The long-standing strategy of vague strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan pursued by the United States is still effective, and it will not easily intimidate China into compromising. (Reuters)
[Financial Channel/Comprehensive Report] Foreign media "Eurasia Review" reported that the Washington summit between US President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping last month did not reach any major agreement. Trump ensured short-term economic and diplomatic status, while deliberately retaining the United States' most powerful bargaining chip: strategic ambiguity and support for Taiwan, rather than using it to exchange for lower-value concessions in trade, investment or technology. Trump did not play the Taiwan card, and Beijing’s intimidation of Taiwan did not work.
Collins Chong Yew Keat, a professor at the University of Malaya, Malaysia's top university, wrote a commentary in the "Eurasia Review" and pointed out that last month's Trump-Xi summit was not expected to reach a major agreement, but Trump still knows how to play games, winning the support of the Beijing establishment in the short term, and also achieving strategic victory in the long term by relying on his personal relationship with Xi Jinping.
Both Trump and Xi hope to obtain as many concessions as possible from the other party, and at the same time, they also know each other's bottom line and ultimate pain points. Trade and economic considerations, as well as other low-hanging fruit areas such as technology management controls and people-to-people and cultural exchanges, were expected to go smoothly, but both sides remain uncompromising on the key underlying issues that underlie their ongoing confrontation, namely military confrontation and the Taiwan issue.
Trump adheres to his great negotiating creed: Don’t use your highest-value bargaining chip to extract concessions that can be obtained with lower-value chips.
In Trump's view, China can be guided or pressured to purchase coal, reduce tariffs, deepen investment channels, negotiate to expand agricultural access, or establish a more complete artificial intelligence regulatory mechanism. None of these measures would require Washington to abandon Beijing's most desired strategic goal: weakening U.S. support for Taiwan.
Trump has not made any public concessions on Taiwan
Trump offered a series of ceremonial measures, selective economic stabilization measures and new safeguards, but most importantly, he maintained America's most strategic influence. Retaining the option is a victory in itself, and this strategy is particularly prominent in this round of the game. The United States has not made any public concessions on the Taiwan issue.
Beijing has long hoped for strategic progress from Washington, which would see the United States shift from saying it does not support Taiwan's independence to more explicitly opposing it, but this meeting between the two leaders did not materialize. It was still a tactical and psychological victory for Trump, as he refused to give up his opponent's most prized bargaining chip.
The Taiwan issue has always been Beijing's bottom line, and Washington is well aware of this. The more aggressive Beijing becomes on the Taiwan issue, the more firmly Washington and the Trump administration will hold this card.
At present, Taiwan, other countries and policymakers have previously worried that Trump may abandon most of his Taiwan policies in order to appease Xi Jinping and obtain more trade and economic benefits, but this fear has not yet materialized.
The United States' long-standing strategy of strategic ambiguity remains valid, albeit in a changed form. This strategy creates uncertainty on both sides of the Taiwan Strait: Beijing cannot take it for granted that the United States will stay out of the situation, and Taiwan cannot take it for granted that the United States will automatically intervene regardless of its own actions.
The strongest cards are often the ones that don’t need to be played, and Trump has used this skillfully.
The White House is trying to push China to take economically beneficial actions without abandoning Taiwan, including tariff reductions on some non-sensitive goods, coal purchases, investment negotiations, cooperation on fentanyl and discussions on critical minerals.
Indeed, U.S. ambiguity still constitutes crucial deterrence and uncertainty, preventing Beijing from fully assessing and predicting its next moves.
The article painted Trump as winning the round by refusing to give up structural advantages for temporary business gains. The article concludes by reminding that during Trump’s term, it would be beneficial for Washington for the United States to continue to maintain a power gap, supplement industrial strength, and establish credible deterrence. However, in the post-Trump era, if modernization or political commitment weakens, it may face higher structural risks.
