Manisa Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ferdi Zeyrek, who was electrocuted at his home in Yunusemre district on the evening of June 6, died on June 9 at Manisa Celal Bayar University Hafsa Sultan Hospital, where he was treated. Within the scope of the investigation initiated into Zeyrek's death, upon the interim decision of the Manisa 2nd High Criminal Court, the report prepared by the expert committee consisting of 2 electrical engineers, 1 civil engineer, 1 mechanical engineer and 1 occupational safety expert from Dokuz Eylül University Faculty of Engineering was completed on September 15, 2026. In the report, the villa, pool and machine room where the incident occurred were examined in terms of project design, construction, inspection, electrical and mechanical installation, as well as occupational health and safety.
THE POOL IS NOT IN THE ORIGINAL PROJECT
In the report, it was stated that licenses were obtained for 7 different buildings on the parcel where the house where the incident occurred was located, 6 of which were residences and 1 was a retaining wall. It was determined that the swimming pool was not marked in the common areas section of any of the building permits. It was noted that the engine room and the associated pool where the incident occurred were not in the original architectural project. It was stated that an application was made to Yunusemre Municipality for an architectural renovation project on November 17, 2020, and the phrase 'ornamental pools were added' was included in the project approved on November 20, 2020. The report emphasized that the pools were included in the plans and layout plans in the renovation project, but there was no information about the depth of the pools. It was also included in the report that the municipality did not request special licenses and additional projects for the pools. The expert committee evaluated that not specifying the depth of the pool led to the determination of whether the pool to be built is an 'ornamental pool' or not.
DEPTH OF THE POOL 1.60 METERS
The report stated that the pool where the incident occurred was 4 meters by 8 meters and 1.60 meters deep. It was evaluated that the pool was built later and the engine room was built without permission and without a project. It was stated that in the photographs of the 'Level Determination Report' dated November 11, 2020, the pool, which has not yet been approved even as an 'ornamental pool', was seen full of water. Despite this, it was noted that the current condition of the pool was not determined during the inspection process. The report also stated that it was signed that the work was 100 percent completed in the Work Completion Report dated February 23, 2021, but in the photographs taken on the same date, it was seen that the pool and machine room entrance was covered with grass or similar material.
NO GROUNDING PROJECT FOR ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION
One of the most important findings in the expert committee report regarding the technical aspect of the incident was that the electrical installation and grounding project of the pool and machinery room had not been prepared. The report stated that pool pump motors, filter systems, metal stairs and other metal parts around the pool should be properly grounded and connected to each other with a potential equalization system. However, it was noted that there was no document proving that potential equalization conductors were used in accordance with the standards and that a grounding project was carried out in the pool and machinery room associated with the incident. It was stated that N.B., who carried out the electromechanical installation of the pool and machine room, did not prepare the necessary grounding project and did not receive approval. The report also states that the electrical installation of 6 pools was carried out under a single contract by N.B. It was evaluated that the total connection power was 28.08 kilowatts, the 16 kilowatt authority limit specified for electricians was exceeded, and therefore N.B. was not authorized to carry out the entire project work under a single contract.
LEFT CURRENT RELAY IS DEFECTIVE
In the report, it was stated that the leakage current relay in the electrical panel in the pool's machine room was also faulty. The expert committee noted that upon examination of the video recordings, it was seen that the leakage current relay did not work as expected during the manual on-off control, and evaluated that how the relay reacted to the leakage current Ferdi Zeyrek was exposed to was a coincidental situation, beyond scientific expectations. It was stated that the three-phase overcurrent breakers in residential and pool panels are not protective circuit elements against electric shock and that they are intended to protect against overcurrent. In the report, it was also included in the information in the file that Ferdi Zeyrek's wife, Nurcan Zeyrek, was exposed to electric current by touching her husband when she arrived at the scene, and then went to the house and cut off the electricity of the facility via the breaker on the electrical panel.
THE INSULATION ON THE ENGINE IS DEFECTED
The expert committee determined that the electrical leakage occurred through the pool pump motor. According to the report, the engine was overhauled by a private company in 2021. It was stated that the cover where the phase, neutral and ground connections of the engine were made was opened during maintenance, but the gaskets that should be used to prevent water leakage under the cover were not installed and the gland connection at the cable entry was left loose. It was later evaluated that the engine was repaired again on April 18, 2022, and after this repair, the waterproof insulation was broken and moisture and water entered the electrical connection cables. In the report, it was noted that, for this reason, insulation deterioration occurred again in the motor windings and that smoke and a burning smell came from the windings when the electricity was applied, which was recorded in the crime scene investigation report.
67 VOLTS WAS MEASURED ON THE METAL LADDER
The expert committee stated that it was measured that a voltage level of 67 volts occurred between the metal ladder used to enter the machine room and the ground due to electrical leakage. The report stated that voltages above 50 volts are considered dangerous to humans by international standards. It was stated that there was 15-20 centimeters of water on the floor of the engine room on the day of the incident, and although the ladder was metal, it was not grounded. In the calculations made by the expert panel, it was calculated that 203 milliamperes of current could pass through the human in the first scenario, and 170 milliamperes of current could pass through the human in the second scenario. It was stated in the report that the dangerous current limit for humans was accepted as 30 milliamperes, and it was evaluated that the calculated values were very high and fell within the lethal effect limit in the current-time graphs given in the crime scene investigation report.
