The overwhelming Democratic victory in the midterm elections has caused an emotional shock in the United States. Euphoria has been unleashed among progressives that goes far beyond the number of seats. Relief, hope, collective relief and the feeling that, for once, for the first time perhaps, Trumpism has found its limits.
The blue wave, however, far exceeds American borders. For the rest of the planet, allies and adversaries, the polls were also a thermometer of the strength of Trump's project and a test to determine how far his capacity still reaches to drag an entire country, especially in foreign affairs. In Tehran, for example, it has been ironically celebrated that the war is considered the factor that decided the outcome, especially by figures like JD Vance. In Israel, with panic.
Among Atlanticists, among those who never completely lost faith in the solidity of liberal democracies and institutions, there is a satisfaction that is difficult to conceal. Some are beginning to glimpse an underlying current, a fatigue with strong men. The punishment of Viktor Orban, the surprise defeat of Jair Bolsonaro and the political difficulties of Benjamin Netanyahu feed that story. Investors have also chosen to see the cup as half full. "Global markets have reacted mostly positively to the important Democratic gains in the elections. Markets are betting that Trump will find it more difficult to govern impulsively, and even his own Republican Party will probably exercise greater control over his decisions. After two years of tariffs, pressure on the independence of the Federal Reserve and an energy crisis, this is good news for the global economy," estimates Alicia García-Herrero of the Bruegel Institute.
But enthusiasm coexists with deep caution. Because a Trump politically weakened at home, cornered by his adversaries and forced to live with the limits of his power, is more than likely to feel the temptation to look far away for what is beginning to be missing nearby. "In general, when Republican presidents lose Congress, they focus on foreign policy because that is where they have the most freedom of action. A weakened, wounded Trump is a more dangerous Trump. The president does not tolerate failure or criticism well. As a result, I expect him to lash out on some fronts and try to rehabilitate his image. A serious possibility is that he restarts the war with Iran to prove he was right and overthrow the regime. But it is also possible that he will try to do the opposite, accept that the war has ruined his presidency, put an end to it and look for a legacy elsewhere. I suppose Cuba would be his first option," Charles Kupchan, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and who was a member of the US National Security Council with Clinton and Obama, explains to EL MUNDO.
"In international affairs, Trump was unpredictable and dangerous before the election, and he will continue to be so after. Congress will hound him, and Republicans may begin to abandon him. But Trump could also become even more obsessed with cementing his legacy as a great global statesman. This could lead him to intensify his efforts to achieve peace or to use military force more boldly, and probably both. What worries me is his reaction to the election, because it indicates that he either does not understand or does not care about his popularity among the American people," explains the historian Stephen Wertheim, senior fellow in the American Diplomacy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and professor at Yale. And there are few things more dangerous than a leader with little to lose, indifferent to control and desperate to leave a mark without an equivalent in history.
The alternation in Congress will have a relevant, but limited, weight. "In January 2027, Democrats will chair all congressional committees and subcommittees, including appropriations and those important to European security and foreign policy (the Senate Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee). Democrats will decide which bills come up for hearings, control investigations, and oversee approximately two-thirds of the committees' staff and budgets and begin pave the way for a new approach to collaboration with US allies," says Torrey Taussig, senior researcher at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and an analyst also with experience in the Administration.
But foreign policy will continue to be in the hands of the Executive. Trump made it clear during his first term, but especially during his second, that he doesn't care at all what Congress does or says. And he has proven extremely adept at circumventing legislative and judicial restrictions, even when Republicans controlled both chambers. The best example of this was a few weeks ago, when the sanctions bill designed for Russia and Iran and named in honor of Lindsey Graham was approved with the support of both parties. Shortly after, the president rejected it by lifting the punishment on Moscow after a call with Vladimir Putin and the promise to put a few thousand barrels of diesel on the market. So the idea that somehow the polls are going to stop it and that change is going to lead to a radically different foreign policy is an illusion.
"If Donald Trump wants to escalate some conflict, he will not be deterred by the fact that voters did not like his foreign policy. These days he has reiterated that he still believes that the decision on Iran was the right one. Congress cannot prevent, for example, him from attempting a regime change in Cuba, but it can certainly make it difficult publicly. The other limitation is simply that the United States, in terms of its armed forces, is very overstretched at the moment. We are blockading Cuba. We are blockading the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. We are quite spread out, so if there is aggression or escalation, I would expect it to be in an area where the United States has already been acting, not in a new place," says Emma Ashford, a senior researcher at the Stimson Center in Washington.
