With the worsening fuel and electricity crises; The scope of popular discontent began to expand in Libya, after the queues of cars began to expand in front of the stations, coinciding with the long power outages amid a severe heat wave, which puts the service and supervisory institutions before a real test to contain the rising anger.
A number of citizens, especially in the capital, Tripoli, observed an extended queue of vehicles in front of distribution stations to obtain fuel, in addition to similar complaints about reduced electricity loads for a period exceeding 10 hours a day, which reflects the worsening daily suffering.
As part of official efforts to confront the repercussions, the head of the Administrative Control Authority, Abdullah Qadirbuh, held an expanded meeting at the authority’s headquarters in Tripoli to discuss the causes of the crisis and propose sustainable solutions, in the presence of officials from the General Electricity Company, Brega Oil and Gas Marketing Company, and the National Oil Corporation.
The meeting reviewed the roots of the problem, most notably the decline in maintenance work, the deterioration of large parts of generating stations and transmission and distribution networks, in addition to the delayed implementation of a number of vital projects, limited generating capacity, and recurring malfunctions and technical bottlenecks.
The participants in the meeting, which was held on Thursday evening, stressed the need to move to “radical solutions that ensure redirecting public spending towards effective priorities, accelerating the pace of stalled projects, and raising the efficiency of generating stations and transportation networks,” stressing “the necessity of stabilizing gas and fuel supplies, reducing waste, and developing sustainable strategic plans to rely on renewable energy.”
Regarding the oil sector file, the Chairman of the Authority stressed “the necessity of controlling the work of the National Oil Corporation, to ensure increased production rates and sustainability of supplies, coupled with good management of resources and raising the efficiency of financial spending, and directing it to meet basic requirements.”
Qadirbuh directed the authority’s competent departments to “investigate decisions, contracts, supply operations, and financial allocations, and match documents with field reality, in addition to tracking the paths of fuel and gas from the source to the distribution stations, to verify the safety of operations and arrest violators.”
The directives also included completing examination and reasoning procedures regarding deficiencies and violations, determining legal responsibilities for them, forming supervisory committees responsible for matching the quantities of fuel disbursed to generating stations with the official data of the “Brega” company, and taking legal measures against any proven violations, in accordance with the legislation in force.
The Chairman of the Authority explained that addressing the electricity and fuel crises “is not limited to providing financing, but rather requires addressing the causes of the default, controlling spending and supply, directing resources to locations of actual need, following up on the implementation of projects and measuring their impact on the ground.”
The meeting concluded by “imposing periodic oversight follow-up on the energy and oil files to ensure the implementation of recommendations, reduce waste, and improve the level of services provided to citizens.”
The authority also called on the security services to “tighten control over fuel shipments, starting from warehouses, until they reach stations, to prevent smuggling operations,” stressing that it “will not hesitate to take legal measures against any negligent or violator.”
In a related development, the Minister of the Interior in the interim “National Unity” government, Imad Trabelsi, held an expanded meeting to follow up on fuel distribution mechanisms, dismantle the regulatory obstacles that hinder its arrival at stations, and combat smuggling and manipulation, stressing law enforcement and supporting the security services to impose order and end the state of congestion.
Amid fears of economic repercussions, Egypt is preparing for a “prolonged war” in the region, through a government scenario that expects the conflict to continue until 2030, and experts believe that a prolonged period of regional tensions “may force the Egyptian government to activate the war economy.”
Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly said that the government has developed various scenarios to deal with the repercussions of the war in the region, including the “worst scenario,” which is the continuation of the war for years. He explained during a press conference on Thursday that “one of the scenarios that the government has set until 2030 is the continuation of the war and its repercussions on the Egyptian economy,” stressing the necessity of “preparing for the continuation of the current situation for years to come.”
The Egyptian Prime Minister pointed out that “the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development has developed different scenarios to deal with the repercussions of the war,” pointing out that “despite the significant rise in prices and its burden on the Egyptian state, and the large increase in energy consumption in the summer, no crisis occurred.”
