Oscar Jonsson: Hultqvist wants one more regiment - that doesn't make Sweden safer

While Swedish politics is consumed by the formation of a government, or the lack thereof, the situation outside the world continues to worsen. Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin made a diesel deal. It has an almost non-existent economic impact, but the security policy signs are not negligible. It gives a taste of what this term will entail.

The Trump administration's instincts go against what provides European and Swedish security. In addition, the United States looks at where in the world the country has its military capabilities. They will decrease in Europe. At the same time, Russia is increasing its military spending by 32 percent until 2027, which adjusted for purchasing power will be between SEK 5,500 and 6,000 billion.

How then should Swedish defense policy develop during this mandate? For the common man, the issue can be perceived as settled. In 2021, the defense budget was SEK 66 billion. In 2026, it will be SEK 175 billion. With such an increase, everything should be clear. The grim news is that the new money has been used to repair the holes in the Armed Forces. Defense Minister Pål Jonson called it a tribal change rather than a facade renovation. It's a good analogy, because trunk renovation costs a lot but really only gives what you already have.

If we get a change of government, the clearest change that can be seen is a greater social democratic focus on growing the army and increased detailed control. Peter Hultqvist (S) took a position in a reservation in the Defense Committee for a new regiment in Kiruna.

If we get a change of government, the clearest change that can be seen is a greater social democratic focus on growing the army and increased detailed control.

It may sound harmless, but it is associated with billions of investments of questionable effect, as there is capacity in existing regiments. The armed forces were crystal clear: they wanted to "especially emphasize that political controls around ... the agency's basic organization risk leading to cost increases and suboptimization".

Such price increases and sub-optimizations can be seen in the latest regimental establishments with political signs that were ordered in 2020. Neither in Falun nor in Sollefteå has construction even begun, but everything has been stuck in construction processes and courts and the hunt for environmental permits. They will likely be completed after 2035. In Sollefteå alone, the costs are estimated to amount to NOK 6.5 billion.

Since 2022, however, many good things have been done with the new money. It is partly about investing in air defenses of various kinds, as well as in command systems, space capabilities, rocket artillery and the development of unmanned systems. However, there is a major flaw.

Let's see Ukraine's biggest challenges. The first is air defense and the need to shoot down anything Russia fires at them. But since it is so extremely expensive and advanced to shoot down robots in the air, air defense alone is an unsustainable strategy. Ukraine lacks long-range combat to knock out the platforms that fire robots at the country.

In the same way, the lack of long-range combat in Sweden is absolutely decisive. We do have a ground target robot (Taurus) with a stated range of 50 miles that can be placed on our fighter planes. However, it is an expensive robot that exists in few copies. In addition, we have ordered the Himars rocket artillery system whose Atacms and PrSM robots can be fired 30 and 50 miles respectively.

In plain language: if Sweden were to end up in a similar situation to Ukraine, we would have a very difficult time defending the entire country from the air.

It may sound like a long distance, but 30 miles is exactly from Öland's southern tip to Kaliningrad's shore. That is, you will not reach Kaliningrad. From the Stockholm archipelago, it is 60 miles to Saint Petersburg. That is, you will not reach Russian airfields and military bases in the Leningrad Military District.

In plain language: if Sweden were to end up in the same situation as Ukraine, we would have a very difficult time defending the entire country from the air, including the energy system, critical infrastructure, industry and economic goals. Even worse, we would have minimal opportunities to strike the platforms from which Russia launches the robots.

The lessons from Ukraine also show that one type of robot is not enough. To knock out the things shooting at you, you'll need to combine long-range drones with cruise and ballistic robots to saturate your opponent's anti-aircraft systems.

This is the decisive shortcoming in Swedish defense policy for the next four years. We need several different long-range systems, but also in significant quantities.

The best analogy is an archer shooting at you. You can reinforce your castle to block the arrows. You can try to catch the arrows in the air, but it is difficult. If nothing threatens the archer himself, there is every incentive to continue. That is Ukraine's problem today.

Russia may not hit every time, but with low risk to its systems can continue to bomb Ukraine.

I find it hard to see Russia being deterred by more regiments in the sparsely populated countryside or even by more tanks on the Östgöta plain. However, the ability to strike against the platforms that can fire at us is such a thing that is required. It would also be the best way to support our allies.

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