Police in South Africa said today (Sunday) that they had launched a manhunt to search for the perpetrators after 17 people were killed in a shooting inside a bar in the town of Wedela, southwest of Johannesburg.
The South African Police Service added that emergency medical services declared all 17 victims dead at the scene, while the motive behind the shooting remains unknown.
She noted that “the suspects were reportedly armed with AK-47 automatic rifles and pistols,” according to what Reuters reported.
In a separate incident, 10 people were killed and 11 injured in a shooting that occurred at dawn on Sunday in a town near the Cape in South Africa, according to what local police announced.
Police said that gunmen entered an entertainment venue in Luandli at 1.46 am (23.46 GMT) and opened fire on customers, according to what Agence France-Presse reported.
While the circles of turmoil within Ethiopia are expanding from “Tigray” to Amhara and Oromia, the repercussions of the crisis seem far beyond the boundaries of the conflict between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and its internal opponents, complicating the ambitions of Abiy Ahmed’s regional government, especially in the files of searching for an outlet on the Red Sea and the “Renaissance Dam.”
According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, the relationship between internal crises and regional ambitions is intersecting. While Abiy Ahmed needs a “national symbol” to strengthen his influence and push the people to rally around his government, the fragility of the internal situation may deepen regional disputes, obstruct their settlement, and limit the regime’s ability to compete for influence in the Horn of Africa.
This intersection was pointed out in a study published by Ethiopian researcher Begachew Metiko Abera, from Bahir Dar University, last August, in which he said that the search for a sea port is a “long-term strategic goal” linked to economic and security needs, but armed conflicts, economic pressures, and the decline of internal political legitimacy played a role in determining the timing of signing the memorandum of understanding with “Somaliland” in 2024.
According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently published, “the relationship between the internal situation and foreign policy operates in a complex manner,” explaining that “the broad parliamentary majority obtained by the (Prosperity) Party reduces the institutional restrictions imposed on Abiy Ahmed’s government, but the Ethiopian moves regarding the sea port and the (Renaissance Dam) prompted the emergence of regional alignments against him.”
Hajar Ali, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Regional Studies (GIGA), confirmed that “the use of external competition to mobilize internal affairs is not new in the policy of the Abiy Ahmed government.” She told Asharq Al-Awsat that “regional competition was a powerful tool for mobilizing support and mobilizing nationalist sentiments, especially in light of societal divisions and separatist tendencies.”
But Hajar stressed at the same time that “this equation becomes more difficult as internal cohesion declines,” explaining that “unifying different groups within Ethiopia in the face of a common external competitor is something that will only succeed if the federal government is stable.”
She said, “The decline in stability could open the way for a geopolitical realignment that could change the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.”
The memorandum of understanding that Ethiopia signed with Somaliland in January 2024 sparked a political crisis. Shafie Yusuf Omar, CEO of the BRCSOM Center for Strategic Studies in Somalia, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Somalia is not against Ethiopia’s trade or its access to the sea,” explaining that the problem begins “when interests turn into unilateral policies that ignore the sovereignty of neighbors and international law, and open the door to external forces in a highly sensitive region like the Red Sea.” And Bab al-Mandab.
Omar asked: “In light of the conflicts in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia; Why is resolving the internal Ethiopian crisis not a priority before expanding the arenas of regional conflict?” Pointing out that “the fragility of the Ethiopian interior has become part of the regional debate about the legitimacy and method of achieving Addis Ababa’s maritime ambitions.”
An analysis by the Chatham House Institute in London, published recently, indicates that “the conflict in Tigray and the deterioration of Ethiopian-Eritrean relations have become linked to each other, and that a widespread return to war in Tigray may extend beyond Ethiopia’s borders.”
The same applies to the “Renaissance Dam” file, which raises a dispute with Egypt and Sudan over the lack of agreement on how to manage and operate it. Hajar said, “The Ethiopian government raised the dam to the level of a symbol of national pride that everyone can rally around, at a time when the country was very divided, and used the conflict with Egypt and Sudan in a speech of national unity.”
But the current crisis, according to Hager, could push Ethiopian politics in two opposing directions. “Increases the incentive to take a tougher stance on sovereignty issues,” and on the other hand “makes the government very vulnerable with regard to its territorial ambitions.”
While Addis considers the dam and sea issues separate, Ali stressed that “maritime ambitions and (the Renaissance Dam) reinforce each other in the geopolitical competition, even if Addis Ababa presents them as two separate issues.” She attributed this to the regional alignment in the two files, and said that “internal crises may deepen the unrest in the Horn of Africa.”
Here, Shafie Yusuf Omar stressed that “it is in the interest of Somalia, Egypt, and the Arab world for Ethiopia to be stable and regionally responsible,” adding that “his country does not reject Ethiopia obtaining commercial access to the sea, just as it does not oppose its right to development,” but it refuses, as he put it, to let these demands turn into “a policy of imposing a fait accompli or a proxy conflict.”
He warned that “any expansion of the Ethiopian internal conflict, the cost of which will not remain confined within the country’s borders, given the size of Ethiopia and its geographical, demographic, and security intertwining with Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Red Sea.”
Hajar said: “The current tense internal situation in Ethiopia makes Abiy Ahmed’s government more fragile with regard to its ambitions to impose its influence as a regional power. “This makes it unable to compete with regional powers to a large extent.”
