The majority of the protesters who attended the 11-N general strike demonstrations last Wednesday were not born on December 14, 1988, when the UGT and CC OO unions made a powerful show of force by completely paralyzing Spain. The general strike of December 14, almost 38 years ago, was a milestone in the history of social conflicts in a Spain very different from today. The socialist government of Felipe González enjoyed its second consecutive absolute majority; The Transition and the attempted coup d'état of 23-F 1981 were still recent. They were years of industrial reconversion and other adjustment measures for the integration process in the EU. The economic growth was notable, at 5%, but the employment situation was very delicate: the unemployment rate was 20%, double the current rate, and the youth rate climbed to a scandalous 35%. And inflation amounted to 5.8%. The González Government wanted to face the problem of unemployment with more labor flexibility through a Youth Employment Plan that opened the door to precariousness. Better precarious than unemployed, was the message.
14-D consummated a very traumatic break between González's PSOE and its sister union, the UGT, led by Nicolás Redondo. It was the bankruptcy of the Casas del Pueblo, the social centers shared by the two organizations, linked since their foundation by Pablo Iglesias at the end of the 19th century. Redondo, who had supported González at the PSOE Congress in Suresnes in 1974, felt betrayed.
UGT emancipated itself and preferred to ally itself with the Workers' Commissions, then led by a young Antonio Gutiérrez (in turn emancipated from the PCE), in what was called the union action unit. The person who signs this, who is already old, was then starting out in journalism in the now defunct newspaper Ya. It was very shocking to walk through the completely empty streets (except for the pickets and for the demonstration) as we would not see again until the 2020 pandemic. In some sectors there was anger with González's PSOE for liberal policies not expected by the left (but even so, the Sevillian president would last two more terms). And there was fear in other sectors of opening the stores, so all the blinds were lowered with few exceptions, among them El Corte Inglés, which was a source of tension.
Since then, Spain has experienced seven other general strikes, including the one on Wednesday, and the organizers knew that they would not have the impact that the one in 1988 had. The unions were calling them with a more or less common thread: facing labor reforms that made dismissal cheaper or favored precariousness, changes in unemployment benefits and other social cuts. There were two more general strikes against the González governments (1992, this one half-day, and 1994), one against Aznar (2002), and the last three during the worst of the financial crisis: one against Zapatero (2010) and two against Rajoy (both in 2012, in March and November). Its impact has been relative in all cases. It did not happen again that citizen life ceased: unions have more strength in large industries and transport than in SMEs or commerce. Success should be measured more by what they achieved. In 1988, González had to withdraw the Youth Employment Plan; In 1993, a strike law was agreed upon that did not come into force because González brought forward the elections by surprise before completing the process; In 2002, the centrals achieved the fall of Minister Juan Carlos Aparicio and the rectification of the so-called decree, which made fair dismissal cheaper and toughened benefits for the unemployed (and which, to make matters worse, was declared unconstitutional five years later). But the rest of the strikes, from the last one against González or the subsequent ones against austerity due to the Great Recession, did not make the successive governments (or the troika) give in.
The different thing about this general strike of 11-N is that we cannot say that it went against Pedro Sánchez, who even encouraged it and canceled the agenda of his entire Government. When the protests over the housing access crisis began to be massive, the PSOE wanted to get in front of the demonstration before it turned against them, and saw a cause for the mobilization of the left in the face of elections that looked bad. Of the two decrees rejected by Congress, which precipitated the electoral call, the main one has been revived and has been approved in the Permanent Deputation. The socialists gave in to pressure for rent regulation, about which they previously had misgivings. They are not the definitive solution to the crisis, nor can they be, but rather an emergency response to dramatic situations such as that of Maricarmen Abascal, whose eviction and death were the spark of the protest. Some experts fear counterproductive effects: there are signs that the rental supply has been reduced, perhaps waiting for a new Government more favorable to owners. Another oddity: the initiative for the strike was not from CC OO and UGT, but from the Tenants' Union, and the centrals were dragged into it. They also feared that it would turn against them if they did not join.
Who was this strike against? Against speculation, vulture funds, rentism, in the vocabulary that has now been imposed. Also against employers for not raising salaries enough in the face of the skyrocketing cost of living. Has it also gone against the future Government that, if the polls that the CIS does not fail, will form PP and Vox? Yes, if only as a warning. To begin with, so that they do not repeal the rent decree. Also so that they know from the outset that if they choose the path of social cuts or labor counter-reform they will have the unions in front of them. That is why the PP calls it a "preventive" strike, and it has something of that, but it is perfectly legitimate.
