UN nuclear chief reveals secret Syrian reactor could have produced weapons-grade material
Quick Look
- IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi disclosed that a nearly complete nuclear reactor built secretly under Bashar al-Assad’s rule could have produced fissile material for nuclear weapons.
- Inspectors accessed two sites in Syria, including one in Deir ez-Zor, and confirmed the presence of around 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal.
- The material is now under IAEA safeguards, with cameras installed, while Syria decides its future disposition.
AI-generated summary
Why It Matters
Syria was believed to have operated an extensive undeclared nuclear program under Bashar al-Assad, including a reactor built by North Korea in Deir ez-Zor. Israel conducted a secret air strike on the site in 2007, which it admitted to in 2018. After Assad’s ouster in December 2024, the new Syrian government granted IAEA access to suspected nuclear sites.
A nearly complete nuclear reactor built secretly during the rule of the toppled Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad would have been able to produce fissile material for possible use in nuclear weapons, the chief of the UN nuclear watchdog has revealed.
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last month visited two sites, one in Deir ez-Zor and a second in an undisclosed location identified to them by Syrian authorities.
The IAEA head, Rafael Grossi, said on Monday it was “obvious that the previous government was pursuing a number of clandestine” activities.
“They didn’t want the world to know what they were doing,” he told reporters after opening the Vienna-based agency’s quarterly board of governors meeting.
“Given the configuration, the technical features of that type of reactor, this is a reactor that is very efficient in the production of fissile material that could be used directly for the fabrication of nuclear weapons,” he said, adding that building the reactor was a “very important step”.
Syria was believed to have operated an extensive undeclared nuclear programme under Assad that included a nuclear reactor built by North Korea in the eastern Deir ez-Zor province.
After Assad was ousted in December 2024, the new government agreed to give IAEA inspectors access to suspected former nuclear sites.
During a visit to Syria in August, IAEA inspectors confirmed that “the cooling infrastructure which has now been uncovered is consistent with that of a nuclear reactor”. Grossi and a team of senior inspectors also visited a previously undeclared site in the country.
In 2018, Israel admitted carrying out a top-secret air raid on the site 11 years earlier.
In 2008, less than a year after the strike, US officials accused Syria of having sought to build a secret nuclear reactor and acknowledged that Israel had destroyed it in the raid.
Syria notified the agency of the site’s existence in a 17 July letter and invited the IAEA “to cooperate with the Syrian authorities in the inspection and verification of the site and of any nuclear material to be potentially found”.
The IAEA said in its confidential report circulated to member states last Tuesday and seen by the Associated Press that this new site contained “natural uranium metal in the form of fuel rods with cladding”. The agency verified the material and confirmed “the presence of around 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal”.
Grossi said that when the inspectors visited the site in August they had to “tear down walls” and go through “very difficult and narrow passages” to reach the nuclear material that had been hidden. The site had boxes scattered all over the place, he said.
Grossi said “the important thing is that this material now is under safeguards” of the IAEA, adding that agency inspectors had managed to install cameras at the location.
Asked if the nuclear material would remain in Syria or be removed, Grossi said this was “a matter that the Syrian government will have to decide”. He added: “We are not requesting them to do this or to do that. For us what’s important is that we know all the time where this [material] is until the last gram.”
Logan Mintz, a director for nuclear materials security at the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, said natural uranium metal was not directly usable for a nuclear weapon but could be “diverted to a covert weapons programme that further processes it into plutonium for a nuclear weapon”.
She said that once deemed safe to move, the material could be “transported in certified containers” to a third country that could “safely and securely disposition it into a more chemically stable and more widely used form” for possible use in nuclear power plants.
“As with any transport of nuclear material, this movement would require robust security from theft or sabotage,” she said.
Associated Press and Agence France-Press contributed reporting
What to Watch
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
The Syrian government will decide to remove or transfer the natural uranium metal to a third country for secure disposition.
Likely · Within months
IAEA will maintain continuous monitoring and safeguards on the nuclear material regardless of its location.
Very likely · Within months
Open Questions
- What is the exact location of the second undisclosed site visited by IAEA inspectors?
- Will the Syrian government choose to retain, remove, or dispose of the 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal?
- Are there additional undeclared nuclear sites in Syria yet to be discovered?
- What level of international cooperation will be required to secure or dispose of the nuclear material?







