Assoc. Prof., Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Department of International Relations. Dr. Yunus Turhan wrote for AA Analysis about what the withdrawal of the UN mission from Somalia means in terms of the country's sovereignty, security and regional balance of power, and Turkey's role in strengthening Somalia's state capacity.
Former US State Department officials Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, in their article titled "Saving Failed States" in the 1992-1993 winter issue of Foreign Policy magazine, described Somalia as "among the examples of failed nation-states that are completely incapable of sustaining themselves as a member of the international community." They used the expressions. Not long ago, less than a year later, the Mogadishu conflict, remembered as "Black Hawk Down", took place, and then US President Bill Clinton said in his address to the nation in 1993, "It is not our job to rebuild the Somali society." By saying this, he essentially turned the US's Somalia policy into a political choice from the top window.
Somalia's bad fortune, which started with the definition of a "failed state" and became institutionalized with the indifference of the international community, reached a new historical threshold thirty-three years later. The United Nations Transition Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) has officially ended its activities as of October 31, 2026. This development has raised three questions that need to be answered regarding the transformation that Somalia has undergone: Who are the actors of this transformation, how did Somalia get to this point, and what awaits the country in the new era?
At the center of the answer to the first of these questions is Türkiye, which rejects the "non-self-sufficient state" label that has been attached to Somalia for many years and trusts the Somali people. The Somali initiative, which started in 2011 when drought and famine deeply affected the country, was the milestone of this transformation process. TURKSOM, which was opened in Mogadishu in 2017 and is Turkey's largest military training base abroad, today forms the backbone of Somalia's defense capacity against Al-Shabab. The Turkish Grand National Assembly's (TBMM) extension of the Somalia mandate for another two years in July 2026 shows that this support has moved from training and equipment to the field. For this reason, reading the termination of UNTMIS's activities independently of Turkey's de facto security guarantor role and investments in Somalia for fifteen years would leave the analysis incomplete.
From tutelage to sovereignty
UNTMIS was established as a two-year transitional mission at the request of the Somali government, by UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2753 and 2809, and its duties were transferred to Somali institutions and UN agencies. The political existence of the international mission, which started with the UN Somalia Operation (UNOSOM) in 1992, effectively ended as of October 31, 2026. Arguably the most important outcome of this new process is that, in addition to the fact that the process started with Mogadishu's own demand, it reflects the federal government's quest to get rid of external control and strengthen its emphasis on sovereignty. In other words, it is necessary to see Somalia's self-confidence and the political-military stability it has established in the new process.
It is known that the authority of AUSSOM, the African Union's mission to Somalia, and the UN, will end on December 31. However, the end of the UN's presence in Somalia and the uncertainty of the future of the African Union mission indicate that Somalia's security equation will shift from multilateral institutions to bilateral partnerships in the new period. This process also increases the weight of the agreements signed between Türkiye and Somalia. The Framework Agreement on Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation in the Military Field signed between Ankara and Mogadishu in 2010, the Military Training Cooperation Agreement in 2012 and the Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement in 2015 will gain much more meaning in the new period.
Challenges of the new era
However, serious challenges await Somalia in the new era. Chief among these is the possibility that actors such as Israel, which pursues revisionist policies in the region, will use the power vacuum that may arise with the withdrawal of the UN to their advantage. Recognition, port and military cooperation initiatives extending to Somaliland via Berbera Port further strengthen this possibility. Although Israel's recognition of Somaliland in 2025 is a largely symbolic step, the fact that this step is close to Babulmandeb increases the geostrategic weight of the line in question.
A similar determination is evident on the Ethiopian side of the issue. For Ethiopia, which conducts approximately 90 percent of its foreign trade through Djibouti, Somaliland remains the main lever in its search for maritime access. The Abiy Ahmed administration, which is trying to balance its domestic vulnerabilities with foreign policy moves, is not expected to give up this leverage easily. When Egypt's deepened military cooperation with Somalia is added to this, the risk that multi-layered geopolitical equations ranging from the rivalry in the Nile basin to the struggle for influence in the Red Sea will be transferred to the Somali area becomes evident. At this point, the Ankara Negotiations initiated by Turkey on the Somalia-Ethiopia line gain more meaning in the new period.
This equation also poses certain difficulties for Ankara in the new period. Unlike external actors who prefer to gain influence by dividing, Türkiye follows an integrative foreign policy in Somalia. This strategy, which operates through humanitarian aid, military training, budget support, economic agreements and mediation efforts, aims to re-establish a functioning state administration in Somalia. However, building the de facto sovereignty of the state in an environment where external actors establish relationships beyond the center means a much more costly and long-lasting process. For example, the mobilization in regions such as Awdal weakens the internal integrity of the separatist project and brings with it the risk and cost of further fragmentation of the political geography. Therefore, the success of Ankara's integrative strategy will not only preserve the territorial integrity of the country in regions outside Mogadishu, but will also manifest itself in its capacity to reconcile a fragmented political geography under a common state roof.
Despite these difficulties, Ankara has a diplomatic capital that few other actors in the field have. Turkey's mediation of the Ankara Declaration between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2024 showed that it did not break off the dialogue with Addis Ababa while defending the territorial integrity of Somalia. The repaired relations with Cairo and Abu Dhabi in recent years provide Ankara with the opportunity to talk to rival parties in the Somali field at the same time. This position also points to Turkey's potential to transform its integrative strategy from a limited bilateral partnership with Mogadishu into a regional balance element.
In short, Somalia's experience of more than thirty years shows that states cannot be built from outside, but can only be supported from outside. While an egg broken from the outside is the end of life, an egg broken from the inside is the beginning of a new life. Turkey's military, economic and social support in Somalia was shaped by this understanding and aimed to create conditions in which Somalia could break the shell from the inside with its own power, without attempting to break it from the outside. The responsibility for breaking the shell now belongs to Somalia, as a matter of fact, the fact that the departure of UNTMIS from the country started with Mogadishu's own request may be a turning point for Somalia to break the shell from the inside.
The most important test awaiting the country in the new period is to transform its strategic position from a competitive burden into a bargaining power. In a geography on the Babulmandeb coast where great powers and regional actors try to balance each other, this transformation can only be possible with a state that trusts its own institutions. Turkey's Somalia policy will crown its real success with Somalia reaching a point where it will not need this support one day.