IF GROUNDING WAS MADE, IT WOULD BE 6 VOLT
The report stated that if the metal ladder is grounded and potential equalization is done during the installation of the pool and machine room, very low resistance will occur between the engine body where the electrical leakage is located and the foundation grounding. In the calculation made according to this scenario, it was stated that the voltage seen on the human body would be approximately 6 volts and that this would be well below the dangerous voltage level of 50 volts. The expert panel concluded that if these conditions had been met, Ferdi Zeyrek would not have been in a life-threatening situation.
THE ENGINE IS PLACED ON A PLASTIC STAND
The report also stated that the pool pump motor was placed on a plastic stand that was not fixed to the floor. It was noted that the fixing screws of the engine to the floor were not used and the plastic stand was not fixed to the floor. It was evaluated that the vibrations occurring during engine operation increased for this reason and this could cause problems in bearings, motor windings and plastic water pipes. The report stated that plastic fittings may loosen due to vibration and cause water leakage, and in an environment where there is electricity leakage, this may also pose a danger to people in the pool.
THERE IS NO MECHANICAL PROJECT FOR THE POOL.
In the report, it was determined that there was no approved mechanical installation project for the pool and engine room. It was stated that there was no calculation document regarding the technical capacity of the circulation pump, no record regarding the compliance of the pump installation with the manufacturer's instructions, and no document regarding the continuity of the grounding connection through the mechanical equipment. It was noted that the humidity control and drainage adequacy of the machine room was unclear, it could not be determined whether a safe distance was maintained between the electrical panel and the water installation, and the compliance of the ventilation system with technical standards could not be documented. In the report, it was stated that N.B., the owner of the company that installed the pool, was not a mechanical engineer and that the company did not employ engineers competent in preparing pool mechanical installation projects.
MACHINE ROOM WAS RATED AS 'VERY DANGEROUS'
In the evaluation made in terms of occupational health and safety, it was stated that the machine room where the incident occurred was a closed area. It was stated that there was limited ventilation as well as electricity, water and humidity in the engine room, which was created by digging at a depth of approximately 2-2.5 meters and was located very close to the pool. In the report; It was evaluated that the combination of narrow entrance, electric motors, electric cables, water and humidity, mobile metal ladder in vertical position, lack of grounding and not actively working leakage current relay made the environment very dangerous.
CHAIN OF DEFECTS IN THE REPORT
The expert panel also evaluated the accident based on Heinrich's 'Domino Theory'. In the report, failure to comply with the TS HD 60364 standard while building the pool and engine room, leakage current relay not working, not preparing a project for the pool and its installations, building the engine room too close to the pool, not connecting the jacuzzi engine to the floor with a fixed platform, water accumulation in the machine room on the morning of the incident day, and not reporting this situation to Ferdi Zeyrek despite the electrical system not working normally were listed as the chain of negligence leading to the accident.
4 PEOPLE ARE MAINLY DEFECTIVE
In the report, N.B., H.A., M.G. were involved in the incident. and H.İ. were found to be fundamentally at fault. N.B., grounding and project deficiencies in the pool's electrical installation; H.A., deterioration of waterproof insulation after engine repair; M.G., unauthorized pool and engine room and lack of supervision; H.I. was deemed to be fundamentally defective due to defects in the assembly of the engine.
9 PERSONS ARE SECONDARY DEFECTIVE
In the report, A.Ö., E.K., R.A., H.Ş., M.Ç., M.S., Ö.T., Y.Ö. and A.S. were found to be at fault. A.Ö. and E.K. did not fulfill their duties even though they signed the report that included a photograph showing that the pool was full of water at a time when it was not yet approved; R.A., H.Ş., and M.Ç. were deemed to be at fault because they could not prevent the pool and engine room from being built unsupervised. M.S., and Ö.T. could not determine the current state of the pool and signed the Building Permit Certificate; Y.Ö. was found to be at fault for not fulfilling his duties and responsibilities, and A.S. was found to be at fault for not notifying the homeowners of the dangerous situation.
3 DEFENDANTS WERE FOUND FLAWLESS
In the report, it was concluded that M.E., H.A., and H.E. had no fault in the incident. It was stated that the responsibility of the electricity distribution company personnel M.E. was defined by the relevant legislation and that the report prepared by the METU faculty members in the file showed that he was not responsible. Yunusemre Municipality Zoning and Urbanization Manager H.A. made the final signatures on the architectural renovation project and Building Occupancy Permit in accordance with the institutional hierarchy, but it was evaluated as flawless on the grounds that there were no deficiencies in the administrative process and necessary signatures and there was no officer inspecting the building site. It was stated that Building Document Officer H.E. signed the document as the official who inspected the document, but there was no deficiency in the process and necessary signatures, and it was flawless on the grounds that he was not the official who inspected the building site.
ACCORDING TO EXPERTS, FERDİ ZEYREK IS ALSO PERFECT
