How is it possible that for so many years a drug lord, like Óscar Sánchez Gil, could operate without anyone within the Police noticing?
You defined it very well, he was a boss, really a drug boss. This is what the police officers who caught him consider him to be. When they discovered what he was doing, he stopped being a police officer for them and became a boss. The truth is that he managed to maintain himself for so long because, from what we have been able to find out in the book, he was a very intelligent person, with great skill at disguising. For years he opened false investigations against his collaborators and managed to establish a kind of network within the Police, using the police intelligence itself for the benefit of the organization for which he worked. This is very difficult to detect, because the investigations cross between different groups. He continually managed to insert himself into the operations carried out by the Drug and Organized Crime Unit of the National Police (UDYCO), his own drug and organized crime colleagues. In this way, he could interfere in the investigations.
How was he discovered?
The case ended up coming to light when the UDYCO intercepted a couple of containers, one of them with 1.6 tons of drugs, and there was no one behind the operation. The police began to suspect that someone was collaborating from within. Internal Affairs got to work, received a tip from UDYCO Central itself and analyzed this agent's assets. They detected unjustified increases in both his cash income and the investments that he, his wife and other family members were making.
To what extent are we facing an exceptional case within the Police?
It is the most exceptional case that the Police have ever had, not only because of the time he was working for drug trafficking, but also because of the amount of money that appeared when they searched his house. Those responsible for the operation insist that so much money had never been seized from a police officer, but neither had such an amount of cash been found from a drug trafficker. The record is described meticulously, both in the handwritten annotations and in subsequent documents. When the agents began to open the different rooms of the house, the money multiplied to such an extent that the bill counting machines broke down, truly crazy. Furthermore, he had such a low profile and was so discreet that he surprised even the agents themselves. He himself was the most surprised, because he was so convinced that he would never be caught that he had all that money at home as if it were nothing.
To what extent can a case like this damage the reputation of the Police in general and the UDYCO in particular?
The UDYCO has suffered some discredit in recent years. They themselves are aware. Of course, cases like this damage the image of the Police, but we must not forget that it was other police officers who caught him. This shows that, although the system arrived late and for six years this man was able to operate with total impunity, it finally ended up working. The operation is a very clear example. There is so much evidence against him that the judge has extended his stay in prison and he will probably remain there until the trial is held, which could come next year or the year after.
Can we talk about a structural problem of police corruption related to drug trafficking that is not receiving enough attention from the Ministry of the Interior?
In the book we provide data on a sustained number of agents involved in this type of cases over the last fifteen years. It has not experienced major variations, but has remained quite stable. However, in the last four or five years, several cases have come to light of high-ranking police officers, including heads of anti-drug units and even entire teams being detained or investigated. And it does not only happen in the National Police: there are also cases in the Civil Guard. In the book I collect the words of anti-drug prosecutor Rosana Morán, who insists that organized crime needs police officers and other corrupt agents to function. There is a hidden problem that perhaps is not being given the importance it really has.
What makes these agents corruptible? The lack of means and financing or the growing economic capacity of drug trafficking organizations?
I think it's more the latter. This is a very unequal war. Organized crime has resources far superior to those of the investigation units of the Ministry of the Interior. Plus, it's like fighting a hydra: you cut off one head and two more appear. It seems like a war that will never end. They break up a clan and, years later, their former subordinates end up breaking up and forming their own organizations.
It is a far-reaching problem that, in my opinion, only attracts media attention when something especially serious happens, such as when two civil guards were killed by a drug boat in Barbate. Only in situations like this does it seem that society becomes aware of the dimension of the problem.
And what means does Internal Affairs have to investigate corruption within the body itself? Are they enough?
They are also very limited. If cases like this start to appear, which go on for years, it is clear that they need more resources. They all need them: Internal Affairs, the UDYCO and the Prosecutor's Office. Everyone has asked for staff to be expanded and for more courts to be dedicated to these matters. It is a problem that affects everyone.
All this occurs in a context of growing international drug trafficking activity in Europe. What role does Spain play in this framework?
Spain is, in some places, the headquarters of large fortunes from organized crime. It is no secret that Marbella is the playground of big bosses of the European mafia and other parts of the world. It is also no secret, and this is what agents from the Civil Guard and the Police tell us, that the Guadalquivir and the Guadiana have become major drug entry highways into Spain. Before they were used mainly for hashish and now also for cocaine.
Does this organized crime come from abroad or is it national?
Organizations have adopted a different operating model: they distribute work as if they were a large multinational. Each group, and even each country, specializes in a specific task. For example, within organized crime, Bulgarians are considered specialists in piloting sailing ships and for years numerous pilots of that nationality were detected on the routes that connected Latin America with the Canary Islands and, later, with Spain. Organizations from producing countries, such as Brazil, Colombia or Mexico, provide the merchandise, but then they need Spanish groups to transport and distribute it. Spain is a large platform for drug distribution to Europe. Morocco and some countries in the Gulf of Guinea also function as temporary storage points for merchandise during crossings between continents, until the time comes to introduce it into Spain, either through ports or other routes.
