new, but it was concentrated before the war, in the main neighborhoods of Cairo and Giza, such as Zamalek, Mohandessin, and Faisal.”
In addition to the real estate market and manufacturing industries, Sudanese investments are directed to educational centers and private schools, according to Al-Maghrabi. He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There are many educational centers that are still operating inside Egypt for members of the community, despite the Egyptian authorities closing schools that do not meet the standards of educational activity inside the country.”
The closure procedures included the “Friendship” School, which was launched by the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo in 2016, and private schools, before the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo announced the resumption of studies at the “Friendship” School again, starting in December 2024.
Operation “Yemen Dawn” entered its sixth day, Saturday, due to the expansion of air strikes targeting the Houthi military capabilities, in parallel with the continued advance of government forces on the west coast and Marib, at a time when the Giants’ brigades thwarted an attack by the group north of Dhubab Airport, while hundreds of Houthi elements are still holed up in pockets behind mines and trenches in the Bab al-Mandab region and its islands.
The developments reflect the transition of the battle to the stage of pursuing the remaining pockets of Houthi resistance in the sites that government forces regained control to consolidate the gains, with the group’s continued attempts to break the siege on its members, amid cautious military progress aimed at completing the cleansing of the area and consolidating field gains, in conjunction with air strikes that go beyond the front lines to military sites and missile bunkers deep in Houthi-controlled areas.
In the latest field developments, the Southern Giants Brigades responded to an attack launched by the Houthi group on its positions north of Dhubab Airport, inflicting losses on them in lives and equipment, in conjunction with air raids by the “Coalition to Support Legitimacy” targeting military reinforcements that the group sent to the region, in an attempt to strengthen its positions and support its besieged members.
The confrontations come in the wake of a large-scale operation aimed at completing the liberation of the remainder of the Bab al-Mandab region and its affiliated islands, where military units continue combing operations and dealing with mines and fortifications, amid estimates of the presence of hundreds of Houthi elements in various pockets, which makes completing the cleansing and establishing control a field priority at the current stage.
Deep strikes
In parallel with the ground battles, the Yemeni army announced the implementation of more than 2,750 precise targeting operations during the past 24 hours, targeting fortifications, defensive sites, observation and reconnaissance points, artillery positions, weapons and ammunition stores, supply and supply depots, and Houthi military reinforcements in various battle axes.
The official spokesman for the armed forces, Colonel Majid Al-Nuzaili, said that the operations carried out within the framework of “Yemen Dawn” also included military targets, which he described as “legitimate and of high value,” deep in the group’s areas of control.
He explained that initial field estimates indicate the neutralization of more than 1,400 Houthi elements, and the destruction or damage of more than 250 combat vehicles and military equipment, which weakened the group's ability to maneuver, provide support, and continue its combat operations.
Al-Nuzaili added that the ground forces were able to penetrate the Houthi defenses and fortifications, recover high-altitude positions of operational importance, consolidate their gains, and continue the attack according to the established military plans.
For its part, the “Coalition to Support Legitimacy” announced the destruction of 136 military targets as part of a wide operation that targeted the group’s elements and capabilities in areas under its control. Coalition spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, said that the coalition is working to dismantle and destroy the Houthi ballistic missile network, stressing the continuation of air support for Yemeni military units around the clock.
Depletion in Marib
In Marib Governorate (east of Sanaa), government forces and the popular resistance continued their operations along the lines of contact, and carried out attacks on Houthi positions on the southern fronts, during which they were able to seize positions after penetrating fortifications and dealing with minefields planted by the group.
The Yemeni Armed Forces Media Center stated that the confrontations inflicted losses on the Houthis in lives and equipment, in conjunction with the continuation of offensive operations on the northern and northwestern fronts, and the implementation of monitoring and reconnaissance of the group’s movements and reinforcements.
He added that military and drone aircraft, along with artillery and rocket launchers, continued to target Houthi sites and gatherings, leadership centers, weapons stores, fire pits, and sites for operating drones, along the front lines and in areas under the group’s control.
On the other hand, the center indicated that dozens of Houthi members were killed and injured during the confrontations, and 22 members of the armed forces and popular resistance were killed and others were injured.
The battle to restore the state
In light of the developments on the ground, a member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, Abdul Rahman Al-Muharrami, confirmed that the government forces presented models of steadfastness and fighting, considering that the confrontations represent part of the battle to restore the state and its institutions, and confront the Houthi project supported by Iran.
Al-Muharrami said, in a post on Facebook, addressing the forces stationed on the West Coast, Bab al-Mandab and other fronts, that the battle requires continued steadfastness until achieving its goals, praising the role of the fighters in confronting the Houthis and protecting the security of the region. He also renewed his appreciation for the “Coalition to Support Legitimacy” led by Saudi Arabia, stressing that the Yemeni forces and the coalition are fighting a common battle, and share its burdens and sacrifices.