The monitoring of the general strike was not massive, based on the data available, but it was not negligible either. It had more visibility on the streets than in the workplace, especially because the afternoon demonstrations in the main cities were massive. It seems clear that many people worked with a certain normality, or remotely, because missing it would cost them money that they need, and then they went to the demonstrations to support the cause. We are not in the Spain of 1988: unions have been losing strength in an economy with more services and less industry. Neither the pickets are so intimidating, nor are the shops or companies afraid to open on the day of the strike. The acts of violence and looting, if there were any, responded more to uncontrolled groups, such as those that have shaken the streets of France, than to those who organized them.
What was not foreseeable is that the Popular Party, which has felt attacked, not only went on the defensive, but also attacked the unions with fury. The PP is an institutional party, which has occupied different democratic governments, which adheres to the Constitution, where the role of unions in labor relations, collective bargaining and the right to strike is written very clearly. It is difficult to understand that no one denied Isabel Díaz Ayuso when she said that Feijóo had promised her that "all the union garbage is going to end." We would think that it was an excess of what Ayuso frequently allows himself, like his Chief of Staff, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, if it were not for the fact that Manuel Tellado, Feijóo's right-hand man, spoke in the same tone and portrayed the unions as servile to the Government. And if it weren't for the fact that the official PP account on the social network The old myth of the "prawn-eater", of the union-liberated freeloader who goes blind at the expense of subsidies. An insulting stereotype. No less insulting than being called trash, no less threatening than hearing that they're going to finish you off.
When writing this, no one in the PP has corrected the speech. And it doesn't seem very sensible to maintain it when they are so close to reaching La Moncloa. Offending anyone who feels in any way represented or protected by unions (including voters on the right, humans are more complex and contradictory than the cartoon says) is not very wise two weeks before going to the polls. It was not necessary to go on the attack in this way: it was enough for them to attribute responsibility for the chaos and the housing crisis to the Government, for which they had arguments.
When the right is in government, as is likely, they will have to try to reach an understanding with the unions and employers. Unless they know from the start that there is no possible understanding and they want to show them their teeth. Does this speech anticipate a hostile attitude? A new wave of labor reforms or cuts in social benefits? There are no clues to this in the PP's electoral program, presented this week. Rather, one reads a speech that is initially conciliatory: "This culture of agreement, which has its best example in social dialogue, is part of the best of our democratic model."
There is no mention of any major change in the workplace, nor in the field of pensions, beyond its update with the CPI already provided for in the law (although in that chapter there is a hidden section that will be announced later, they wanted to give excitement to some proposals). It is proposed that companies that maintain employment have not very specified advantages, it is also proposed to reinforce the training of employees to prepare for the challenges of AI and so that there is labor in the construction sector (and to build a million homes, a very ambitious objective). Among what can be controversial, the PP insists a lot that it will tackle "unjustified absenteeism", but it is progress that the "unjustified" term is specified because Feijóo got into trouble by putting sick leave in the same bag. Regarding the latter, it promises to tighten control and proclaims: "We will pursue the fraud of those who take advantage of the system to avoid working and collect undue benefits."
Another thorny issue: a reduction in the number of public employees is suggested by not covering all vacancies: the retirements of civil servants in the next decade, he says, allow us to "rethink what we should do with each service." Not written in the program, or perhaps it is a hidden article, is Feijóo's proposal to unify the minimum vital income and other subsidies into an "activation income", conditional on job offers not being rejected without justification. There are more controversial points in other sections, especially on immigration, to which an extensive part of the program is dedicated, circling the idea of "national priority" imported from Vox that is not mentioned with those words, but with "rooting" as a requirement to access public aid.
Of course we also have to look at the program of its foreseeable government partner, Vox. Which contains much more drastic measures. Among them, "progressively reduce until their elimination" subsidies to unions, parties and NGOs, a "massive tax reduction" (let's see who pays that, beyond the "superfluous" spending cuts) and repeal the labor reform of the Sánchez Government, the one led by Yolanda Díaz and approved by a wrong vote of the PP. However, two explosive points from its previous election program have been dropped from Vox's program: the proposal that contributory pensions be exempt from personal income tax, which would open a huge hole in public accounts but it promised it in 2023, and a radical reform of Social Security: "A new model for our pensions (mixed capitalization and pay-as-you-go)," what it defended in 2019.
Vox is interested, in its supposedly anti-system strategy, in going into total confrontation with the unions. But did it suit the PP? From now until 29-N, and from 29-N to the formation of the new Executive, there is time to modulate the message. Failure to do so would advance conflictive times. Like those of the harsh eighties, if it weren't for how different Spain is today. The PP would do well to take note that social unrest over the cost of living and, very particularly, that of housing, is not going to disappear. And that will continue to move young people, with or without the help of the unions and the parties that remain in the opposition.
