Istanbul Aydin University Faculty Member Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu wrote about the possible course of relations with Türkiye after the US midterm elections for AA Analysis.
The midterm elections held on November 3 in the USA revealed a new political picture that will mark the last two years of President Donald Trump's term in office. Democrats' victory in the majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate not only narrows the president's field of action in domestic politics, but also increases the weight of Congress in the formation of foreign policy decisions. This result shows that new pages that can be opened in Ankara-Washington relations with Trump's personal will may encounter institutional resistance.
Trump wants to improve relations with Türkiye and solve chronic problems in the field of defense. Türkiye, on the other hand, maintains its expectation of returning to the F-35 program, advancing the F-16 procurement and modernization process, lifting CAATSA sanctions and revitalizing defense industry cooperation. But American foreign policy is not limited to the president's personal preferences. Thanks to its constitutional powers and control mechanisms, Congress can slow down the executive's choices, subject them to conditions, and even legally limit them in some areas.
A cautious table
Therefore, the assessment that the Democrats' victory may have negative consequences for Ankara has a strong basis. The fact that the Trump administration's desired steps in favor of Türkiye have not become easier even during the Republican-controlled Congress period suggests that a more cautious picture may emerge with the Democratic majority. Criticism towards Turkey within the Democratic Party does not only arise from security and foreign policy differences. Evaluations made by Democrats about Turkey's domestic policy also drive a wedge between the two parties.
However, it would be misleading to see the Democrats as a monolithic anti-Türkiye bloc. There are also people within the party who take into account Turkey's strategic importance in the southeastern wing of NATO and Ankara's diplomatic and military capacity in crises extending from the Black Sea to the Middle East. The contribution of Turkey's NATO membership and military capacity to American security does not disappear with the Democrats winning the majority. The geographical location, opportunities such as the Straits, Incirlik and Kürecik, the security of the Black Sea and the developments in the Middle East are of strategic value for Washington. Therefore, it is not right to expect two completely opposite approaches regarding the strategic importance of Turkey between the Democrats and Trump. The difference arises in terms of under what political and normative conditions this strategic value will be transformed into cooperation. While Democrats acknowledge the importance of Turkey, they may put forward more conditions through management and foreign policy preferences, while Trump may focus more on leaders' diplomacy and pragmatic bargaining.
It would be incomplete to read Trump's approach to Turkey only in terms of F-35 and sanctions. The fact that Ankara follows a line in Syria that takes its priorities into account, that Turkey positively welcomes the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, that it supports Ankara's diplomatic initiatives in the tension with Iran, and that it wants to benefit from Turkey's mediation capacity in the Russia-Ukraine War, shows that the bilateral relationship is based on a broader basis. Trump sees Turkey as an important NATO ally that can contribute more to European security. He also wants to improve economic relations and trade volume. As a matter of fact, the bilateral trade target of 100 billion dollars is one of the important indicators of this approach. There may be personal proximity, pragmatic calculations or regional needs behind this attitude. However, whatever the reasons, having a president in Washington who is open to improving cooperation with Turkey is an important opportunity for Ankara.
What steps can Congress take?
One of the most effective tools available to Congress is the power to control arms sales. In large-scale defense sales, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs first informs the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Objections by committee members can activate the holding mechanism, which does not constitute an absolute veto in law but can delay the process in practice. After official notification, Congress can make a joint decision to block the sale within the framework of the Arms Export Control Act. It is also possible to impose conditions on sales, limit deliveries or prohibit certain transfers through the defense budget and the annual National Defense Authorization Act.
The F-35 issue is a concrete example of this power. The fiscal year 2020 defense law bans the transfer of F-35s as long as Türkiye has the S-400 system. Trump's positive political will alone cannot eliminate this provision; the executive must certify that the legal conditions are met. In CAATSA sanctions, the president has some waiver and termination powers, but there are also certain notification and Congressional review processes. The president can intensify diplomatic contacts, pursue negotiations within executive authority, seek sanctions waivers to the extent permitted by legislation, and advance the F-16 sales process. In contrast, to lift the F-35 ban, legal conditions must be met or Congress must change the law. New budget and sanctions regulations are also areas where Congress is decisive.
Another important instrument of the Congress is the budget and audit authority. The Türkiye file can be constantly kept on the agenda through provisions regarding the resources of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, reporting requirements, investigations and committee hearings. The Senate could also delay senior diplomatic and security bureaucracy appointments. These tools have the potential to affect the political atmosphere in Washington, even if a direct sanction decision is not taken.
The next two years are a period that requires both opportunity and careful diplomacy for Türkiye. It is a rational choice for Ankara to preserve the relationship it has developed with Trump, continue the dialogue between leaders and try to make progress on the F-35, F-16 and CAATSA titles. Trump's stance in favor of Türkiye in these files is valuable in itself, even though not all expectations have been met yet. Türkiye will try to maintain this political closeness and turn it into concrete results during the remainder of Trump's term. However, it is also necessary to carry this closeness to a permanent institutional basis. Ankara should establish more regular contact with the foreign policy elites of the Democratic Party, Congressional committees, and influential figures from both parties. Action should be taken through partnerships, especially the NATO alliance. In the final analysis, the future of Turkish-American relations will be determined not only by the Trump-Erdogan closeness, but also by the institutional balance of power in Washington and Ankara's relationship with these balances.