How has the organization of drug trafficking in Spain changed compared to the time of the great Galician clans of the 1980s?
Now they work in a much more discreet way. Perhaps the last large organizations that had some media projection were the Castaña, in La Línea de la Concepción, about ten years ago. But the clans continue to exist and continue to dominate different areas of the country. In Galicia there are criminal families, although they are no longer the historical ones. In Andalusia there are also large organizations in Huelva and around the Guadalquivir. They continue operating in Algeciras. What happens is that they are much more atomized. There are also large clans that operate in Barcelona and on the Mediterranean coast, many of them from abroad, who have managed to settle in Spain.
You have previously defined Spain as a large drug distribution platform. What does it mean exactly?
Spain is a distribution center. It is one of the main gateways for cocaine in Europe, but it is also a place where marijuana is massively produced. The hashish continues to arrive, although it does not stay here either: it ends up being distributed throughout the continent. I was referring to that, that Spain functions as a large distribution center.
Has the type of substances that enrich these organizations also changed? If in the eighties it was heroin, today it is mainly cocaine and marijuana?
Yes, especially those two. There are also synthetic drugs, although I think to a lesser extent. In Spain, very large laboratories have been dismantled and large caches of these substances have been seized, but the Netherlands continues to be the main point of reference in this area, in collaboration with Mexican cartels.
How does cocaine currently enter Spain? Are traditional routes still important?
It continues to enter mainly through large ports, such as Valencia, Barcelona and Algeciras, and also through rivers. That is one of the great developments of the last three or four years: the Guadiana and the Guadalquivir have become two of the hottest areas. In Guadiana there have been shootouts with the Police in recent months and, approximately a year ago, a Portuguese Guard agent died in a collision. Numerous confrontations occur because the drug boats that enter the river are much more numerous than the vessels of the Maritime Service of the Civil Guard. On many occasions, agents are overwhelmed.
All this activity generates enormous amounts of money. How does it filter into the legal economy? How does our economy participate in the benefits of drug trafficking?
In the book there is a very clear example: in the case of Óscar Sánchez Gil, it was his sister-in-law who was in charge of laundering part of the organization's money. To do this, he obtained dozens of VTC licenses. It's absolutely eye-catching, but it worked for him. They also created different companies and bought real estate assets. Óscar Sánchez Gil, for example, invested a large amount of money in renovating his second home in Alicante, an amount that he could not justify with his income.
Other members of the organization bought spectacular houses and mansions in Dubai. In Spain we constantly see laundering schemes that use seemingly normal, small and medium-sized companies, both to simulate activities that allow the merchandise to be introduced and to later launder the money. Without going any further, there are several fruit companies on the Mediterranean coast that imported fruit from Latin America in a completely real way, but took advantage of some of those shipments to introduce drugs.
He has also mentioned the entry of weapons along with drugs. It has always been said that, compared to countries like the United States, Spain and Europe, they have very strict control of weapons. To what extent is this situation changing?
It's crazy. This week precisely, an M80 anti-tank rocket launcher was seized in the province of Seville. In practically any operation of the Civil Guard or the Police, weapons of war appear: AK-47 rifles, hand grenades and other devices that were not previously seen in the hands of these organizations. This happens, first of all, due to the conflicts that currently exist in the world and in nearby territories, such as Ukraine and the Middle East. There are routes that traditionally served to introduce weapons into the black market and now there is greater availability of weapons. In one way or another, many weapons of NATO caliber or of Soviet origin, such as the AK-47s that circulate in the context of the Ukrainian war, end up in the hands of Spanish clans or organizations that operate in Spain.
This greater availability causes an escalation effect. If a clan has AK-47 to protect itself from possible attacks or theft of merchandise by its rivals, the others also use that weapon to defend themselves. Furthermore, unfortunately, they have fewer and fewer qualms about using it. Last year there was a shooting in the Guadalquivir in which a UDYCO agent was injured. The agents intervened in an operation and the drug traffickers took out their weapons and shot at them. The availability of weapons is increasing.
Is there a risk that the violence associated with drug trafficking that we know in countries like Mexico ends up moving to Europe? In recent times we have seen murders and shootings that seem straight out of a movie.
We have also seen what has happened with the Mocro Maffia in the Netherlands. This is what I said at the beginning: they seem like isolated events, but there are more and more episodes of this type. The case of the hitmen who traveled to Barcelona to murder a person is an example. Last year there were numerous shootings in Marbella between different clans, including Irish groups. Incidents have occurred in nightclubs, bars and other establishments.
The Swedish mafia has also sent hitmen to Spain, including minors, to commit murders. Last year several were arrested. These are events that we sometimes treat in the press as independent episodes, but they are part of the same phenomenon. The attempted murder of Alejo Vidal-Quadras was also apparently an isolated case. It was not a matter of drug trafficking per se, but of organized crime: according to the investigation by the National Court, the order was carried out through the Mocro Maffia and came from a foreign power: Iran. In the end, all these events are part of the same story: greater availability of weapons, more impunity and more criminal organizations operating in our country.