That said, trying to anticipate Donald Trump's next foreign policy moves is, almost always, an exercise in contortionism and haruspicin. Although he has a series of strong ideas that remain firm over time, on a day-to-day basis Trump constantly changes his mind. He alters his priorities and changes course depending on the last conversation, the interlocutor in front of him, and the impression a meeting has made on him. Whether there are business opportunities. He is a president extraordinarily permeable to the people around him, to their arguments, to their flattery and to their demonstrations of strength. What seems like a red line today can become a concession tomorrow, and what yesterday was an absolute priority can disappear from the agenda without much explanation.
To this personal volatility we must also add the weight of events: the decisions of his adversaries, the reactions of the markets, the fact that he is not awarded a Nobel Prize, the opinion of his leading talk shows on his favorite television programs. One of those elements capable of completely altering forecasts is the human factor. In Washington it is increasingly taken for granted that Pete Hegseth will end up leaving the Pentagon, whether through a dismissal, a forced resignation or an agreed departure. At the same time, rumors are growing about the eventual departure of Marco Rubio, who may want to free himself from his responsibilities at the State Department to focus on his own presidential aspirations.
He expressly denied it this Thursday, saying that he is not thinking about 2028, but the mere possibility forces us to review any analysis of the direction of the Administration. Hegseth is responsible for the war and Rubio, the anchor of foreign policy. "I'm worried that Rubio might leave. I think if there's anything resembling an adult in the room, it's him. He's a more traditional Republican internationalist, and that's why I think he's played a role in moderating Trump's policies. If he leaves, we know who stays. JD Vance. Stephen Miller, Witkoff and Kushner, who don't know what they're doing. In this second term, Trump only hires people who say yes, and anyone who contradicts him is out of a job. So the news of that Rubio could leave is worrying," says Kupchan. "It is evident that there will still be internal pressure on Marco Rubio's entourage to attempt a regime change. But they are looking for someone like Delcy Rodríguez, as in Venezuela. They are not looking for a total regime change or military action," says Ashford.
On Friday afternoon, Trump announced the dismissal of his chief of staff, Susie Wiles, and her replacement by Stephen Miller, the most radical of his advisors. Wiles was a lifelong party strategist, more pragmatic than ideological in her ways and with little interest in foreign policy. Miller is the opposite. His worldview is based on a premise that breaks with the international order built after 1945, since he considers that power is not subject to law, but rather that it is power that determines the rules. His conception of the United States is openly nationalist, unilateralist and neo-imperial. He believes that a superpower should not ask permission or accept limits when its interests are at stake, whether territories, natural resources, security or strategic influence. The weaker countries are not equal interlocutors, but pawns that Washington can put under pressure, protect or put at its service, from Greenland to Venezuela.
In their world, allies, who have been abusing Washington's generosity for decades, from Canada to the EU to Australia and Japan, must accept the rules of the game, submit to the hierarchy and align themselves with American priorities.
"The victory of the Democrats in the midterm elections marks the beginning of Trump's transition period. Three different actors will shape the next two years: a Congress focused on domestic affairs, a president increasingly inclined to pursue an unpredictable foreign policy, and public opinion. To improve relations, Europe needs a strategy for each of them: forging coalitions in the new Congress, managing the unpredictability of Trump's foreign policy and laying the foundations for the relationship beyond 2028," says Giuseppe Spatafora, from the EU Institute for Security Studies in Brussels. "Europe is more likely to suffer collateral damage than to be the direct target of Trump's foreign policy ambitions. Recent threats to suspend intelligence sharing with Ukraine and other proposals could undermine efforts to support kyiv. The United States could also pressure the Europeans to reach agreements with Putin, such as resuming Russian imports of fossil fuels. Gas prices in Europe, already up 140% since February, could rise further if the conflict in the Gulf escalates. The desire for Trump diverting attention from his defeat in the midterm elections could also affect the Pentagon's European Force Posture Review, scheduled for the end of the year and which he could use to punish countries for their positions on US foreign policy," Spatafora points out.
