Defense policies, now an absolute priority for European countries, bring with them strange traveling companions... or perhaps not so strange. The so-called "Shield of Achilles" is a good example of these alliances: Greece and Israel signed this week a military pact worth 3 billion euros that, in the words of Athens, is part of "the greatest revolution" in defense in the country's history. But the agreements with Tel Aviv are uncomfortable right now: in fact, it has set off alarms in Turkey, a strategic rival of both, and in Brussels it has generated, at the very least, an uncomfortable silence because the EU's relations with Israel are not going through their best moment.
According to both governments, this "ambitious" defensive umbrella could be fully operational in two and a half years and will combine existing Greek capabilities with cutting-edge Israeli technology. The core of this multi-layer air and missile defense framework will be made up of three key systems: David's Sling (designed to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles at ranges between 40 and 300 kilometers), Spyder (for low-altitude threats such as drones and aircraft) and Barak MX (capable of neutralizing fighters and missiles using various interceptors). In addition, the pact includes air surveillance radars, a command center powered by artificial intelligence and complementary drone anti-fall dome systems for an additional value of 26 million euros.
It all sounds very powerful, but community sources consulted by 20minutos in Brussels are not so optimistic; To speak of caution, they do not rely only on the fact that Israel's offensive in Gaza or its rapprochement with the United States has weakened relations - although, for example, Ursula von der Leyen insists on showing the opposite - but also on the fact that an agreement of this type can increase military dependencies with third countries. Just what the Union wants to avoid. Neither excessive approaches to Washington, nor to Beijing... nor to Tel Aviv.
But Athens and the Government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis do not take care of this discomfort in the community capital. This multimillion-dollar acquisition is part of Greece's broader plan to modernize its armed forces by 2030. Athens plans to allocate nearly 28 billion euros (about $32 billion) until 2036 to update its arsenal, which includes not only the Israeli shield, but also the purchase of up to 40 F-35 fighter jets from the United States and state-of-the-art frigates from France and Italy. The goal of the Greek defense ministry is to make all this new technology fully interoperable with its current assets, such as the Belharra frigates and the Rafale and F-16 Viper fighter jets.
However, the most worried is Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Israel and Greece have Turkey as their most direct strategic rival, and after a season of tense calm, problems are growing again with this agreement. And that is something that is not of interest to NATO, for example: in the Alliance they insist, at least behind closed doors, that Ankara is decisive for stability not only in the Middle East but as a possible mediator - given Washington's ineffectiveness - in potential peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.
And the deployment of the first phases of this system will be concentrated in the Aegean Sea, an area of historical territorial dispute with neighboring Turkey. Greek media have noted that this new air defense umbrella significantly alters the balance of power in the region. The reinforcement of the Hellenic air border seeks to mitigate the growing technological development and drone capacity that the Ankara government has been demonstrating.
From calm... to more tensions
Border tensions between Greeks and Turks have escalated in recent weeks after a period without major shocks. As an example of the fragility of the moment, on August 28, a Turkish drone flew over the space between the islands of Samothrace and Lemnos - very close to the Turkish coast -, forcing the Greek air forces to mobilize F-16 fighters to intercept it. Türkiye has reacted extremely negatively to this growing military cooperation between Greece and Israel, arguing that it represents a direct threat to its national security.
The timing of the pact cannot be, therefore, worse for Ottoman interests. Just a few days ago, for example, Erdogan himself accused Netanyahu's government of "wanting to erase Palestine from the map" and now he sees how two of his strategic opponents sign a medium and long-term pact and also add another rival, Cyprus, to the 'tweezer'. In 2025, in fact, Nicosia also purchased Israel's Barak defensive system, and Ankara did not hesitate to call the Cypriot Executive a "puppet" in the hands of Washington and Tel Aviv. Athens has already joined this society, the Turks repeat, with its face revealed.
At the same time, Greece's role is key to the interests of the US and Israel in their offensive against Iran since the country hosts important bases within the framework of NATO; Trump, without going any further, has not included the Greeks in his idea of reducing his presence on the European continent... because he knows he cannot afford it. The most important installation is Souda Bay, on the island of Crete, a strategic point for US naval and air operations in the Mediterranean. Additionally, US forces use Greek facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikio and Alexandroupolis, the latter especially important for the transport and deployment of troops and military materiel to the Balkans and Eastern Europe.
To the above we must add that the European Union is looking for a way to be more active within the framework of NATO while reducing its dependencies: the High Representative, Kaja Kallas, has announced that she will bring together the countries' top military commanders to see how the continent can "compensate" for the readjustment of the United States. At the same time, the Secretary General of the Alliance, Mark Rutte, agreed with Von der Leyen on the need for more coordination and a more active role for Europeans in the organization. But it is understood that by themselves, not through pacts with third states that, like Israel, are not part of NATO.
