Kuomintang supporters wave national flags at a political rally in Taipei. A special article in the U.S. Foreign Policy warned that if Taiwan makes strategic adjustments to Beijing through democratic procedures in the future, Washington may face legal and strategic dilemmas that are difficult to intervene. (AFP file photo)
If Taiwan gradually switches from a democratically elected government to Beijing in the future, will and can the United States intervene? The American diplomatic journal "Foreign Policy" published an article on the 6th warning that this strategic shift, seemingly completed through democratic procedures, may cause Washington to face legal and strategic difficulties that are different from those of using force to invade Taiwan.
Ian Easton, a researcher at the American think tank "Project 2049 Institute", and Michael Poznansky, an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, pointed out in the article that a non-force strategic shift or even "bloodless annexation" is the "win without a fight" outcome that Beijing most desires, but Washington is clearly unprepared for this scenario. The article believes that Beijing's more ideal result may not be through a large-scale blockade or amphibious landing, but an agreement signed by the democratically elected government of Taipei, so that Taiwan will essentially turn to China.
According to the article's analysis, the most extreme scenario is to sign a formal unification agreement, but Taiwan's current laws have procedural requirements for this to include a super majority vote in the Legislative Yuan and a nationwide referendum. Beyond the formal unification agreement, there are more gradual strategic pivot scenarios, such as a pro-Beijing government gradually weakening the security partnership with the United States, including withdrawing training personnel, reducing the military service system, and gradually letting sales to the US military expire. In addition, pro-Beijing political leaders may also sign broad economic agreements and so-called "peace frameworks" to closely bind Taiwan to China.
The article also uses some Taiwanese politicians as examples. The article mentioned that KMT Chairman Cheng Lai-wen visited China in April and later said in an interview with "The Atlantic" that "everything is possible because we are one family." She also wrote an article in "Foreign Affairs" arguing that Taiwan does not have to choose between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The author lists these words and deeds as examples of some Taiwanese politicians taking cross-strait policies in a direction closer to Beijing's preferences.
The "Taiwan Relations Act" is the core of the article's discussion. On the one hand, the law expects Taiwan's future to be decided peacefully, and on the other hand, it requires the United States to maintain the ability to resist any force or other coercion that endangers Taiwan's security, social or economic system. The article believes that if China directly threatens Taiwan with war to surrender, the United States will be more likely to regard it as coercion covered by the bill; but if Taiwan completes its strategic transition through seemingly democratic procedures against the background of years of political warfare and manipulation, the United States may face the political risk of being accused of interfering in democratic procedures even if it has definite evidence of relevant political manipulation.
The article pointed out that if Taiwan moves towards de facto annexation without the outbreak of war, although the United States may have avoided a costly conflict on the surface, the strategic losses will be huge. Not only might Washington lose an important fulcrum of the United States’ postwar Pacific security architecture, but China might also gain access to Taiwan’s world-class chip ecosystem without the devastation of a large-scale war.
The article reviews the history of the Cold War and points out that in the past, the United States tried to use covert operations to prevent partner countries from electing leaders who supported Moscow, which often resulted in severe backlash. The author calls on Washington to strengthen its preventive strategy in advance and not only rely on arms sales to Taiwan. It should also strengthen public diplomacy, assist Taiwan in exposing United Front activities through counterintelligence work, and provide firm security guarantees to prevent China from "victory without a fight" becoming a reality.