For his part, a member of the Presidential Command Council, Lieutenant General Mahmoud Al-Subaihi, praised the performance of the armed forces and the popular resistance on various fighting fronts, and said that the confrontations embody the defense of the republican system and state institutions against the Houthi group.
Al-Subaihi pointed to the role played by the Giants Brigades, the National Shield, Support and Support and National Resistance forces, and the Joint Forces, on the Western Coast and Sabiha fronts and the areas extending towards Al-Wazi’iyah and other areas in Taiz and Lahj.
He specifically mentioned the sacrifices of the Sabiha tribes, which made more than 170 dead and 700 wounded during the confrontations. He also praised the role of the military and field leadership, and the efforts of the government and local authorities in Aden and Lahj in supporting the fronts, reiterating his appreciation for the Saudi support provided to government forces.
Large areas in the Yemeni Taiz Governorate (southwest) are witnessing an interruption in Internet and communications services, coinciding with a Houthi military escalation in the south of the governorate, while residents have resorted to local networks that rely on the satellite Internet service “Starlink,” whose devices the group was quick to confiscate in the areas it recently controlled, as part of security and oversight measures that also included surveillance cameras and mobile phones.
Local sources in the city of Al-Turbah, the center of the Al-Shamaytain District south of Taiz, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Houthi group launched a massive campaign to confiscate Starlink devices during the first days of its control of the city, after prior investigations conducted by its intelligence cells regarding the owners of those devices, days before the arrival of its forces.
The Houthi group deals with the “Starlink” service as a threat to its influence on the communications sector. In addition to depriving it of part of the revenues it earns from it, it deprives it of the advantage of monitoring communications and controlling the flow of information.
The group had previously taken similar measures after taking control of the city of Mocha, a number of whose residents depended on the service.
Its measures in the field were not limited to confiscating satellite Internet devices; Rather, it extended to surveillance cameras installed in front of shops and residential buildings.
The Houthi group informed the owners of the cameras that their confiscation was a temporary measure, until the monitoring systems were completed connecting to its regulatory bodies, and demanded that they allow them to access storage devices, warning against connecting any cameras to the Internet without their permission.
A store owner told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group removed the surveillance cameras directed towards the streets without asking the owners’ permission, due to the closure of most of the shops. However, the owners of the few shops that opened their doors were also surprised by this measure, and were not allowed to discuss it.
The city of Al-Turbah is experiencing a state of paralysis in commercial activities, amid rejection of the presence of the Houthi group, which has resorted to threatening to forcefully open closed shops.
Control the services
In the besieged city of Taiz, residents reported that internet and communications services belonging to networks operating in areas under Houthi control had stopped, or were exposed to widespread interruptions that affected citizens’ ability to communicate and access the Internet.
This interruption coincides with the Houthi military escalation in Taiz Governorate, and the government’s subsequent launch of Operation “Yemen Dawn,” amid field changes in a number of districts and regions, and the increasing repercussions of security developments on public services and population movement.
People in government-controlled areas try to access the Internet service via Starlink devices, which are available to a limited number of them. They share this service with their neighbors in exchange for money or for free.
Although the reasons for the disruption of communications and Internet services in the city of Taiz are not clear, residents link it to the military escalation in the governorate.
The main communications infrastructure in Yemen is subject to the Houthi group, which controls the headquarters and facilities of the Yemeni communications network in Sanaa, giving it a wide ability to control services and access to information.
In parallel with the measures related to communications, the Houthi group, since taking control of a number of southern Taiz districts, has begun expanding its security and intelligence measures, using local sources to collect information about the population and monitor their movements.
Creating spy networks
Informed sources revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the supervisors of the Houthi group who arrived in the districts that were recently under its control met with notables and village sheikhs, or addressed letters to them asking them to work as local intelligence sources, responsible for submitting periodic reports on the movement of the population, monitoring those moving between villages and regions, tracking the visits of relatives and friends, and reporting on any people whose activities the group suspects.
According to the sources, the Houthi supervisors held the notables and village sheikhs responsible for the occurrence of any anti-group activity in their areas, if they were not informed in advance about those responsible for it, in a measure that puts social figures under pressure to participate in the security oversight system.
According to the sources, the group relies on a network of local collaborators, including social figures who are complicit with it, and people who were released from prisons after it took control of those areas, in addition to others who were fleeing justice in its areas of influence.
Monitoring procedures were not limited to field movements; The group directed its spy cells to monitor social media sites and report anyone who publishes information or data related to the situation in the areas it recently controlled.
It also carried out random campaigns to search mobile phones in the streets, looking for messaging applications that the group believes provide communications that are not subject to its control, or virtual private network (VPN) programs that are used to bypass blocks.
The sources said that these campaigns aim, in addition to checking applications on phones, to uncover people who work for the Yemeni army and government, or communicate with their leaders and officials, as well as those who contact media and human rights bodies to report on the group’s practices, or use accounts under pseudonyms on social media sites.
