The government's decision to dispatch an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and unmanned minesweeping equipment as assets of the Cheonghae Unit means that it is taking one step closer to contributing to the passage through Hormuz, which has been requested by the international community.
Although conditions were attached, such as an environment such as the end of the war between the US and Iran, and separate consent from the National Assembly must be obtained, it was a message to the international community through 'action' that it was prepared to participate in efforts to stabilize the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the Ministry of National Defense on the 5th, 'Support for the restoration of freedom of navigation on international maritime traffic routes' was added as the mission of the Cheonghae Unit in the motion to amend the extension of the Cheonghae Unit's deployment, which the government will soon submit to the National Assembly.
It is said to be the first time that 'support for the restoration of freedom of navigation' is specified in the mission of the Cheonghae Unit, which has been dispatched to the Gulf of Aden waters in Somalia since 2009 to protect merchant ships and combat pirates.
This seems to be related to the purpose of dispatching minesweeping equipment such as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), and underwater unmanned vehicles (ROV), as well as EODs to operate them, with the full force of the Cheonghae Unit.
The government believes that if the environment surrounding the Strait of Hormuz changes in the future and mine removal activities at the international community level begin in earnest, EOD teams and unmanned minesweeping equipment may be deployed.
The plan is to dispatch these personnel and equipment in advance as part of the Cheonghae Unit to prepare for them, including mastering operational capabilities and adapting to the local operational environment.
When asked, "The most necessary thing to secure maritime transportation routes is the removal of mines in Hormuz, is there a purpose to prepare for this?" a Ministry of National Defense official responded, "No," but added, "We did not exclude that part and included it as an operational element."
This official said, “Because we are also members of the international community, we cannot help but prepare for the time when a ‘permissive environment’ arises.” He also said, “When the UK, France, and others request protection for international maritime routes, we must participate, and we cannot go without preparation at this time.”
So far, the UK and France have led discussions on forming a multinational mission to restore passage through the Strait of Hormuz on the premise of implementation after the end of the war, and the government has also consistently participated in these discussions.
Recently, a liaison officer was dispatched to the British-French-led Hormuz Freedom of Navigation Initiative.
In this line of extension, there is an interpretation that the message that we can participate in military contribution if conditions such as the end of the war are met is underlying this plan to extend the dispatch.
However, the government also makes it clear that participation in the freedom of navigation operation in Hormuz is possible only when a 'permissive environment' is established, such as securing safety through the end of the war or the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Iran and the United States, and that consent from the National Assembly must be obtained again.
It appears that the government's intention is to secure a justification by keeping pace with the UK and France in that the 'permissive environment' is the same prerequisite as that of the UK and France. At this point, before the end of the war, it is known that the Hormuz mine removal operation is centered around the United States.
Another justification cited by the military is that it is difficult to rule out the possibility that future mine threats will appear in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
An official from the Ministry of National Defense said, "We are making a military assessment that there are no mines in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait so far, but we do not know how the fighting between the Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia will progress."
In addition, the unmanned minesweeping force that the military is considering dispatching is in the early stages of deployment and lacks operational experience. Although unmanned submarines and underwater probes have been deployed, it is reported that unmanned surface vehicles are still in the combat testing stage.
An official from the Ministry of National Defense explained the reason why preparations by dispatching the Cheonghae Unit are necessary, saying, “If Hormuz becomes a permissive environment and sends an EOD unit, it would be burdensome for us to send it in when we are not fully adapted to the operational environment.”
The government is also emphasizing that the Cheonghae Unit is under the independent command of our Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff).
In addition, it is reported that the existing destroyer and the additionally dispatched maritime patrol aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon, will remain in their existing mission areas of the Gulf of Aden and the southern ocean of Oman even if the environment is permissive. Organizing minesweeping forces around unmanned equipment also appears to have been chosen to minimize the controversy over 'dispatch of troops.'
In the end, there is an interpretation that this dispatch extension is a compromise to show the international community a willingness to contribute to freedom of navigation within the principle of "no deployment of troops to intervene in war" proposed by President Lee Jae-myung last September.
It can also be interpreted as the result of long-term consideration of ways to contribute in a situation where public opinion is strong against sending troops to Hormuz.
A high-ranking Blue House official recently met with reporters and said, "We cannot not play any role in the international community." He also mentioned that what contribution must be made is fixed and it is a matter of how to do it.
However, controversy is expected to follow over the inclusion of elements that can be interpreted as a lead for participation in contributing to the navigation of Hormuz in the dispatch of the Cheonghae Unit, whose original purpose is to protect our people and ships. It remains to be seen whether the National Assembly consent process will proceed smoothly in the future.
Kim Jun-hyung, floor leader of the Homeland Innovation Party, held a press conference at the National Assembly the day before and argued, “Do not open the door to dispatching troops by inserting expansion of the operational area and change of mission into the agreement to extend the deployment of the Cheonghae Unit.”
In addition, some are concerned that as the Cheonghae Unit's operational range expands to the southern ocean of Oman, closer to the Strait of Hormuz, it may become more exposed to threats such as Iranian drones and surface-to-air missiles. The military plans to further review the rules of engagement as the mission scope expands.
Regarding this, a Ministry of Defense official said, "When we assessed the threat, Iran had no assets that could attack us and the distance was far away."