The Egyptian Prime Minister’s speech raised questions about the impact on the economy if the war continues in the region, and the government’s “hedging” to deal with the effects. In the opinion of economic expert Dr. Wael Al-Nahhas, “Egyptian concerns are mainly focused on the main sources of dollar flows; These are the Suez Canal, remittances from Egyptians abroad, and tourism.”
He told Asharq Al-Awsat, “The government’s anticipation of an extended war means adopting a war economy by hedging the provision of basic commodities through the (Egypt’s Future) device, ensuring energy supplies, and searching for alternative sources of basic commodities, most notably alternatives to Russian and Ukrainian wheat.”
Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly previously hinted in October 2024 that the state would deal with what could be described as a “war economy,” indicating that “this approach may be forced by the government if the region is exposed to a regional war,” which raised controversy and questions at the time.
Al-Nahhas stressed that “the continuation of the war in the region will directly affect dollar flows. Whether tourism, the Suez Canal, or remittances from Egyptians abroad.”
According to a statement from the Central Bank in early July, remittances from Egyptians working abroad continued their increasing pace, as they “rose during the period from July 2025 to May 2026, at a rate of 31.2 percent, to reach about 43.1 billion dollars, compared to about 32.8 billion dollars during the same period of the previous year.”
Al-Nahhas pointed out that “the Prime Minister’s statements carry a message to citizens that the government may be forced to reduce support for some services; “Foremost among these are fuel and electricity, due to the repercussions of the economic war.”
Madbouly stated that gas and oil prices rose due to regional unrest, and “over the past few years, the state has borne the bill for those unrest,” explaining that “there are governments that pass on the entire increase to the citizen, or take measures in the form of charging a portion to the citizen and charging another portion to the debt bill, and these are the policies very simply, but we chose the second alternative; This means that the state bears part of this bill in the form of debts, and the citizen bears the other part.”
The Egyptian Prime Minister’s speech carries several political messages in its context, according to the director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Dr. Ayman Abdel Wahab, who told Asharq Al-Awsat, “There is a message to the Egyptian citizen, not to expect the wave of high prices to decline soon; “It is a message of openness and frankness about the effects of regional crises.” In his opinion, “the nature of the stage and regional transformations enhances the scenario of instability in the region, which is reflected in the economic policies of most countries, including Egypt.”
He continued: “Government anticipation of economic impacts can be considered a form of risk management, requiring preparation for all scenarios, especially sectors that are quickly affected by tensions. Such as energy supplies, remittances from Egyptians abroad, tourism, and the Suez Canal, so government hedging must be taken seriously.”
Abdel Wahab stressed that “the Prime Minister’s speech includes alerting public opinion to the extent of the pressures that the country’s economy is exposed to due to regional tensions and the difficulties and challenges facing the government, with the aim of increasing citizens’ awareness of the extent of the risks.”
The Egyptian Prime Minister’s statements come at a time when the government is moving from “in-kind” to “cash” support for ration card holders. Last May, the Ministry of Supply began procedures to purify ration cards and remove those who are not eligible, which raised fears of the economic effects of the war spreading to the support file.
The Libyan parties move between negotiating formulas and paths through committees sponsored by the UN mission to the country, with numbers starting from “5 + 5” to “6 + 6”, “3 + 3”, and “2 + 2”, all the way to “4 + 4”, in attempts to break a political stalemate, an electoral stumble, and a long-standing military and security division.
With the “4 + 4” committee reaching understandings between the “National Army” in the east of the country and the interim “unity” government in the west regarding electoral laws and the “Commission Council,” last week, and the controversy it sparked, the question returns about the feasibility of these paths, and whether they will end the transitional phase, or might they pave the way for a new formula?
These committees, despite their different tasks, participate in trying to bring viewpoints closer between the institutions and parties of eastern and western Libya, and address outstanding issues, from the ceasefire and unifying the military institution, to electoral laws or unifying the budget.
