The European Parliament's assessment of the military operation in the Black Sea is being examined in terms of the Montreux provisions and regional security.
The European Parliament's call to evaluate a possible EU naval operation in the Black Sea is discussed in the context of the Montreux Convention and regional security balances.
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The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the security situation in the Black Sea on 22 October 2026.
Independent researcher Erman Tatlıoğlu wrote for AA Analysis about the possible military role of the EU in the Black Sea, which was brought to the agenda with the decision of the European Parliament (EP) dated October 22, 2026, within the framework of the Montreux provisions and regional security balances.
In the Black Sea, where the impact of the Russia-Ukraine War is felt intensely, topics such as attacks on commercial ships, the security of maritime transportation and the protection of critical infrastructures have begun to find an increasing place on the agenda of the European Union (EU). In this context, the AP, with its decision adopted on 22 October 2026, called for the evaluation of the option of organizing an EU naval operation in the Black Sea. The decision also requested that NATO's security activities in the region be increased, the defense capacities of Romania and Bulgaria be strengthened, and the Black Sea Maritime Security Center initiative be accelerated. Although no concrete military operation decision has been taken yet, these initiatives have brought to the fore the possibility of expanding the EU's current role in the Black Sea beyond maritime security and surveillance activities. The possibility of expanding the EU's military role in the Black Sea is important in terms of the legal order created by the Montreux Straits Convention, the security responsibilities of riparian countries and Türkiye's policy towards maintaining regional military balances.
EP's decision of 22 October
On 22 October 2026, the EP adopted a resolution on the security situation in the Black Sea with 432 votes in favour, 52 against and 88 abstentions. The decision discussed attacks on commercial ships, notifications of violations of Romanian airspace and threats to maritime transport. While the AP held Russia responsible for the deterioration of the security environment in the Black Sea, it evaluated the protection of freedom of navigation among the priorities of European security.
The most important element of the decision was the call on the EU and its member states to consider the option of organizing a naval operation in the Black Sea. A final decision has not been made yet to launch the operation. Basic issues such as mission scope, participating countries, command-control structure and financing were also not clarified. However, the EU's inclusion of the possibility of assuming direct military responsibility in the Black Sea on its agenda is important in terms of the Union's tendency to expand its role in the region beyond its current activities.
The decision also asked NATO to consider a special security initiative for the Black Sea, to improve the defense capabilities of Romania and Bulgaria against unmanned aerial vehicles, and to direct unused resources in the EU's SAFE program to regional security needs. With the acceleration of the Black Sea Maritime Security Center initiative based in Varna and Constanta, the protection of critical submarine infrastructure was also brought to the agenda.
Montreux and the military balance in the Black Sea
The basis of the security architecture of the Black Sea is the Montreux Straits Convention dated 1936. While the Convention regulates the passage regime through the Turkish Straits, it applies different provisions to warships of coastal and non-littoral states. The tonnage limitations and the 21-day maximum stay period for warships of non-littoral states constitute an important legal framework for limiting extra-regional military presence.
Türkiye's implementation of the Montreux provisions since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War played an important role in limiting military mobility in the Black Sea. Ankara implemented restrictions on warship passage through the straits by activating the provisions regarding war periods. This policy also became part of the diplomatic approach to prevent the conflict from escalating into a broader naval rivalry.
The legal basis of a possible EU naval operation, the contributions of participating states, the military platforms to be used and deployment periods should be evaluated separately, and the applicable provisions of the Montreux Straits Convention should also be taken into account within the framework of the nature and geographical scope of the operation.
Activities to be carried out under the umbrella of an international organization do not make the warships of the participating states free from the limitations imposed by the contract. New military mechanisms that can be established for maritime security reasons and taking on broader duties over time may affect the current balances in the Black Sea.
Responsibility of riparian countries in regional security
Existing cooperation mechanisms of riparian countries have an important place in meeting the security needs in the Black Sea. The Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group (MCM Black Sea), established between Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria, operates to reduce the threats posed by sea mines and to support the security of commercial maritime transportation. This mechanism offers a model based on the common capacity of riparian countries in the field of regional security.
As for the EU's new initiatives, the limits of the relationship to be established with existing regional mechanisms have not yet been determined. While cooperation can be improved in areas such as maritime surveillance, early warning, search and rescue and critical infrastructure security, the creation of a separate military command structure can increase military density in the region. In particular, the expansion of operational activities of non-littoral states may cause security problems in the Black Sea to be addressed more within the framework of NATO-Russia competition. Evaluating the Black Sea solely based on the security priorities of NATO and the EU does not coincide with the geopolitical characteristics of the region. In this maritime basin, where Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia have different security perceptions, the expansion of the permanent presence of extra-regional military forces may deepen existing divisions.
Türkiye's strategic priorities
Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, Türkiye has followed a cautious and consistent policy towards maintaining military balances in the Black Sea. The implementation of the Montreux provisions, limiting the passage of warships through the straits and the approach adopted against the expansion of extra-regional military presence were among the basic elements of Ankara's security policy. While Türkiye fulfilled its obligations arising from NATO membership, it also maintained its diplomatic stance aimed at preventing the Black Sea from turning into a wider military confrontation area.
The possible EU naval operation, which came to the agenda with the EP's October 22 decision, increases the importance of Türkiye's current policy. If the EU's Black Sea initiatives move from the political stage to operational planning, the relationship of these activities with the Montreux provisions, the military presence of the participating states and their effects on regional balances should be carefully examined. Establishing a new and permanent military structure to ensure maritime security may put pressure on the delicate balances that Türkiye has tried to maintain until now.
In this context, it is important to closely follow the decisions to be taken regarding the Black Sea within the EU institutions and NATO, and to express Türkiye's regional security policy again and clearly, when necessary, in relevant diplomatic and military platforms. Preserving the provisions of the Montreux Straits Convention, maintaining the primary responsibility of coastal countries in the field of security, and preventing extra-regional military structures from becoming permanent in the Black Sea are among the main priorities for the continuation of the policy that Ankara has followed to date.
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