Izmir Katip Çelebi University International Relations Department Lecturer Prof. Dr. Tuğçe Ersoy Ceylan wrote about the results of the election in Israel for AA Analytics.
The picture that became clear after the October 27 elections in Israel points to a political impasse in which Benjamin Netanyahu cannot maintain his parliamentary majority, but the opposition has not yet formed a partnership that can take over power. The formation of a government seems to depend on re-evaluating the partnerships that were excluded during the campaign or resolving existing blocs.
In the distribution published before the counting of special envelopes on October 28, the Netanyahu bloc has 52 seats, the opposition led by Eisenkot has 48 seats, and the Arab parties have 20 seats. Likud is the largest party with 26 seats. Eisenkot's party has 21 seats, Bennett's party and the Joint Arab List have 12 seats each, and Ra'am has 8 seats. Although it cannot be said that these figures are finalized until the counting and controls are completed, the current table shows that both main blocs need additional partners for the majority.
Can the boundaries of blocks change?
It is a significant loss for the Netanyahu bloc to fall behind the 64-seat majority it won in 2022. However, it also appears that the opposition's goal of replacing Netanyahu will not constitute a common government program on its own. Cooperation with Arab parties, Haredi military service, disagreements over the position of the judiciary and leadership sharing are political obstacles to parliamentary arithmetic.
The first option is for the opposition to form a government with the support of Arab parties, but when Ra'am's 8 are added to the 48 seats, the total remains at 56. Therefore, merely reaching an agreement with Mansur Abbas is not enough; the attitude of the Joint Arab List is also decisive. It clearly shows that the anti-Netanyahu bloc has won the majority, based on the 68 seats that could be reached with the support of the two Arab lists. However, the structural inequality underlying the state prevents seeing the result in this way. Therefore, in these circumstances, in order for the 68-seat majority to turn into a government, the objections within the opposition will need to be overcome and the conditions of support will need to be negotiated.
The second option is to create a new majority through transitions between blocks. Netanyahu may try to attract an opposition party or MPs to his side. As a matter of fact, it is possible to argue that the call he made after the election to form a "Jewish right wing" government was made to Israel Beitenu leader Avigdor Lieberman or Beyachad leader Naftali Bennett. For Eisenkot, reconciliation with Haredi parties poses a different possibility. In the current distribution, the total of the opposition and the two Haredi parties reaches 62, but the distance between the opposition discourse, which emphasizes military service obligation, and the demands of the Haredi parties is the main obstacle to this option.
The third option is a broad-based unity government. President Isaac Herzog's call for an open-minded approach to the parties to prevent re-election keeps this possibility on the agenda, but the unity government also requires agreement on the sharing of the prime ministership, commitments to work with Netanyahu and the position of the current coalition partners. Therefore, a large majority does not automatically mean a stable partnership.
If these roads are closed, a prolonged search for a government or re-election may come to the fore. Such a process could prolong Netanyahu's stay in office. Additionally, apart from the struggle to form a government, there may be negotiations over the Presidency of the Parliament, commissions and parliamentary control.
Arab votes and majority legitimacy
The fact that Arab parties reached 20 seats is one of the most important developments of the election. With a population of approximately two million, Israeli Palestinians showed in these elections that they are a political subject of the country that cannot be ignored. According to these results, the Joint Arab List became the third party in the country together with Beyachad, while Ra'am and the Joint List Arab parties became the third political bloc with the most votes in the country after Likud and Yashar. However, Israel's ethnocratic structure will cause this situation to be ignored in Israeli politics. Therefore, the acceptance of Arab parties with parliamentary weight into the government partnership is not an expected outcome. Netanyahu's emphasis on the "Zionist majority" and his opposition to the government based on Arab parties also move the discussion from the seat count to which partnerships will be considered legitimate. This makes visible the tension between equal citizenship and the practice of forming a government.
Likud's accusation of Arab parties of election irregularities added a new dimension to this debate. The Election Commission stated that it would examine the application within the normal control process, but the political impact of this discourse, which brings into question the legitimacy of the increased representation of Arab parties, should be evaluated separately.
On the other hand, the 77.7 percent participation rate reported across the country shows the importance attached to this election. Mobilization in Arab settlements also draws attention in the increase in representation. However, it would be insufficient to reduce Arab voters' preferences solely to opposition to Netanyahu. The fight against crime and daily security demands, which came to the fore in pre-election research, may also be important topics in coalition negotiations.
The cost of war and the limits of change
In the post-October 7 period, the economic and social costs of Israel's war in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran became politicized, especially through the sharing of burdens. Prolonged reserve military service, interruptions in working life and the care burden of families have transformed the debate about Haredi military service beyond security into an issue of social justice. Today, various groups are bringing up the issue of military service for certain reasons. The Bank of Israel also considers the expansion of Haredi military recruitment as a step that could reduce the economic and personal burden of dependence on reserve soldiers.
But the costs of war do not automatically produce anti-government sentiment. The same military operations can be read by different voters as security successes or unsustainable burdens. The results do not alone explain the impact of economic difficulties on voting preferences. On the other hand, the fact that the opposition includes right-wing parties makes it difficult to assume that the leadership change will turn into a comprehensive policy change on the Palestine issue.
The options available to Israel appear to extend to a broader bargaining area than a change of leader. At this point, it will be decisive which commitments the parties are ready to give up and what kind of management program they can create in return. In the final analysis, the ballot box seems to have shaken the existing majority, and the upcoming negotiations will determine who the new majority will consist of and what it can do.
