Funding crisis and an irony

The funding crisis we have been talking about for weeks is a multi-dimensional event. To simplify, there is an exoteric (visible on the surface) dimension: criminal affairs, politics, family, clan relations... There is also an esoteric (deep, technical - in a sense related to infrastructure) dimension: the production, sharing and dispossession of surplus value. In fact, there is an ironic dimension: The crisis that broke out in an environment where productive investments have a shortage of resources, while financial gains and rents grow, shows that the AKP regime of political Islam has exhausted its own economic supports while trying to survive.

ESOTERIC DIMENSION

The surplus value created in the economy is shared in the forms of profit, interest and rent. In the sectors where surplus value is produced, especially in industry, surplus value production, renewal of factories, technology, investments and employment require long-term financing, while financial investments, speculation and rent income can be realized in a much shorter term. When the producer's profit rates begin to decline and the producer's confidence in economic stability and economic policies begins to be shaken, capital begins to turn to the financial field, speculation, and rent income. In the sharing of surplus value, the share of financial gains and rents begins to increase and the share of profits begins to decrease. Thus, while the resources required for the reproduction of productive capital further shrink, as a result, surplus-value production continues to shrink, gradually affecting interest and rent income. This process - as crisis tendencies deepen - capital increasingly tends to plunder/usurp the wealth previously accumulated in society (savings, assets "under the pillow", even values ​​blocked in real estate) through financial and political means: Thus, a process of dispossession begins.

FUNDING CRISIS AS A TOOL OF DISAPPROPRIATION

In the Turkish economy, while negative real interest rates eroded the value of savings, people turned to housing, gold, foreign currency, stock markets and investment funds in an effort to protect their savings against inflation. However, the flow of savings into the financial system did not mean that resources were provided for productive investments. Under the political and cultural factors operating on an exoteric dimension, the growth of financial assets and the development of surplus-value production capacity diverged from each other.

The fund crisis was a result of this separation, an event of dispossession facilitated by the financial and political-cultural relations built by the AKP regime: Extraordinary increases in financial asset prices, which took place within political-cultural relations, lacked an economic basis, and were impossible to sustain in reality, created the impression of easy, safe profits for inexperienced investors who were unfamiliar with exoteric relations. While they were rushing to those financial instruments, the actors that seemed exoteric ended up at the point of unsustainability, actually plundering the assets of the investors who came after them. The empty funds also collapsed rapidly.

The losses that emerged as the dust settled showed that a massive transfer of wealth - dispossession - had occurred, generally from medium and small investors to a very limited number of investors. The identity of the actors who carried out this dispossession (theft) and the tools they used became increasingly clear.

Under the presidential system, the separation of powers and the autonomy of supervisory institutions disappeared, the distribution of state resources and economic-cultural relationship networks close to the government were intertwined, and the border between public interest and private interest dissolved. Now, it should not be surprising that the actors who carried out the dispossession (theft) emerged from among the elites governing the regime of political Islam as a product of this transformation.