The former chairman of the Huang Fuxing Party Committee of the Kuomintang, retired major general Zang Youxia, and the legislator Gao Jin Sumei were prosecuted for the "Reverse Osmosis Law" and the "National Security Law" respectively. The China Affairs Department of the Democratic Progressive Party warned that the CCP is using "the flow of people, money, organizations, and information to The comprehensive penetration of the "four streams" into Taiwan's election campaign calls on voters to open their eyes and examine the political contacts and interest relationships between candidates and Beijing. Party exchanges cannot become a fig leaf for the united front, and local services cannot be reduced to a tool for foreign forces to mediate the election.
The China Department of the Democratic Progressive Party pointed out that Zang Youxia was suspected of cooperating with the "Huangpu Military Academy Alumni Association" guided by the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee through his association to recruit people to go to China to receive receptions on arrival, and then used existing connections to mobilize for the election. The prosecutor was investigated under the "Counter Osmosis Law". Gao Jin Sumei was also accused of accepting funds from the Chinese Communist Party through related organizations, developing organizations in Taiwan and influencing political operations, and was prosecuted under the "National Security Law" and other related crimes. The risks of united front infiltration involved in the two cases deserve Taiwanese society to be highly vigilant.
The China Department of the Democratic Progressive Party stated that the purpose of the CCP's infiltration into Taiwan is to cultivate local forces willing to cooperate with Beijing's political operations, gradually expanding from local elections to central decision-making, and then affecting Taiwan's national defense and security, cross-strait policies, and democratic independent decision-making. The most dangerous thing is that these political purposes are often hidden in daily exchanges and local activities, through the flow of people to establish relationships, the flow of money to convey interests, the flow of organizations to expand mobilization, and combined with the flow of information to influence political cognition.
The China Department of the Democratic Progressive Party analyzed that once the aforementioned channels are connected to each other, they will form a long-term local cooperation network that will gradually affect Taiwan’s elections and political decision-making. There are four methods worth being vigilant about: First, establishing connections through exchanges and entertainment, and gradually forming political dependence. The CCP uses free travel, on-site hospitality and various exchange activities to build connections and trust with the Taiwanese people, and then forms dependence relationships through long-term interest exchanges. It even requires support for specific candidates, turning seemingly normal exchanges into a tool for political mobilization.
Second, build relationships with financial interests and build political synergies. The CCP may indirectly support specific politicians or local organizations through overseas funds, meals, entertainment, and activity subsidies, concealing the true source of funds and political purposes, in an attempt to support people who are willing to cooperate with Beijing to enter public opinion organs and government systems, and further influence Taiwan's political decision-making.
Third, use local organizations to connect people and establish a local mobilization network. The CCP focuses on the local influence of palaces, community groups, and veterans’ organizations. Through exchanges and cooperation, resource injection, and organizational connections, it transforms originally dispersed connections and interests into long-term local political networks. During elections, it is more likely to become a mobilizing force for specific candidates.
Fourth, use information manipulation to influence cognition and allow political propaganda to penetrate into daily life. In addition to infiltrating connections, funds, and organizations, the CCP may also use social platforms, local groups, and online media to spread disinformation, one-sided information, and specific political discussions. Especially when political information is disseminated through a network of acquaintances, local communities and opinion leaders, it is easier to lower people's vigilance, allowing Beijing's political propaganda to be mixed with daily information and influence voters' judgment.
The China Department of the Democratic Progressive Party emphasized that politicians who know that Beijing is uniting in Taiwan, but cooperate with political operations, and even assist foreign forces in the election, should be subject to the most stringent social tests. In the face of comprehensive infiltration by the CCP, all political parties should jointly take precautions. Voters should also open their eyes and examine the political dealings and interest relationships between candidates and Beijing. Politicians who cooperate with the CCP's united front must not be allowed to use Taiwan's democratic system to in turn harm Taiwan's democracy.
