In recent weeks, United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of Syrian intervention to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Washington clearly wants to keep this option at its disposal as yet another pressure point against Iran.
But Damascus has stronger reasons to reject military intervention than those that might push towards it. Sending its forces across the border could strengthen Hezbollah politically, destabilise both countries and expose Syria to Iranian retaliation that could reach its capital.
So far, there is no declared and comprehensive American vision of what is expected of Damascus. Intervention, at its most limited, could mean tightening control over the border, curbing the smuggling of weapons and fighters, and sharing intelligence with the Lebanese army. The more dangerous scenario would involve Syrian forces entering to take part in disarming Hezbollah or taking control of its areas in southern Lebanon.
Trump’s repeated mention of the idea appears closer to an exercise in political pressure than to the unveiling of an imminent military operation. Raising the prospect of a Syrian role confuses Hezbollah’s and Iran’s calculations, demonstrates the multiplicity of American options, and increases pressure on the Lebanese government to prove its ability to place all weapons under state control.
But what may look like a low-cost option for the US or Israel is entirely different for Syria, which would bear the cost of human losses and security repercussions, in addition to the risk of returning to regional conflict at a time when its new leadership is betting on stability, economic recovery and attracting investment.
Syria possesses some capacity to act. It has a long border with Lebanon, which means its forces can easily cross into Lebanese territory. In addition, factions that are now part of the new Syrian army previously fought Hezbollah and are familiar with some of its methods and areas of deployment.
But this is not sufficient to wage a broad operation. The Syrian army is still in the phase of unifying factions and organising command, armament and deployment. The state faces internal security and economic challenges. Opening an external front risks draining key state resources needed to continue developing state institutions and services.
The Syrian armed forces can carry out limited operations along its borders, close smuggling routes and tunnels, and prevent armed groups from infiltrating. But they would face difficulty holding areas inside Lebanon or managing a war of attrition in populated environments. Entering Lebanon may be easier than defining the conditions for leaving it, especially if withdrawal becomes linked to a political settlement which Damascus cannot alone secure.
Nor is there any guarantee that the confrontation would remain inside Lebanese territory. To retaliate, Iran does not necessarily need to enter into a direct war with Syria; it can manage the confrontation through allied groups in Iraq by targeting Syrian military sites, using drones and missiles, or carrying out security operations that exhaust Damascus without declaring war. The possibility of direct Iranian bombardment cannot be ruled out, either. The Iranian attack on US forces near al-Tanf, southern Syria, in July demonstrated that Iran’s use of force inside Syrian territory is no longer just a theoretical possibility.
Whether the conflict is managed through Iran’s allies or turns into a declared confrontation in which military facilities, or even Damascus, come under missile and drone attacks, Syria would once again appear to investors as an arena of regional conflict. This would directly undermine President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s top priorities: maintaining stability, attracting Gulf and Western capital, reintegrating the Syrian economy into the international financial system, and turning the lifting of sanctions into a process of recovery and reconstruction.
But beyond the economy, Syria would risk undoing much of the work done in building a new unified armed force. Any military failures in Lebanon could strengthen factional loyalties within the Syrian army and give field commanders influence independent of the central leadership.
Then there is the problem of legitimacy. The hostility many Syrians feel towards Hezbollah because of its military support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime does not mean they would accept fighting a war inside Lebanon that serves American or Israeli objectives. If Syrian forces appear to be fighting on behalf of foreign powers, the leadership could lose domestic and regional legitimacy that would be difficult to restore.
Syria could also risk its international standing if it were to intervene in Lebanon. Without an official request from the Lebanese government, the entry of Syrian forces would be considered a violation of sovereignty and would evoke memories of the Syrian military occupation that lasted from 1976 until 2005.
Bringing back recollections of that period could change the very nature of the conflict in Lebanon. Instead of the internal Lebanese debate remaining focused on the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s armament and the state’s monopoly on force, the centre of controversy would shift to the presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese territory. This would likely strengthen Hezbollah’s hand, which would join a broader coalition of political forces rejecting what would be perceived as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
Israel’s continuing occupation of Lebanese territory would further complicate any push for disarmament. Attempting disarmament before an Israeli withdrawal would make the process appear imposed in Israel’s interest, which would weaken the Lebanese government’s ability to promote it among parts of the Shia community.
If the fighting extends to the Bekaa, the southern suburbs of Beirut, or the south, it could turn into a broader internal conflict, especially if Hezbollah’s social base sees the objective as threatening its position within the political system, not merely the dismantling of the party’s military wing. The result would be new waves of displacement and a deeper economic collapse, with the possibility of expanded Iranian and Israeli intervention. A destabilised Lebanon would inevitably destabilise Syria as well.
Therefore, a direct Syrian military intervention remains an unlikely possibility. The situation could change if there is an official request from Lebanon and a broad regional understanding that provides the operation with political, legal and military cover.
A more realistic option remains an operation inside Syrian territory, which would involve controlling the border with Lebanon, closing smuggling routes and tunnels, preventing the movement of weapons and fighters, and exchanging information with the Lebanese army.
This option is less risky and more sustainable. It would limit Hezbollah’s logistical depth without granting it the legitimacy of resisting foreign intervention. It would also preserve Lebanese sovereignty and the responsibility of Lebanese institutions in addressing the disarmament file.
In the end, however much pressure the US is exerting on Syria to intervene in Lebanon, the prospect of starting a new war before even starting to recover from the previous one is enough for Damascus to stand its ground.