From the perspective of Dr. Arif Ahmed Al-Tir, a Libyan academic, the succession of these paths reflects an aspect of the complexities of the crisis, in light of the political and military division, the spread of weapons and militias, as well as regional and international interventions.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Tir believes that these formulas “have come to represent a framework for finding solutions to the crisis by involving representatives from the east and west of the country,” adding that the nature of the conflict prompted the search for arrangements that accommodate the balance of power, but they still carry within them a question among the Libyans about the “lucky number” that carries a solution for the Libyans.
The beginning with these paths was military, when the “5 + 5” committee was formed in January 2020 according to the outcomes of the “Berlin Conference,” and it undertook the task of stabilizing the ceasefire that followed the war in the capital, Tripoli, in 2019, and working to unify the military institution. It was able to stabilize the truce, but it did not achieve decisive results to unify the army.
With the faltering presidential and parliamentary elections of 2021, the “6 + 6” committee was formed in March 2023, with 6 members from the House of Representatives, and the same from the Supreme Council of State, and in June of the same year it approved amendments to the electoral laws, but it did not lead to holding elections due to continuing political differences.
These paths did not stop, as the approval of the first unified budget in Libya in 13 years, last April, was linked to understandings known as the “2 + 2” formula, which brought together representatives of the House of Representatives and the Supreme Council of State in a path linked to the Central Bank of Libya. But its implementation was not completed as hoped, according to statements by government officials.
Currently, secrecy surrounds the work of the “3 + 3” committee, which was formed between military personnel from eastern and western Libya, following joint maneuvers in Sirte last April under American sponsorship. Its stated goal is to combat terrorism and organized crime, including human trafficking and smuggling.
Observers believe that this path may open the door to steps to bring the military establishment closer between the East and the West, although no announced results have yet emerged regarding the unification of the army, but it remains hostage to a postponed question about the fate of the militias and the foreign presence.
Despite the consensus achieved by the “4 + 4” committee last week regarding the elections, their laws, and the “Commission Council,” as an “important step” on the path to ending the transitional phase, Al-Tir stresses that “the real test is in unifying the military institution and the executive authority,” considering that the success of the formula in this “will be an important achievement,” and paves the way for addressing the economic and living conditions and organizing elections.
Other politicians view the phenomenon of committees with digital formats with greater skepticism, considering that their precedents have no chance of ending the transitional phase, after they dealt with partial files without producing a comprehensive solution.
Abu Bakr Misbah, a member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva, says that the formulas that were proposed, including “6 + 6,” “4 + 4,” and “3 + 3,” have proven to be closer to “temporary solutions to manage the crisis” than to paths aimed at ending it and reaching a permanent settlement.
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Misbah linked the continuation of this cycle to the change of UN envoys to Libya, explaining that changing the former acting UN envoy, Stephanie Williams, contributed, in his opinion, to “disrupting the political track,” as each new envoy comes with different visions and arrangements before the previous tracks are completed.
Misbah notes the composition of the committees, as he believes that most of the formulas focused on the East and the West, while their equations ignored the South, despite its influential position, considering that the South “represents the tip of the scale in this complex political equation,” stressing that reaching a stable settlement “cannot be achieved without the real involvement of the South,” warning that the continued production of committees according to different formulas does not necessarily mean that the solution has become closer, unless there is a political will to implement the understandings.
Fathallah Al-Sariri, a member of the Supreme Council of State and a member of the “6 + 6” committee, does not hold the committees themselves responsible for the stumble, as he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the problem is not in the committees, but rather in the mission’s tendencies to prolong the transitional phase to achieve the goals of some of those intervening in the Libyan affairs regionally and internationally.”
While assessments vary, the outcome of these paths reveals that each committee came to address a specific problem, but has not yet been able to provide decisive and sustainable solutions. The question remains: If “4 + 4” is not the path that will get Libya out of its crisis, how many formulas and committees will the country need in order for the transitional phase to end?
