The roles of US President Donald Trump's advisors in foreign policy files vary, between efforts to normalize relations with Israel and efforts to settle conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. While Jared Kushner's name is associated with the Abraham Accords, Massad Boulos is in charge of thorny files including Sudan and Libya, amid questions about the chances of achieving sustainable political settlements.
This was confirmed by the American writer and analyst Robert Williams, in a report published by the American Gatestone Research Institute. Williams wonders, saying: Two Trump family advisers gained exceptional access to the circles of presidential power. One of them helped change the Middle East, so what did the other change?
He says that on September 15, 2020, US President Donald Trump hosted the signing ceremony of the Abraham Accords. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain normalized their relations with Israel, followed by Morocco. Jared Kushner helped turn a strategic opportunity into diplomatic recognition, trade, and security cooperation. Six years later, despite regional wars, these relations still exist. The Abraham Accords achieved more value than just a signing ceremony, as they brought about a tangible change in relations between countries. This is the standard by which the performance of presidential advisors should be evaluated.
According to Williams, Kushner had a well-known career long before his marriage to Ivanka Trump in 2009. He worked in real estate and acquired the New York Observer newspaper in 2006. He was not a career diplomat, but his professional record was clear and assessable. He wonders: What similar professional record did Massad Boulos, the president’s senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, have before his son’s marriage to Tiffany Trump?
He has done business in Nigeria and maintains Lebanese political connections. But none of this is evidence of having experience in ending civil wars. In 2024, press investigations also questioned widely repeated descriptions of Paul as a billionaire lawyer running a huge business empire, while Paul and the Trump team rejected those criticisms.
However, a more important question remains: Why were the Sudan, Congo and Libya files entrusted to someone with no known record in resolving international conflicts? Williams cited Sudan, saying: The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces allied with the regime, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), caused the death and displacement of civilians on a massive scale. Washington imposed sanctions on the two leaders, accused the Rapid Support Forces of committing genocide, and the Sudanese Armed Forces of committing war crimes, and concluded that regime forces used chemical weapons.
Paul promoted a 90-day humanitarian ceasefire, but no permanent ceasefire was reached. According to Williams, the impact of the Sudanese conflict is not limited to the country's borders. Iranian-made drones have enhanced the capabilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces. In March 2026, Washington designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, which is allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces, a foreign terrorist organization, due to the violence it committed against civilians and the support it receives from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
He pointed out that Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen has already revealed how armed groups can threaten shipping traffic in the Red Sea. He wonders: Does Paul have a strategy to prevent the Sudanese coast on the Red Sea from turning into another arena for Iranian influence?
He says the United States cannot afford an approach that treats every armed faction as an equally acceptable partner, simply because each faction controls territory. Diplomacy must distinguish between temporary contacts and granting legitimacy to forces that threaten long-term security.
Williams stressed that Libya raises an equally serious question about the course of American diplomacy. Paul sought to conduct negotiations aimed at reconciling the competing authorities associated with Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya and Abdel Hamid Dabaiba in Tripoli. The American proposal, according to reports, stipulates a power-sharing arrangement between the Haftar and Dabaiba families, in addition to unifying state institutions and providing opportunities for American investments in the Libyan energy sector.
But Washington must confront a more fundamental question: How can a true national unity government be formed in Libya, when one party to the negotiations is operating within a political environment deeply intertwined with armed militias and networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and extremist Islamist factions? The influence of these networks in western Libya cannot simply be ignored.
Dabaiba's administration relied on shifting alliances with powerful armed groups, while political figures linked to the Muslim Brotherhood maintained ties within Libya's divided power structure. These relations may be complex, and sometimes even hostile, but the basic problem remains: Who will actually exercise power within a supposedly unified Libyan government?
Williams asks: Will Washington help establish a sovereign state, with a unified national army, accountable institutions, and civilian authority? Or will it lend legitimacy to an arrangement whereby established political families share state resources, while armed factions and Islamist networks maintain influence behind the scenes? He says that a national unity government cannot succeed if it is limited to uniting the political elites, while leaving the forces that tore the country apart without a stance towards them.
Trump has repeatedly confronted Iran, and his administration has officially identified specific branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, accused of supporting terrorism. How can his representatives seek to conclude agreements that might lead to maintaining the influence of armed Islamist networks, at a time when the president pledges to confront them?
Williams says that in Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, American national security cannot be a hostage of the strategic ambiguity that hides behind balance. Trump does not need an envoy whose most important card of strength is his proximity to the circles of presidential power. Rather, he needs results that are consistent with his declared strategy: stronger allies, weaker terrorist networks, less Iranian influence, and lasting peace.
Williams concludes that Kushner had the Abraham Accords. What will Paul leave behind? Stressing that the photo should document a victory, not be a substitute for it.
