Iran last month offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume nuclear talks within a week, provided the naval blockade is lifted, Iranian oil sales are exempt from sanctions, and frozen assets are released. The offer is still on the table, according to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
Former American diplomat, Ludovic Hood, a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Peace and Security of the Hudson Institute, believes that US President Donald Trump was right, and is still right, in rejecting (the offer). Demanding financial compensation to reopen a waterway that Iran itself closed is not a concession, but rather blackmail dressed as diplomacy.
According to reports, President Trump informed his advisors that he expects the bombing to resume after the midterm congressional elections, and this option must be kept on the table, as a targeted military campaign would work in parallel with tightening economic pressures.
Hood says in an analysis published by the American magazine "National Interest" that the economic campaign is not a substitute for force, but rather a preparation for its use.
Hood bases his proposal on the vision of game theorist Thomas Schelling, who influenced generations of strategic experts with his theory of coercion and deterrence. This vision is based on the fact that “the ability to cause harm does not turn into a negotiating card unless the other party realizes that the greatest harm has not yet occurred.” According to this perspective, the economic blockade represents the pain that Iran is currently feeling, while the power behind it represents the greatest threat that still looms on the horizon.
Hood believes that the American administration has come to realize that the ultimate goal cannot be limited to a formal ceasefire. He points out that the memorandum of understanding signed in June granted Iran relief from sanctions in exchange for its pledge not to seek to possess a nuclear weapon and to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but it collapsed due to the ambiguity of its provisions, especially with regard to who is in control of the strait.
Hood warns that any new memorandum limited to reopening the waterway, releasing frozen assets, and postponing verification of nuclear commitments may reproduce the same problems that led to the failure of the previous agreement.
According to Hood, whose research focuses on American policy in the Middle East, regional security in the Gulf, Israel, the Arab countries, Iran, and Lebanon, there are only two outcomes that can be accepted: The first is that the current Iranian leadership shows, quickly, and with actions not promises, its willingness to accept the basic American conditions: not possessing a nuclear weapon, the return of inspectors, opening the Strait of Hormuz without any compensation, imposing restrictions on Iranian missiles, and stopping support for proxy groups.
As for the second result, it is the emergence of a new leadership in Iran that abandons the founding project of the Islamic Republic, which is based on confrontation and exporting the revolution abroad, and accepts the same conditions, and immediately proves its commitment to them, starting with completely opening the strait and allowing nuclear inspections.
Discussing the options available in light of the escalating risks, Hood, who worked in the American diplomatic corps for 20 years, points out the necessity of “filling the gaps in the economic campaign” against Iran.
This means imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks, refineries, and ports that still deal in Iranian oil, tightening the implementation of the naval blockade, and fully activating the sanctions law on Iran... thus ending Tehran’s hopes for an end to the sanctions imposed under it. These measures form the basis for all other options and can be further implemented in parallel with the negotiations.
The second option is to resume a sustained campaign of strikes on military, economic, and leadership targets in Iran. “The air campaign that lasted from February to April weakened Iran’s missile capabilities and nuclear facilities, but largely avoided targeting the oil sector, and ended before completing the list of targets. It also targeted an economy that had not yet been affected by the blockade.”
The new round will differ in four ways: First, the completion of targeting missile units, launch pads, and remaining facilities associated with the nuclear program. Second, expand strikes to include energy infrastructure and IRGC-linked companies that fund the regime. Third, targeting Revolutionary Guard leaders who obstruct reaching an agreement. Fourth, it increases pressure on an economy already suffering under the weight of sanctions, so that each loss becomes more difficult to compensate for.
The goal is to convince Iran that the cost of procrastination exceeds the cost of making concessions, without sending American forces to Iranian territory.
The third option, which is the most dangerous, is to launch a limited ground operation, as its supporters believe that ground operations would change the negotiation equation and impose a new reality on the ground.
These options aim to achieve three main goals: opening the strait, ending the nuclear threat, and convincing the Iranian regime that the cost of continuing resistance will be greater than it can bear. Hood believes that controlling Kharg Island, through which about 90 percent of Iranian crude oil exports pass, would deprive Tehran of the most important sources of hard currency, while keeping the facility as an American pressure card in any future negotiations.
Hood proposes another option, which is to control Abu Musa Island or the islands of Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, or the three islands combined, thus limiting the ability of the Revolutionary Guard to threaten maritime navigation from its advanced bases. A more complex option would be to access, verify, and possibly extract the stored stocks of highly enriched uranium buried underground.
However, Hood emphasizes that these options are not without significant risks, as they may provide the Revolutionary Guard with fixed targets to target with missiles and drones, and will also require additional logistical and defense resources. Although there are about 50,000 American soldiers and 19 warships in the region, carrying out such operations will require additional reinforcements.
In addition to military pressure, Hood calls for intensifying political and intelligence pressure by exploiting divisions within the Iranian regime and between the Revolutionary Guard and the regular armed forces. But at the same time, he warns that any escalation could push Iran and its proxies to target US interests and threaten shipping and energy markets, as well as potentially increasing regime cohesion rather than weakening it.
Hood believes that the risks associated with increasing pressure on Iran require careful management of escalation, by continuing the economic campaign and preparing for subsequent military options, not retreating from them. He stresses that the alternative is not to achieve stability, but rather to prolong the danger itself at a slower pace, as any formal ceasefire will give Tehran an opportunity to restore its revenues, keep the fate of its highly enriched uranium stock ambiguous, and may also strengthen its leadership’s conviction that Washington’s will is affected by political and electoral considerations.
The former American diplomat sets clear criteria to measure the success of any American campaign, which are the return of international inspectors, verifying the fate of enriched uranium, imposing restrictions on the missile program, and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz without making corresponding concessions. He stresses that anything short of that will be nothing more than a temporary truce.
Hood concludes that Iran has long bet on its ability to buy time and wait for political calculations in the United States to change, considering that economic sanctions and the military force supporting them represent the two main tools that Washington is betting on to thwart this bet.
