The fuss surrounding Nvidia boss Jensen Huang shows how sensitive personal contacts can be for top managers. Constitutional protection officer Kramer explains what this means for German company bosses.
The Nvidia logo: The company may have been spied on through personal contacts with the CEO. Photo: REUTERS
Berlin. A suspected Chinese agent close to Nvidia boss Jensen Huang is causing a stir. The case raises the question of how vulnerable the management levels of German companies are.
In an interview, Thuringia's head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Stephan Kramer, explains which warning signals managers should take seriously and why even small, special machine manufacturers can find themselves in the sights of foreign intelligence services.
Mr. Kramer, Nvidia boss Jensen Huang is said to have had a relationship with a suspected Chinese agent. How likely is it that Chinese intelligence services will target German CEOs?
I think it is very likely that German CEOs, managing directors and other top managers are also targeted by Chinese intelligence services. By the way, your immediate personal environment cannot be ruled out. As a leading industrial and technology location, Germany is a particularly attractive educational destination.
Are the secret services primarily concerned with business secrets and technical know-how?
It's not just about classic economic espionage, but also about strategic decisions, political influence, international networks and access to key technologies. Science and universities also play a role and we are trying to raise awareness.
Vita Stephan Kramer
Kramer has been President of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Thuringia since December 1, 2015. As the state's top constitutional protection officer, he became known for his political measures against the partly right-wing extremist AfD party.
As a student, Kramer joined the Junge Union and later the CDU. He studied law, worked as an office manager for two CDU members of the Bundestag, then initially switched to the FDP and became a member of the SPD in 2010.
Kramer worked for the Central Council of Jews in Germany for several years and was its general secretary from 2004. He is deputy chairman of the state community in Thuringia. His ancestors come from Altenburg in Thuringia, and he himself was born in Siegen in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1968.
How do such agents operate?
We have been warning for years about so-called social engineering attacks, in which attackers specifically build trust and exploit personal relationships to obtain confidential information. Professional and personal contact exchanges continue to play a major role here. People initially make professional or private contacts via such platforms, which can later be exploited in a targeted and unscrupulous manner for espionage purposes.
Why are top managers particularly interesting for secret services?
Managers in particular have confidential information and can at the same time influence business and sometimes also political decisions. The intelligence services' methods range from systematic research to long-term personal contact initiation and possible recruitment attempts.
The people at the top of our economy are also strategic intelligence targets.
How risky is that?
It is also about the creation of personal dependencies and targeted blackmail, for example through kompromat, i.e. incriminating or compromising material with which those affected can be put under pressure.
The Thuringian Office for the Protection of the Constitution Kramer at a press conference in Erfurt (archive): The threat is not limited to DAX companies. Photo: Martin Schutt/dpa
What can be derived from the case of the Nvidia boss for the German economy?
The Nvidia case shows what security policy significance such personal access can have. However, the ongoing investigation must first clarify whether the specific allegations are true and how extensive the damage actually is. What is crucial is that not only company data, but also the people at the top of our economy are strategic intelligence targets.
Which German companies are particularly at risk?
Companies that have cutting-edge technological knowledge, strategically important patents or information relevant to security policy are particularly at risk. These include in particular the semiconductor industry, artificial intelligence, automotive and mechanical engineering, robotics, chemical and pharmaceutical industries, energy and battery technologies, telecommunications as well as aerospace and the defense industry, but also quantum technology. Companies that are involved in critical infrastructure or have close connections to political decision-makers and international markets are also of interest.
Does the danger particularly affect large companies such as Siemens, SAP or Volkswagen?
The threat is by no means limited to DAX companies. Innovative medium-sized companies, often world market leaders in technological niches, are particularly attractive targets. Some of their specialized know-how is of considerable strategic value.
So a small specialist machine manufacturer can be just as interesting as a billion-dollar company?
What matters is not the size of a company, but the value of its knowledge, technologies and access.
How does a CEO recognize that a secret service may be interested in him?
Intelligence service initiations generally do not begin with an open request for espionage. They often develop gradually, through seemingly harmless business contacts, exclusive invitations, advice offers or personal relationships.
When should the alarm bells ring?
Particular attention is required if new contacts establish confidentiality unusually quickly, show conspicuously high levels of personal interest, promise extraordinary business benefits, or repeatedly request information that goes beyond the actual business purpose.
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What specific warning signs are there?
Warning signs can include generous gifts, financial contributions, invitations to confidential meetings, or a desire to pass communication through official company channels. A further risk arises when personal relationships are deliberately used to create dependencies or to bring about compromising situations.
Does that mean a manager has to be suspicious of every new acquaintance?
Not every unusual contact is an attempt at espionage. A relationship becomes particularly suspicious when personal closeness, exceptional benefits, secrecy and a growing interest in confidential information come together.
If a story is too good to be true, then it usually isn't true.
What advice would you give to managers who suddenly find themselves confronted with particularly attractive offers or acquaintances who are noticeably interested?
Trust your gut feeling: If a story is too good to be true, then it usually isn't true.
Related topics
NvidiaDaxSiemensMechanical engineering
And if there is suspicion of a recruitment attempt?
Managers should disclose such situations to their company security department at an early stage and, if necessary, confidentially contact the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The most effective prevention lies in raising awareness, clear security rules and a corporate culture in which possible attempts at initiation can be reported without fear of personal consequences.
What do you think is the biggest threat to the German economy?
The greatest danger lies not only in the theft of technologies or business secrets, but also in the deliberate creation of personal dependencies on decision-makers. Anyone who gains access to top management may not only be able to extract information, but also influence strategic decisions. Industrial espionage has long been a question of the personal security of managers.
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