“It is Korean overseas aid… KOICA supports Chinese IT equipment with digital ODA”

Ahn Cheol-soo "Ministry of Foreign Affairs must reexamine all manufacturers and establish a supply chain evaluation system."

(Seoul = Yonhap News) Reporter Park Soo-yoon = People Power Party lawmaker Ahn Cheol-soo announced on the 12th that it has been confirmed that the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has been supporting Chinese company equipment overseas through digital Official Development Assistance (ODA).

According to data submitted by KOICA on the 12th by Rep. Ahn, a member of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, KOICA has conducted 33 digital ODA projects (in 21 countries) over the past five years.

Among these, products from Chinese PC and server company Lenovo were found to be used in the Senegal National Assembly legislative activity system modernization project, the Paraguay Customs Service electronic customs clearance system advancement project, the Kyrgyzstan National Assembly digitalization project, the Egyptian Government Service Agency public e-procurement system improvement project, and the Sri Lankan road traffic database (DB) construction project.

Representative Ahn's office pointed out that although the Alcatel-Lucent equipment supplied to Cameroon's electronic procurement system was listed as 'France' in the KOICA data, the company in question is owned by China Huaxin. Representative Ahn's office also added that 700 tablets from China's CHUWI and 700 receipt printers from EastRoyce from Shenzhen, China were confirmed in Rwanda's electronic receipt and integrated tax portal project.

Rep. Ahn said that the government's ODA aid is contrary to the trend of the United States and the European Union (EU) excluding Chinese information and communication (IT) products from public sector applications.

In relation to this, KOICA responded to Rep. Ahn's question about whether there are standards for determining whether equipment is classified as linked to a 'high-risk supply chain' such as China or Russia, saying, "We do not have a separate standard or checklist to determine whether it is a high-risk supply chain."

He explained, "All systems and equipment built through the digital ODA project are transferred to the recipient country after the project is completed, and operation and management authority is vested in the recipient country. Equipment was selected by first considering the conditions of the recipient country, such as the possibility of local maintenance and compatibility with the recipient country's existing system."

Rep. Ahn pointed out, "While Chinese equipment was supported for overseas national parliaments and sensitive information systems such as public security and customs, there was not even a standard for determining risk. Manufacturers owned by Chinese state-owned enterprises were classified as French, and Chinese brand equipment that was actually handed over did not appear in the main status of the submitted data. It is a serious mismanagement if only product specifications were checked and supply chain security was not properly verified."

He emphasized, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KOICA must reexamine the manufacturers, governance structure, and production countries of digital ODA equipment, and establish a supply chain risk assessment and security management system after project completion.”