Speculation Grows Over Possible Trump-Kim Summit in Pyongyang or Other Venues

Speculation is mounting over when and where US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un might meet for another round of their high-stakes personal diplomacy.

With a fourth Trump-Kim meeting looking increasingly possible this year — despite Kim’s silence so far in response to Trump’s repeated overtures — several potential venues have emerged: Shenzhen, China, on the sidelines of the 2026 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting on Nov. 18-19; Trump National Doral in Miami, Florida, where Trump will host the G20 Leaders’ Summit on Dec. 14-15; the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area on North Korea’s east coast; and Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, has raised the possibility of the two leaders meeting in Pyongyang while warning of the “very high” risk surrounding renewed summitry. Pyongyang would provide an ideal setting for the kind of publicity spectacle Trump favors, according to Bolton, known for his hard-line approach toward the North. He made the remarks during a recent virtual forum hosted by the Washington-based Institute for Corean-American Studies.

Bolton’s mention of Pyongyang recalls a diplomatic opening between Kim Jong-il, the current leader’s father and predecessor, and then US President Bill Clinton in October 2000, when the two countries came close to their first summit amid a remarkable mood of detente. Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, Kim’s special envoy and one of North Korea’s most powerful officials, delivered an invitation for Clinton to visit Pyongyang as the two sides explored a possible breakthrough on the North’s missile program.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang later that month to prepare the ground for a possible Clinton visit and returned encouraged by her talks with Kim. The two countries appeared tantalizingly close to an agreement to curb North Korea’s missile development and exports and move toward normalized relations.

But time was running out before Clinton left office. The protracted dispute over the November presidential election consumed valuable weeks, while Clinton was also deeply engaged in efforts to salvage Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. In late December, he finally gave up the Pyongyang trip, saying there was insufficient time to prepare an agreement that would justify it.

Looking back, one cannot help lamenting the lost opportunity. A Clinton visit might have fundamentally altered the trajectory of US-North Korea relations and helped dismantle the lingering Cold War confrontation on the Korean Peninsula before the North’s nuclear threat grew to its present dimensions.

Over the next 2 1/2 decades, successive US administrations failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions amid shifting policies and persistent misreadings of the North’s strategic intentions. Consequently, the Korean Peninsula has remained vulnerable to recurring tensions and hostility, with inter-Korean exchanges completely frozen for years. Meanwhile, the North’s nuclear arsenal has grown larger, more capable and more firmly embedded in the regime’s strategic posture — no longer merely a bargaining chip on the diplomatic table.

A potential Trump-Kim summit in Pyongyang would underscore how drastically the North’s negotiating leverage has increased. Kim has recently hosted two other major world leaders on state visits reaffirming their ties with Pyongyang: Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2024 and Chinese President Xi Jinping this June. Kim may therefore feel that he holds the upper hand over Trump, who is eager for a summit and a diplomatic success amid the continuing crises involving Iran and Ukraine ahead of November’s midterm elections.

As the first sitting US president ever to visit the North Korean capital, Trump would gain an enormous public relations opportunity. Kim, for his part, would have relatively little to lose even if the talks failed to produce satisfactory results. At a minimum, he would be portrayed as a global player rather than merely the leader of an isolated state.

When the fanfare ends and the cameras leave, however, South Korea will have to assess the summit’s consequences and help shape whatever lasting arrangements emerge. Given Trump’s impulsive negotiating style and penchant for personal diplomacy, Seoul cannot assume that it will be sufficiently consulted beforehand on the details of any North Korea deal.

President Lee Jae Myung and his aides therefore need to ensure that Seoul has a voice as a co-author — not merely a "pacemaker" or a bystander — in any arrangement that could reduce threats to the United States while potentially affecting South Korea’s security. The allies should closely coordinate a phased and verifiable process of freezing, controlling and ultimately dismantling the North’s nuclear arsenal. Lee’s emphasis on dialogue, exchange and normalization as steps toward peaceful coexistence and eventual denuclearization could provide a useful strategic framework.

Trump has publicly asserted that North Korea possesses 57 “very powerful” nuclear weapons. Whatever the exact number, Washington and Seoul must confront the uncomfortable reality that they are dealing with a de facto nuclear-armed state and approach negotiations pragmatically.

Kim, for his part, should recognize that this may be his best chance to reach a meaningful deal over his nuclear capabilities and revive his country’s economy. No future US president, Republican or Democrat, may be as willing as Trump to treat him as a legitimate negotiating partner, much less a “friend” or a “nice guy.”

Whether the meeting takes place in Pyongyang, Florida or somewhere else, Kim should not squander the opportunity.

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Lee Kyong-hee

Lee Kyong-hee is a former editor-in-chief of The Korea Herald. The views expressed here are the writer's own. — Ed

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