American political scientist Sheri Berman, 60, one of the world's greatest references in the study of democracy, is preparing a new book scheduled for next year. In it, he analyzes what happened so that, from the turn of the 21st century, optimism with the system gave way to a crisis that threatens democracies even in places previously considered stable.
In the April edition of the academic journal Journal of Democracy, Berman states that the current crisis should have been predicted by his peers, considering the great dissatisfaction that was accumulating in the face of new social and economic challenges in Western democracies.
"When you hire a plumber, he must come to your house, diagnose what's happening and fix the problem. If politicians can't do these things, it's no surprise that people get angry," says the professor at Barnard College, associated with Columbia University (USA), in a videoconference interview with Folha.
For a new wave of democratization to happen, she says, people need to realize not only that populist authoritarian leaders like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro don't deliver what they promise, but believe that the opposition has something better to offer.
You mention in the Journal of Democracy article that political scientists should have predicted the current democratic crisis. Why didn't this happen?
The United States had long been considered a stable democracy. Just as in other places, such as Western Europe, we placed these countries in a category where, although their democratic systems could certainly evolve, we were not concerned about them going backwards. We didn't think about how many of the trends occurring in these democracies could begin to undermine support for them.
In the United States, there is growing dissatisfaction with democratic institutions. We know from history and comparative research that when many people are truly dissatisfied, when they believe that these institutions are not working in their favor, they become very receptive to the appeal of what we now call populists, pseudo-authoritarians, radicals, or extremists.
Many scholars noticed the increase in dissatisfaction in the United States and Western Europe, but they did not imagine, and I include myself in this, that, despite this growing dissatisfaction, our institutions would be so vulnerable.
People were excited about democracy in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, and also during the Weimar Republic [in Germany, before the rise of Nazism]. Why does this great expectation end up turning into widespread dissatisfaction?
People become dissatisfied when they believe that democratic institutions, traditional political parties, are not meeting their needs. They can be economic: "I don't think I'm doing well. I'm worried about the future. I feel very insecure." Immigration has been a major concern.
There are always some angry people in a large society. But when large numbers begin to think that the system is not working for them, they become receptive to the appeals of extremists. The specifics of the origin of this dissatisfaction vary from country to country, from era to era.
It is necessary to see anti-democrats as symptoms of an underlying dissatisfaction and as those who deepen this dissatisfaction. They do both. These types of people come to power and deepen the divisions in society, the anger, the resentment, but there is no doubt that they are also symptoms of it.
Parties should come up with policies that address these demands and concerns, or try to enlighten people about what is happening, so that their concerns ease a little. When you hire a plumber, he or she should come to your home, diagnose what's going on, and fix the problem, or explain to you how to avoid that problem in the future. If politicians can't do these things, then they're not doing their job, and it's no surprise that people get angry.
You also mention in the article what you call the "Weltanschauung" policy. What is that?
It is a German term that means worldview. The idea is that you don't want political competition to focus on these kinds of divisive moral or worldview issues. It should focus on things like: should we have higher or lower taxes? More government regulation or less? More immigration or less? More spending on education or more spending on defense?
If you believe that a politician or a party that is coming to power threatens your entire way of life, has an ideology or a worldview that is so threatening that you are not only going to be uncomfortable with their victory, but potentially willing to consider all sorts of things that might prevent them from coming to power or exercising that power… It's a term that, in a way, says: when politics becomes this kind of life and death issue, that's a threat to me.
You also wrote in the article that overthrowing dictatorships has always been easier than building lasting democracies. Recently, Kim Lane Scheppele [professor in the sociology department at Princeton University, USA] said something worrying in a podcast: in the last 50 years, no democratic recovery after a period of crisis has lasted more than five years. Why do you think this happens?
Kim Scheppele is an incredible democracy scholar. I'm not that skeptical of that claim about history, but I think at this point it's a little hard to say... Of course, there are many countries that have had failed democratic experiences and then become democratic again. It is not true that, if there is a setback, it is not possible to go back.
What we're facing now, in places like Hungary, Turkey, potentially the United States or Brazil, is this kind of in-between situation, where democratic institutions have been weakened but not entirely eliminated.
In the past, democracies died. We knew they were dead. The question was: okay, how do we overthrow the dictatorship and start a new kind of political regime that is democratic? [Now] the question is, when democratic institutions start to deteriorate, how can we strengthen them again?
The problem is that a new government comes into power and says "our job is to restore democracy", and they face a huge number of obstacles in doing that because you're dealing with the same institutions. You have no mandate for constitutional change or radical cleansing. Many people from the old regime are still in the Judiciary, in the bureaucracy, in schools, in the press.
So there's a certain concern that you might end up in one of those situations, where you're constantly bouncing back and forth between Bolsonaro and his son, with an interlude of a political figure more committed to democracy. There is a small advance, then a setback.
It's interesting because, in Brazil, the institutions ensured that Bolsonaro could no longer run, as he attempted a coup. But, beyond the institutional issue, we are seeing that voters still indicate that there is a great demand for leaders like Trump, Bolsonaro or his son.
People will not believe in democracy if they do not see that it is bringing results.
Most people have neither the time nor the interest in spending their entire lives studying politics. For them, it's like, "I elect politicians and parties to run the government, just like I hire a plumber or a construction professional. If they're not doing the job right, then I'm just going to get really angry and be willing to consider other options."
That's a completely reasonable way to react.
The Washington Post newspaper revealed that Trump planned to send two officials to Brazil to raise doubts about the fairness of the electoral process. Is this transnational dimension a new challenge to the current democratic crisis or was it already present?
Authoritarians have always been happy to help other authoritarians. Trump is a special figure, he is the president of the most powerful country in the world and, therefore, he can order his lackeys to do all kinds of things. He's definitely interested in keeping his friends in power. He sees the Bolsonaros as one of those types. Putin has a huge influence operation. The Chinese too. I would see this as absolutely worrying. But is it something new? No.
And how powerful do you think this Trump effect could be in foreign elections?
This varies from country to country. Trump has become particularly unpopular in Europe, right-wing populist parties in several European countries now have no interest in his support. He is toxic. But this kind of intrusion or influence is most useful when it accelerates an already existing trend.
Obviously, there was a desire in Colombia for this kind of pseudo-authoritarian, "law and order" solution. Trump might be a little helpful in this regard, saying something like, "Look, this is my candidate." But he will not create support for these types of politicians separate from the fact that there is already a societal demand for them.
Could it be that this democratic crisis is just another phase?
I hope so. It will be necessary, once again, for voters to realize that radicals, autocrats and populists are not fulfilling what they promised to do. They are not fixing the system they claimed was corrupt and ineffective. And that, on the other hand, democratic-minded parties have viable and attractive plans to deal with the problems.
We now have an extraordinarily unpopular president in the United States. The problem is that the opposition is as unpopular as he is, perhaps even more so. I mention this because both sides of this equation are absolutely necessary. On the one hand, people need to start believing: "Look, we gave these guys a chance – the Bolsonaros, the Trumps, the Orbáns of the world – and they blew it." They didn't fix the economy, they didn't strengthen society. But people also need to believe that, in addition to the current ruler having failed, the opposition actually has something better to offer.
X-RAY
