Just 39 seconds. The disaster of American Airlines Flight 587 did not last any longer, from the first problems occurring to the impact of the Airbus A300, which led to the death of all occupants on the outskirts of New York. 39 seconds: Time for a short exchange of words, a few sentences - but far too little to first understand and then get a handle on a fatal problem that arises unexpectedly. 265 people paid for this with their lives.
Captain Edward States, a former transport aircraft pilot in the US Air Force, and his co-pilot Sten Molin were undoubtedly experienced: The 42-year-old States had 8,050 flight hours, 3,448 of which were on the Airbus A300. The 34-year-old Molin, an enthusiastic sailor in addition to his passion for flying, had a total of 4,403 flying hours, 1,835 of which were on the large medium-haul jet, which he had flown as the second man in the cockpit since 1998. With a maximum of 900 flight hours per calendar year for commercial pilots, both were anything but beginners.
Their task this Monday, November 12, 2001, was routine: Flight 587's destination was Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, home to many immigrants in New York. Ninety percent of the passengers on board that day were of Dominican descent, newspapers reported, although only 68 of them had Dominican Republic passports.
A Japan Airlines Boeing 747-400 (JAL Flight 47) took off directly in front of Flight 587 that morning. Like any aircraft, this huge machine (the largest passenger aircraft in the world up to the double-decker Airbus A380) was always experiencing turbulence, especially during takeoff when the engines were running at maximum thrust. This is known to be a major danger for subsequent machines.
The tower of New York's largest airport, JFK, gave JAL Flight 47 clearance to take off at 9:11:08 a.m.; About a minute and a half later the jumbo jet took off. The American Airlines Airbus A300 was the next aircraft ready to take off. As a matter of routine, at exactly 9:11:36 a.m., the controller pointed out to States and Molin possible wake turbulence from the 747 flying in front. The plane was already accelerating and took off at around 160 knots. So far everything as usual.
The 747-400 had been sent from the tower to the eastern takeoff route, known in the jargon as Bridge Climbing because it went over the Marine Parkway Bridge. American Airlines Flight 587 also took this route, but after taking off at 9:14:29, it took this course around 500 meters earlier than the JAL. There was a distance of around 100 seconds between the two machines and several kilometers due to the earlier change of course.
At exactly 9:15 a.m., Captain States contacted air traffic control for the first time and announced that his aircraft was at an altitude of 1,300 feet (approx. 400 meters) and would climb to 5,000 feet, i.e. “Flight Level 50”. Air traffic control instructed Flight 587 to then climb to 13,000 feet (approx. 4,000 meters) and maintain this altitude.
However, that day the wind was 310 degrees with a speed of eleven knots. Perhaps a gust also shifted the 747's air mass disturbance. In any case, according to the flight data recorder, the A300 got caught in the wake of the large Boeing flying in front at exactly 9:15:36 a.m.
Apparently the plane began to rock violently. For a few seconds the two pilots had too much to do; In any case, it wasn't until 9:15:44 a.m. that the cockpit voice recorder recorded Captain States' next statement: "A bit of wake turbulence, isn't it?" Molin confirmed: “Yeah.”
The problem was by no means over. In the next few seconds, the co-pilot apparently activated the trim stabilizer switch five times in succession. Apparently without success, because Molin now moved the rudder from right to left and back again in quick succession using the pedals (the A300 still had conventional controls, unlike the following models of the A320 series).
At low speeds up to the take-off speed of 160 to 165 knots, rudder deflections of up to 30 degrees in each direction were permitted, at 220 knots of 14.5 degrees and at 250 knots of 9.3 degrees. This was the speed, the maximum at altitudes below 10,000 feet (“Flight Level 100”), which Molin now aimed for as an aircraft pilot.
At the second after 9:15:51 a.m., the voice recorder recorded several thuds. Molin responded with a strained voice: “Full performance.” Although the Airbus was already flying at 240 knots - perhaps that's why States asked, "Are you OK?", Molin replied, "Yes, I'm fine." Immediately afterwards the captain: "Hold on. Hold on." The co-pilot responded to a loud crack with the recommendation: “Let’s give more power, please!” There was another loud crack on the tape.
At this time, exactly at 09:15:57 and seven tenths of a second, the right rear main attachment of the vertical stabilizer tore. At least two more of the six tabs were apparently already broken, so that at 09:15:58 and four tenths of a second the vertical stabilizer separated from the aircraft. The cockpit voice recorder recorded this as a loud bang. At that moment the aircraft was flying at a speed of approximately 251 knots.
The vertical stabilizer crashed into Jamaica Bay, the large bay south of the airport site. Now only a miracle could save the plane and its occupants. But it didn't happen.
Both pilots tried desperately to bring the plane under control, but it went into a spin. The resulting aerodynamic forces tore off both engines, which crashed into the residential area on the elongated Rockaway Peninsula. The engine failure cut power to the flight data recorder at 9:16:01 a.m. while the cockpit voice recorder continued to operate.
At 9:16:07 a.m. Molin said, "What the hell have we gotten ourselves into? We're stuck in the middle of this." States replied, “Get out of here, get out of here!” What he meant remains unclear, because it was clear that no one would get out of the crashing machine. Maybe a reflex, a memory of his time as a pilot in the Air Force? In any case, he had flown planes with ejection seats at times during his training - but not since he moved to the USAF transport pilots, and of course as an airline pilot.
Two seconds later, at 9:16:08 a.m., the American Airlines Airbus crashed into lots 2-62 and 2-58 at the intersection of Newport Avenue and Beach 131st Street. The debris was spread over an area of about 500 by 300 feet, or about 1.4 acres. The left engine was located 800 feet north-northeast of the impact site, the right engine a similar distance northeast.
None of the 260 people on board had the slightest chance of survival. Another five people were killed on the ground: an elderly couple, a mother with her student-aged son and a 45-year-old man whose wife and daughter were just able to escape to safety through the back exit of their house.
The crash, just two months after the terrorist attack on New York on September 11, 2001, immediately caused panic in the city and much of the United States. Several tall buildings, including the Empire State Building and the United Nations headquarters on the East River, were evacuated. The Port Authority closed all bridges and tunnels between Manhattan and New Jersey; Subway traffic was also partially interrupted. New York's three public airports, along with JFK LaGuardia and Newark, remained largely closed for the rest of the day. Two Air National Guard alert squads patrolled the airspace over New York after the crash.
At least in this respect, the all-clear was soon given: it was not an attack, there was not the slightest indication of a kidnapping - the time since the take-off would have been far too short.
The National Transportation Safety Board, the US traffic safety authority, took over the investigation and, almost three years later, presented a 212-page accident report that came to a clear conclusion: "The breaking off of the vertical stabilizer in flight was the result of forces that exceeded the permissible load capacity; they were the result of unnecessary and excessive pedal movements by the first officer."
However, this incorrect operation was made possible by the high sensitivity, i.e. low pedal forces and small pedal travel, of the Airbus rudder control system. This made the aircraft “vulnerable to potentially dangerous rudder pedal operations at higher airspeeds.”
As a result, all Airbus pilots were urgently warned not to deflect the rudder too much in the future. The training program was supplemented accordingly and the warning system was modified.
In memory of the 265 dead, a memorial was erected about one and a half kilometers east on the beach on the Rockaway Peninsula on the (small and short) main road; it was inaugurated on November 12, 2006. A year later, 889 human remains, whose individual identification had been waived, were buried in a crypt intended for this purpose.
